Tennessee Statehood

the Struggle (i.e. Process) Behind Tennessee Statehood and State-building

Statehood

Kentucky negotiated its statehood with the State of Virginia, a seven year long process. Kentucky’s constitutional convention produced a constitution that chiefly reflected the views of the convention’s dominant Federalists and moderate D-Rs. That didn’t sit well with the majority population, our “masses”, more populist, anti-federalist, and Scots-Irish whose culture was somewhat skeptical of this statehood thing. Those with the a populist tilt simply preferred to be left alone, but needing help fighting with Native Americans, and hopeful of improving access to credit and a sympathetic land claims legal process to hardscrabble/yeoman homesteading they went along but aggressively advocated a constitution to their liking. Nicholas outfoxed them and they go a more Federalist-style constitution than they wanted. Luckily for them the Populists got a second bite of the constitution-writing apple, and by 1799 had themselves a constitution more to their liking. In Kentucky things didn’t really settle down until after 1800.

Tennessee, four years later, went through a radically different process into statehood. Beginning with an abortive cession to the Articles of Constitution federal government, followed by the chaos associated with the State of Franklin. Then almost out of the blue, the western counties of North Carolina were once again ceded, this time to the new Early Republic federal government/Congress. To implement its administration of these acquired lands, Congress set up the Southwestern District, headed by its “Governor” William Blount. The Southwestern District cloned the Ohio Territory’s  Northwestern District. Other than population requirements, the Northwest Ordinance was unspecific as to the statehood process so the path to statehood was largely undefined. There was nothing automatic about statehood, and it was totally silent on whether the locals or Congress could lead the process. Nor was there any criteria (other than population) by which Congress could base its decision.

It.was left to Blount to pretty much conduct the process of statehood, subject to his superior, Secretary of War Henry Knox–and then Secretary Pickering when Knox,retired in 1794. That in itself hints at what some describe as indifference to Tennessee’s fate and concerns, or to a congested agenda that included the Napoleonic Wars, a radical reform of the American militia, and the domestic violence that followed in the aftermath of the Shays Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion in full fury when he retired. Truth be told the so-called Defense Department consisted of two bureaucrats when he started, and faced a miserly Congress that in his tenure was not sympathetic to defense spending. In the previous module I spent some time outlining the clash between Blount, his chief lieutenants, and Southwest District white popular opinion–and Knox’s Indian policy.

Blount’s Partisanship Politicized the Drive for Statehood

The heart of that policy was that Native Americans held sovereign rights over the traditional tribal lands, and as a sovereign entity it was left to the federal government, not the states, to manage relations (which included commerce and trade). Federal Indian policy was considerably more “liberal” than that of southern states and western counties of the northern states. Blount tried at first to maneuver between local and federal approaches, but that effort collapsed entirely by 1793–as did the professional and probably personal relationship between Knox and Blount. As to statehood, Knox simply did not get involved. With the arrival of Secretary Thomas Pickering whose anti-Blount feelings were worn on his sleeve, and his even more inflexible approach to managing Native American relations, it was clear to Blount that continuing on with the Southwestern District was in no way favorable to any aspiration for statehood, nor for his dreams of the prosperity that would follow from statehood. Blount himself had personal ambitions, which likely could have placed him in the Senate as one of the new state’s first Senators. In late 1794, key victories over the Tennessee’s hostile tribes, and Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers provided some opportunity for Blount to pivot from Indian-fighting to a formal drive to statehood.

Congressional approval was necessary for statehood–that was an indisputable fact. Congress itself was consumed with other matters of great import–as was the President.It was clear to Blount, and the Southwest District’s non-voting Congressional delegate, James White (NOT the James White of Knoxville fame) that Congress had no interest in Tennessee statehood, and in fact the increasing political polarization between Federalists and Jefferson D-Rs elevated the likelihood that statehood could generate partisan conflict.

