We start our discussion of this critical period by backtracking a bit to the post-1609 Gates Expedition—an expedition that massively affected the course of subsequent events. This module’s chronology begins with actions taken after the signing of the Second Charter in 1606.
As the reader will remember a huge increase in shareholder investment occurred—and was still ongoing as we describe the Gates Expedition which was financed by new shareholder subscription and bond-holder debt.. The mentality of the Company elite, and by investors was new settlers and a more balanced indentured group needed to be sent over as quickly as possible. Obviously, lots more supplies, tools, and even livestock were sent over with Gates as well. That at best it would arrive in the late fall, after harvest, seems not to have affected decision-making.
Accordingly, Virginia Company’s initial formal request for investors to purchase shares-debt was made in mid-March 1609. It appears the first, and most successful installment, was from that point to early June. The king issued the charter document on May 23, 1609, and he gave his final ok sometime in June. The reader might note these actions, while responding to a serious crisis, were optimistic, at least in that investors were very willing to put their money where their hopes were. Aware this was a crisis, it is evident the English elite and investors had not yet come to the conclusion that crisis was indeed existential. Indeed, I sense they seemed to assume the Gates expedition would bring satisfactory support and resources to stabilize Jamestown. Ihttps://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va02.asp#:~:text=The%20Avalon%20Project%20%3A%20The%20Second,of%20Virginia%3B%20May%2023%2C%201609&text=JAMES%2C%20by%20the%20Grace%20of,these%20Presents%20shall%20come%2C%20Greeting.
The Gates Expedition to Virginia was assembled as the investment drive was in progress. At its perceived earliest opportunity, Sir Thomas Gates, a military hero and the new governor, left for Virginia on July 24, 1609 with 500 hundred colonists–a large number–eight ships with considerable supplies, and a new enlarged leadership cadre for the colony. Even by today’s standards this was a quick sendoff, with new shareholder purchase money coming in the front door and shortly out the recruitment and supply back door. One important detail need be mentioned: previous debt was still due on older bonds, actually a lot of the pre-1609 bond issuances, and that debt was not meaningfully extinguished by the 1609 campaign. The new fund raising left outstanding a number of restive older bondholders.
With Gates having sailed off into the sunset, it seems from the records available that a second shareholder installment phase followed in November. At that time, however, news Gates and Admiral Somers’ ship, captained by the redoubtable Newport, had been lost at sea. The news dashed the optimism of investors and supporters, and thrust unwanted reality the Virginia crisis was intensifying, raising fears of an existential collapse of the colony. It was clear then that earlier investment-bond debt had NOT been fully eliminated, and had not covered the full costs of the departed Gates expedition. That meant the new investment had not stopped the Company from digging its debt hole, and it had no hope of even breaking even on future costs of simply supplying the existing small colony, nevermind growing it. The need to send a rescue expedition with new leadership begat additional fiscal concerns that affected any new debt negotiated.
So a second phase of investment, which had been anticipated, targeted shareholders who did not completely pay the entire shareholder purchase. That second phase was less markedly less successful. With news of Gates death reaching England, carrying news of a colony even in worse crisis, John Smith, never at a loss for disparaging and dramatic news, proclaimed a decidedly negative narrative concerning the colony, its leadership, and its future prospects.
Osgood summaries this period: “When the vessels reached England, the full extent of the misfortune [of the Gates Expedition] became known. It was also seen that the colony was left in a precarious position. Some who had returned with the vessels [Captain John Smith for instance] began also to spread evil reports concerning the colony and the mismanagement of its affairs. This caused discouragement among the adventurers [investors], and many now ceased any longer to support the enterprise. But the group among the [active investors and management], whose hearts were wholly in the work, devoted themselves all the more to its prosecution.
[A pamphlet issued by the Company] The True and Sincere Declaration was issued to show what the situation was, how it had come about, and that there was no grounds for discouragement. In a broadside the appeal was renewed for assistance, and for an additional supply of artisans and farmers as colonists. Sir Thomas West, Lord Delaware, a slow and formal man, selected because of his rank was appointed governor [, and preparations were at once made to send him out at the head of a [second] relief expedition [99] Herbert Osgood, the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, Vol. 1, p.65
Nevertheless, a new infusion of money flowed into the Company, but insufficient as it was to the needs at hand, it is suggested the needed funds were raised by virtue of Smythe signing debt issuances that used the uncollected funds of the second phase as collateral. This is probably as close as one can come to today’s unsubordinated, near-equity debt—i.e. almost equity. It is believed Smythe himself bought a considerable amount, a sort of personal guarantee. With these new funds, in line with the previous mentality new settlers were needed, a new supply expedition was assembled, under the command of Governor De La Warr, along with 150 new immigrants, an increasing, but still small number of artisans, farmers and professionals.