Blount retained control over Southwest District decision-making and its administrative/legal and military affairs. He ran his operation through three sub-district militia commanders, (Sevier, Robertson, and White), his , secretary-brother, and a second secretary, the son of James White. Behind them were a small army of surveyors, local officials–often lawyers whom he had a preference, former State of Franklin officials, and associates drawn from his various business partners. This is the political organization that I alluded to in the previous module. Included in that assemblage were an aggregation of young, on-the-make rising stars who occupied key position in the District. Andrew Jackson, by this time a small force in Middle Tennessee, was one of these folk. The only administrative offices of significance were three territorial judges whom he appointed, and they were mostly Blount operatives. Ironically, it would seem that Blount was creating a democratic state government using a decidedly authoritarian bureaucracy-verging on a personal political machine. With ample opportunity to voice their complaints and concerns, Blount’s opposition became increasingly vocal as time elapsed. Pushed to the side, was almost everybody else. It is no wonder that an active opposition coalesced in the first four years of the District.

Blount’s opposition was partly political; up to this point he had aligned himself with the Federalists. Also his business affairs engendered more enemies–either those upset over his lack of ethics, or those disadvantaged by his numerous land schemes and projects. Most of Blount’s opposition hailed from eastern Tennessee, often from those of a Tidewater persuasion. Increasing as time went on, the clamor for statehood, and the end of the Southwest District, gathered local momentum, and was heard in both North Carolina and Philadelphia. No one viewed the Southwestern District as a permanent entity. Blount’s no-win position between Knox–federal government and local popular opinion regarding Native American relations was also a significant.  So late 1794 Blount felt himself at a crossroads and began his pivot to setting up the incipient state institutions vital to independent statehood.

Part of his motivation for the pivot was the sense that sustained migration had not abated, and a population boom was occurring. The federal census in 1791 found sufficient population to legally set up a territorial legislature, but Blount took no action on the matter at that time. In the aftermath, it was likely that Tennessee had came within striking distance of the 60,000 needed for statehood.  By late 1793, it seemed evident Tennessee was fast approaching the necessary threshold.

He had earlier taken a first step by setting in motion the creation of a territorial one-house legislature. An election held in December 1793, sent thirteen legislators to Knoxville, including Blount’s most bitter opponent, John Tipton, and a number of delegates not particularly loyal to Blount. Convening in February 1794 for an exhausting term of two days,The legislature approved a second legislative branch (a five member “legislative council”) to which it delegated much power over day-to-day affairs. The legislature prepared a list of ten nominations to that body, and left it to Congress to select five. Blount, more influential in Philadelphia than Tipton, was able to secure the appointment of Sevier and two other of his close associates to the Legislative Council. That was the status quo of the statehood drive when Blount began his 1794 pivot–better phrased, Blount made his decision to “cross the Rubicon” around June. He decided at that time the statehood was to happen only if the locals went ahead on their own, and set up the institutions necessary for statehood, and once created and in place would file to the federal government a formal petition for their statehood–in effect a fiat accompli to the President and Congress. It was a turning point for Blount as well.

“Blount, discredited by the Washington administration and disgusted with Federalist antagonism toward the Southwest Territory was willing to seize the opportunity and become a Jeffersonian Republican” [1a]. In August 1794, the two legislative bodies met together in session for the first time, with the legislative council serving as the upper body of the legislature–bicameralism through the back door. In its brief joint session (thirty-seven days), the Territorial Legislature submitted a formal request to Congress for assistance to victims and families hurt by war with the Cherokees, levied a property tax, approved the incorporation of two colleges (including Blount College in Knoxville), and elected James White as the territorial representative to Congress. The decision to adopt a clone of North Carolina’s tax system levied a tax on land and on the (election) poll–the former against Blount’s wishes because it primarily rested on a tax on land acreage of which Blount, almost by definition, had a great deal. It may be that Blount recognized the pitfalls of a democratic government at this point–but also knew it was a road he must go down. He choose to focus on those elements essential to his “economic development” land assembly/subdivision interests, and in so doing conceded much of the other more political issues, such as suffrage and independent legislature in favor of safeguarding his chief priority. In any case from this point on, Blount accelerated the pace of his drive to Tennessee statehood.

Again, as Indian fighting further abated Blount convened the legislature in late June, 1795.  The legislature approved several more initiatives and ordered county sheriffs to conduct a census. When the census was completed, its results were  36,000+ white males, 29, 500+ white females, 10,600+ slaves, almost 1,000 “others”–totaling over 77,000. With the statehood threshold exceeded Blount called for a statewide referendum on statehood,which was quickly held. Eastern Tennessee (Watauga) voted overwhelming for statehood, but Middle Tennessee (Davidson or the Cumberland Region) rejected it–possibly because it feared governance of a tyrannical eastern Tennessee majority levying higher taxes. Whatever the motivation, that regional conflict/distinctiveness was apparent in the statehood referendum offers additional support that Tennessee sub-regionalization existed previous to statehood. Still, the vote for statehood was overwhelming and Blount had his popular mandate.

In November 28, 1795 Blount issued a proclamation to convene a constitutional convention. County elections sent representatives to the convention and it convened in early January 1796. Blount was elected Chair of the Constitutional Convention.

The Tennessee Constitution it produced will be discussed below. The Constitution was not sent to the voters for approval.

In the course of the constitutional convention, an evident “deal” was made by Blount with Sevier. Probably acknowledging Sevier’s popularity across the Watauga counties far exceeded his–and no doubt confident that he was both well-suited to stay in Philadelphia and to manage his machine from afar, Blount endorsed Sevier for governor, and in return expected the state’s newly elected Senate to send his as one of the state’s senators to Philadelphia. Blount then proceeded to hold the election for the legislature and governor, an election that sent Sevier to the Governor’s office. With the budding Tennessee government duly elected and in place and functioning in Knoxville, Blount now turned to securing Congressional approval. He hand-delivered the state constitution and formal petition for statehood to Washington and Congress.

Congressional Approval

The pitfalls associated with Congressional approval were enormous. Blount’s reluctance to bring matters to them earlier were probably based on a legitimate fear that Tennessee statehood would have been negatively affected by the huge, and growing, partisan polarization of Congress. In 1794 Fourth Congress put the Jefferson D-R’s in control of the House, and Federalists, the Senate. It might also be mentioned that John Adams was Speaker (the Presiding Official) of the U.S. Senate. By middle 1796 the nation was on the threshold of a presidential election, with Washington heading off to retirement, and the Federalist replacement for him, the ever-popular (sarcasm) John Adams conducting a bitter and path-breaking contested election against Thomas Jefferson. The election promised to be very close and the future control Congress was up for grabs. Washington was a lame duck, and upon receipt of the formal application/constitution from Blount, he merely forwarded it (filed it) with Congress–making no recommendation.

There was no doubt among Federalists that Tennessee was a D-R stronghold, and that if admitted to Union before the election, it would cast its electoral votes for Jefferson and send D-Rs to Congress and the Senate. In such a turbulent political sea, Blount was at his best once again. The Federalist initial inclination was to let the request linger until after the November election–and Federalists in the Senate perceived a partisan attempt to impact that election. Citing several perceived deficiencies in the census and in the state constitution, they alleged in particular that population figures were inaccurate and that only one representative, not two, should be elected to the House. A Congressional investigative committee, led by New York’s Senator Rufus King (a Federalist) formally concluded in early May that Tennessee had not satisfied the requirements for statehood.

The Jeffersonian-controlled House, however, formally voted to support Tennessee statehood. When met with Senate refusal to go forward, the House began negotiations with the Senate. The compromise was that Tennessee would be admitted to the Union, but only one representative would be elected to the House, until a future 1800 census provided a definitive figure on population. The Senate rejected the compromise. With the legislative session ending on June 1st, many Senators then left Philadelphia to return home, thinking the Tennessee matter was now dead until after the election. On May 31st, however, a final conference on the matter was held in response to a House request. At that conference the Senate agreed to reschedule a second vote that day–which it did and produced a majority for Tennessee statehood–and the bill was then sent to the House, and passed immediately. The bill was taken to President Washington directly that night, and he signed it the next day, the last of the legislative session.

BTW The one representative that Tennessee sent to the House in the 1796 election was Andrew Jackson. Tennessee voters did indeed vote for Jefferson as President, but Adams won with only a five vote majority in the electoral college. Adams won the popular vote by a whopping 4500. Turnout was 20%. Thomas Jefferson became his Vice-President.

But Tennessee had participated in its first federal election as a state.

The 1796 Tennessee Constitution

Blount was certainly well aware that any proposed constitution attached to its statehood application would be closely examined–and viewed from hostile and radically divergent partisan prisms. Accordingly, this was not the time for a radical and ideological state constitution which Federalists or radical D-R’s could easily find room to delay, if not reject. By insisting on  incorporating the structure and much of the conceptual dynamics of the Federal constitution in the Tennessee constitution. Above all to better ensure Congressional approval he wanted to produce a constitution that was universally supported by the convention delegates–and approved by the electorate in referendum.

Blount himself was elected the convention’s speaker. Accordingly its deliberations were focused and purposeful. In the sixteen days it took to write the state constitution, the drafting committee and the delegates did their job well. When completed the convention voted unanimously for its approval–and it was hand-carried by Blount to Congress. That the convention included a number of his most hostile enemies, and that there were fundamental differences among various of its segments, is probably testimony to Blount but also to the convention’s desire to successfully obtain statehood. The process for arriving at a consensual state constitution was of considerable importance in determining its content. The convention lasted only thirty-seven days–and–once completed the final document was approved by the Convention, which declared it as the official state constitution.

No popular referendum was held. Almost by definition, the initial Tennessee state constitution was a framework negotiated by and formally approved by a segment of the state’s elite. The process was hurried–and as we shall see, Blount was willing to compromise with opponents to facilitate an overwhelming vote in its favor. He wanted to create a solid local support as statehood was deliberated in Philadelphia. In this respect, Blount played no role similar to that George Nicholas played in Kentucky–even though he possessed considerably more power over the convention’s proceedings.

Of note, this 1796 constitution remained in effect until 1835–when it was rewritten to adopt the anti-elite, anti-aristocratic approach advocated by Andrew Jackson, leading his revolt of the “common man” in the new democracy of the American West. Blount, it might be remembered, was formerly Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and its delegate to the Articles of Confederation.

Who Wrote this Constitution

To accomplish this difficult task, Blount predictably had done what he could to stack the convention with as many delegates as possible closely associated with his political and/or land speculation views. Blount’s enemy Tipton was there, James White, James Robertson, and an “on-the-move” Andrew Jackson (who was included in the elite drafting committee). The Cumberland region’, which had opposed statehood in the referendum, had to be brought in line and its perspective had to be reconciled with the Watauga Tidewater-North Carolina delegation which lacked its heavy hitter, John Sevier. Sevier, earmarked for being the state’s first governor, however, played a serious role supporting Blount in the backrooms of the constitutional convention.

Of the thirty-eight delegates, 42% hailed originally from Virginia, 21% Pennsylvania, 18% North Carolina, and 11% South Carolina [1]. In particular, Scots-Irish had a meaningful say in its deliberations.

The identity of the factions at the convention can hardly be determined with precision. The [Southwest] territorial officials and their lesser satellites were well represented at the convention, and the group that they formed contained the most active delegates and those whose ideas were readily accepted by the convention. They seemed to be more identified with Tidewater society than the rest of the convention. But, control which they exercised was very tolerant for they often made considerable concessions in order to satisfy the opposition. [2] 

the 1796 Tennessee Constitution itself

The radical anti-Federalist North Carolina and populist Pennsylvania constitutions were the most used as language and role models for the Tennessee Constitution. The constitutional framework closely mirrored principles incorporated in the U.S. Constitution.  What emerged was a sort of hodge-podge set of compromises between “populists” and Blount’s coalition of D-Rs with land speculation and slavery on their mind. Fearful of giving populists what they wanted, Blount was able to insert several reasonably strong checks on populist majoritarianism. The break with Virginia’s Revolutionary War constitution as expressed in the North Carolina constitution was not as pronounced, but mirrored Kentucky’s muted divergence. In some respects there was something in the first Tennessee constitution for everybody–and in the final analysis that is what Blount most wanted. One is less sure there is a consistent ideological-philosophical coherence in the document however

While we have discussed the Pennsylvania constitution in an earlier chapter, the North Carolina constitution requires some background as it was the more important of the two.

North Carolina Constitution–The (November) 1776 North Carolina state constitution was a fairly populist, certainly anti-Federalist Revolutionary War era constitution. Approved in an intense and polarized revolutionary war atmosphere, the North Carolina constitution thought in terms that linked the executive branch with George III, and was sympathetic with the populist individualist perspective articulated by Sam Adams and the Sons of Liberty. A 1776 version of the Bill of (individual) Rights dominated its constitution–long before the federal Bill of Rights was devised. North Carolina’s constitution relied on Jefferson’s Virginia Bill of Rights, devised just months earlier. At the heart of Jefferson’s Virginia model was a state constitution based on popular sovereignty, separation of powers, and three branches of government (more moderate than Pennsylvania’s legislative supremacy of branches). The principal thrust of North Carolina’s Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Tennessee Constitution and was regarded by many delegates as more fundamental and critical than the structural elements stressed today. North Carolina also adopted Virginia’s county-based electoral franchise, which embraced property requirements for both office holders and general voter. North Carolina fiscal practice had broken with Virginia’s system of taxation. North Carolina taxed all land equally–which is precisely what large land owners and property speculators wanted. The Senate elected the Governor annually–and the North Carolina governor was exceedingly weak and its little power further diffused.

Tennessee Constitution–Embracing the federal three-branch structure, incorporating a very strong Bill of Rights that was detailed and specific its is application of individual rights to state law. The Tennessee constitution also included North Carolina’s definitions of property and contract law that served as the foundation for land speculation and homesteading. Taxation valued all land equally and that was incorporated into the constitution. Imprisonment of debtors without evidence of fraud was forbidden. Local elections for local militia officers was specified. Residency did not require ownership of land. “All elections shall be free and equal”, i.e. no poll tax.  Representation was based on “taxable inhabitants” and not county population. Property restricts on eligibility to be an officeholder was incorporated. The electoral franchise was certainly unrestricted, but those elected to office had to be property holders–renters could not hold office. In a state whose population was increasing each year both property and residence tenure ensured some degree of control by both the established gentry and the existing resident..

Barnhart suggests the opposition’s demands reflect incorporation of even more strident populist sections of the Pennsylvania constitution [3]. He asserts their bitterest battle was fought on requiring oaths of delegates “to God” and forbidding atheists to serve as office holders–and other religious matters. These offended the more secular Jeffersonian D-Rs, and Abernathy comments that Andrew Jackson was the individual most in opposition to requiring an oath to God and other religious-based requirements [4]. In each instance a compromise was reached.

Probably the most intense debate that occurred– on whether the Legislature should be bicameral–was a Blount victory to make it bicameral. The opposition insisted it should be unicameral–after three seesaw votes Blount finally got his way. That victory made it that much more difficult for a populist lower legislature to challenge slavery, land speculation, and impose land redistribution. Blount might now be a D-R, but he was not then, or ever, a populist (he fought against the Regulators in the 1770 Regulator War). Defeated the populist opposition shifted to reducing Senate powers, but Blount was again able to secure sufficient capacity that the Senate retained its independence from the House, and would be able to vote independently when it elected federal Senators. Perhaps this is a good place to insert, that after its approval, Blount was elected by the new Senate to be one of the state’s federal Senators–the deal with Sevier went off without a hitch.

Legislative terms of office were two years. The legislative powers and scope of its involvement in policy-making were robust indeed. The vital functions and responsibilities of government, and a goodly portion of the state constitution were  dedicated to General Assembly processes. Nearly all appointments to state offices were legislative–including all judicial appointments. A Secretary of State was appointed by the General Assembly and entrusted with keeping of minutes, vouchers and actions of the governor which at request were available to the legislature. The state Treasurer was appointed by the General Assembly. With no lieutenant governor specified, the speaker of the House of Representatives was next in line. Illustrating how important limited government and low taxes were the constitution specified annual salaries for a goodly number of offices and positions. Impeachment was the sole prerogative of the House of Representatives. The General Assembly appointed members of the Judiciary and local court justices of the peace, the chief local court official, was appointed for life subject for “good behavior”.

One third of Article 1 establishing the power of the General Assembly was almost a direct copy of the Pennsylvania constitution, incorporating only one-sixth of the North Carolina;  about 50% of Article II on the governor originated from the Pennsylvania constitution. “The struggles of the convention revealed the differences between two groups of leaders, one more closely identified with Tidewater ideals, and the other with the more radical democracy of the Old West. The former maintained their political control by compromising with the spirit of the frontier. … Copied from many state constitutions, the parts taken from Pennsylvania constitutional law were more numerous than any other constitution [5].

The governor was elected for two years, directly by “the people”, although the process by which his election was confirmed rested in the hands of the General Assembly. The governor could serve six years (three terms) out of eight. He was commander-in-chief of the militia was shared with independently-elected local leadership. The governor could require “information” from his executive departments, but enjoyed no veto.  Article 6 empowered county courts to appoint sheriff, coroner, trustee, and constables, but the sheriff and coroner were “commissioned” by the governor.

Tennessee’s constitution produced a powerful, but not supreme House, a weakened but still independent Senate, and an independent elected governor with limited powers and responsibilities.

Interestingly, there was no article specific to slavery, but the franchise was limited to “freemen”, making an implicit acknowledgement that certain men were not free–but left them undefined. This is how slavery was admitted to Tennessee–a back door which strong anti-slavery delegates from Watauga could vote. Why? Implicitly, Freed Blacks were therefore theoretically allowed to vote if residency requirements were met. Moreover, in the sections which defined the criminal justice rights and process, Article XI, left open the implication that all “accused” of crimes had a right to fair trial by an impartial jury–making no distinction of freed or slave status.

The North Carolina Bill of Rights, consisting to twenty-five articles, enumerated the right of the people against any government. It combined statements of rights which the colonials had asserted under English laws but had been denied by the King and Parliament; it reaffirmed ideas which had been enunciated in the Magna Charta of 1215 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689–some verbatim–from the Maryland and Virginia Bills of Rights, and above all it reflected the [negative] experiences of North Carolina as a colony. … The salient feature of the [1776] Constitution was the shift to legislative predominance and away from executive supremacy of colonial days. The governor and the whole executive department were definitely under legislative control–subject to election removal, short term of office, and restricted powers. [6]

As far as sub-state jurisdictions went, the constitution, as had Kentucky, simply incorporated Virginia’s early Watauga tradition of counties as the basic unit of sub-state governance. Counties could be created only after a local request with 200 signatures be filed in the General Assembly–thus the legislative approval of counties required action from the proposed county itself. The process and some parameters for legislative action in creating counties was also specified. as was not to use public funds, nor public credit/loans, for “state chartered corporations” unless approved by local referendum. Although robust in terms of its capacity, county level government was largely chosen by the legislature or by justices of the peace, chosen by the legislature whose tenure for for life. The government closest to the people, therefore was afforded reasonable capacity and local democracy was easily dominated by the county’s propertied elite–who alone could hold local office and who held considerable sway over their legislative representation. Everyone could vote, a populist insurgency was never out of the question, but a propertied local elite could run the shop until the day of a populist reckoning was at had. In the meantime a local aristocracy could, and did, rule the local roost. The 1835 second constitution was correct this populist deficiency.

Except for an inspection fee, manufacturing was not taxed. “Perpetuities and monopolies [being] contrary to the genius of a free state, and shall not be allowed”–i.e. state-chartered corporations and banks. A section establishing that no retrospective law, or impairing of the obligation of contracts can be made. Several sections outlined rights and geographic areas appropriate for surveying and land claims and a Land Office was established to handle that function So central, if not essential to Tennessee future economic development and individual prosperity, was access and use of the Mississippi River, foreshadowing things to come, that Section 29, of Article XI–the Bill of Rights, specified “equal participation of the navigation of the Mississippi River is one of the inherent rights of the citizens of this state. It cannot, therefore, be conceded to any prince, potentate, power, person, or persons whatever“. That section persists to this day.

If Kentucky’s constitution created the strongest governor found in the United States at the time, Tennessee’s government was among its weakest. Almost total control of  state government was lodged in the legislative branch–and most of that was in the lower house. The opening lines of Article 1 is “all power is inherent in the people and all free governments are founded on their authority” underscores the essential populist nature of the Tennessee constitution. According the electoral franchise was open to all males over twenty-one (with residency)–there was no property requirement. Representation was based on “taxable” residency–which since slaves were taxable included slaves. It rejected North Carolina’s representation which was based on county population. This included freeman Blacks. Debt imprisonment was forbidden, and, for the time, a very “liberal” interpretation of criminal and judicial rights were established.  Section 20 declared no abridgments on free contracts could be made by the legislature–thereby securing land claims contracts of both property speculators and homesteaders.

Jefferson later called the Tennessee constitution “the most republican yet framed in America“[7].

Assessment of Initial Constitutions in a Frontier Policy System

The lesson learned in the first decade(s) after statehood is that constitutions, whatever their power/process distribution and institutional/level of government biases, enter into the picture only after the rule of law is firmly established. These early years, on the frontier especially, predate the establishment and the active involvement of the judiciary, the third branch of government. The third branch was normally left in the none too sensitive hands of the legislature. Kentucky for various reasons dealt with the judiciary sooner, and from its deliberations would emerge a new elite with considerable interest and experiences with matters economic development–again this is post-1800.  Tennessee, perhaps more in the vortex, was not on the judicial cutting edge.

Since migration and formation of the two state’s economic base was also just beginning, the underlying partisan, cultural and economic foundations of the state’s original constitutions were constantly in motion. Importantly the elites were infused with new folk, sometimes different types of folk, and with Indian affairs fading into the background new agendas items replaced it. The character of elite composition changed. Migration brought huge numbers of new residents into the state, carrying with them their hopes and fears, but also past experiences in governance and economy. Essentially, the underlying popular-elite consensus that supports a constitution in day-to-day affairs had not yet evolved, and with the elite-mass differences in partisan affiliation, policy agenda and policy goals in flux–intense escalating conflict and polarization would continue unabated for decades into the future.

Accordingly, there was a fundamental tension between society’s economic and political elements/groups that made the constitution itself partisan, a battleground where the different contenders sought to institutionalize their policy victories. These tensions remind me of those playing out in my contemporary politics as I write these words. Perhaps these elite-mass, society/economic in change tensions are timeless and unbridgeable. It does seem that over time a sort of unreasonable yin-yang eruption of these tensions that cycle through historical periods. In any case the consensual and cultural disruption that occurs in elite-mass clashes, so evident in the post-1790’s, is once again evident.

All this is fine and dandy, but what really impacted the initial policy agendas of Kentucky and Tennessee was foreign affairs–the reality of English and Spanish,  even French, meddling in the western territories, and Florida. Victory in the American War of Independence was at best incomplete–and illusionary. To the outside world, America had little defense other than it was far away, and as Europe was by the early 1790’s engaged in true world war, we were involuntarily caught up it in. Foreign politics enveloped not only the vulnerable western frontier, but it pervaded politics and debate in the nation’s capital, and entered into the rapidly escalating polarization between D-Rs and Federalists. Foreign policy debate touched into definitions of who we considered ourselves and the young Republic to be. Was it to be the staid, imperialistic, George III autocracy and merit/entrepreneurial semi-democratic elite with its cold, yet opportunity-laden economic future, or the exciting revolutionary transformation of lower classes over aristocracy in a bold effort to create brave new world, that would potentially change to character of the federal constitution and domestic politics.

In the 1790’s, stretching into the first decade of the nineteenth century, it was these matters which saturated state policy agendas. Their constitutions were a work-in-progress, and whatever powers, institutionalization, and process parameters they contained, was irrelevant. For the most part, the elites, masses and policy leaderships did not attempt to try out bold new schemes; they had limited domestic agendas to begin with, had constructed a government system prone to fragmentation and personalistic, bottom-driven politics and policy, they were seldom inclined to maximize the potential of their constitutions.

Footnotes

[1a] John R. Finger, Tennessee Frontiers: Three Regions in Transition (Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 148

[1] R. E. Corlew, Tennessee: a Short History (University of Tennessee Press, 1989)

[2] John D. Barnhart, the Tennessee Constitution of 1796: a Product of the Old West, the Journal of Southern History, Vol. 9 No.4  (Nov, 1943), p. 540-543

[3] John D. Barnhart, the Tennessee Constitution of 1796: p. 546

[4] Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation, p. 137

[5]  John D. Barnhart, the Tennessee Constitution of 1796: a Product of the Old West, the Journal of Southern History, Vol. 9 No.4  (Nov, 1943) (pp. 532-48)  p. 548

[6] Hugh Talmage Lefler & Albert Ray Newsome, North Carolina: the History of a Southern State (University of North Carolina Press, 1954), pp. 210-11

[7] Langsdon, Tennessee: a Political History (Hillsboro Press, 2000),  p. 23