The Virginia Company sent a small three ship rescue fleet with the colony’s “New” Governor, Thomas West, Baron De La Warr off to Jamestown. They did so in hopes of mitigating what had to have been a leadership vacuum caused by Gates death, a vacuum that could easily prove fatal to the barely existing colony. De La Warr was empowered with additional authority, status, and experience, and was expected to command obedience and enforce the Company’s vision on the residents. The need for such a severe imposition of military discipline was in considerable measure set by John Smith’s complaints and description of events in Jamestown. At minimum it confirmed the previous local governance system had to be replaced, and that the failure of the colony to that point was clearly attributed in large measure to that leadership and its inability to control and manage the colony.
It was this atmosphere that seemingly required De La Warr to impose what amounted to a military discipline and order to the survivors, and a military life and schedule to the surviving settlers. The reader should note I consider this change in the governance of the colony to be significant, as do other historians such as Jon Kukla. A change in policy regime from the previous mode of governance by a weak and fragmented council to a military regime was significant, and intended to be so by the corporate governance and its investors. Using the metaphor of my title, Virginia’s political development twig was about to be bent.
At this point we return to the earlier Gates fleet which ran into serious trouble on the shoals of an undiscovered-uninhabited island—today’s Bermuda, yesterdays Somers Island in late 1609. Named after the fleet admiral who would later lose his life establishing a colony on that island, the Somers Island proved to be in many way superior to the survivors who made it to its beaches upon shipwreck. Most of the fleet made it through the storms and shoals, and kept on its course to Jamestown. They arrived between August and October 1609, after about three months at sea. The duration of the voyage, longer than most, meant supplies intended for the colony were consumed on ship. They returned to England, bringing on board an injured John Smith, who as mentioned above, arrived in England with temper.
The ship (the Sea Venture) on which were Thomas Gates, George Somers, captained by Christopher Newport, carried most of the heavyweights and high status folk (including John Rolfe, George Yeardley) ran up on the rocks and was lost to the main body—who presumed their sinking and the loss of life. About one hundred and fifty survived and reached the beach. Several died (John Rolfe’s wife and son) but most survived. Onshore in Bermuda they set up camp, finding the island, unsettled, with lots to eat, wild boar to kill, and easy fishing. As the reader knows, except for the occasional hurricane, the weather was ideal, and the soil quite fertile.
Whale ambergris, an expensive luxury perfume and medicinal, was scattered along the beaches, ready to be picked up. This commodity would be a substitute for tobacco in the Somers, and that solved from the start the use of exports to finance the colony. Governor Gates was anxious to get to Jamestown (Somers less so), and reconstructed two new ships to get to Virginia. From wreck to their arrival in Virginia they took about ten months. Gates got to Jamestown before the De La Warr fleet arrived, so he knew little or nothing about De La Warr. They arrived on May 21st, 1610. The timing of event and reaction reflected a three to four month time lag due to communication and logistics, and that meant the situation/atmosphere in either London or Jamestown changed during the time lag.
What they found was shocking. Only sixty survivors of the three-hundred and fifty that were alive in November, 1609, were still alive (including most of the Gates ships that had arrived earlier). The winter interlude is known as the “starving times”. The narrative of that winter informs a considerable part of the American early Jamestown narrative—which I regard as sad as the problems of the three years previous were sort of smushed into a single tale that obscures the larger narrative presented here and by other historians. In this history, acknowledging the sad and horrible experience of that winter, I concentrate on my more immediate task of explaining how the administration of the London-half of the Virginia Company complicated, indeed almost predetermined, the eventual collapse that led to the “starving times”—and the Virginia Company itself. What was left of Jamestown and the condition of the surviving colonists was more than Gates could master.
With the infusion of Gates’ new settlers, the settlers under Gates’ leadership tried to rebuild the dilapidated infrastructure, including palisades. By this time sporadic and unsettling conflict with the Powhatan and other neighboring tribes outside of his Confederation made Jamestown extremely tenuous with so few and weakened settlers without adequate provisions. It seemed to doom the planting of a spring harvest, and any hope for an export to cover the costs of the colony. The settlers and survivors quickly consumed what supplies they had brought—the starving time left none to be had in Jamestown—and spring harvest was months away, if it could be planted at all. Worse, the Sea Venture settlers were undergoing seasonal sickness and were dying as well. The determination was made to leave Jamestown in search of greener, and more healthier locations.
What follows demands a movie be made. With the survivors, Gates evacuated Jamestown intending to sail to some better spot further north to set up a new settlement. Sailing down the James on two sloops, their small boats ran into elements of De La Warr’s small fleet—actually a scout ship in advance of the main fleet. De La Warr, when he arrived on June 10th, 1610, ordered everyone back to Jamestown.
Gates could do little to relieve the situation, for having expected to find the colony flourishing and contented, he had brought no more supplies [in his small boats] than were enough for the voyage. With food remaining for only sixteen days, with all their hogs killed by Indians, with not a hen or a chick in the fort, and with all the horses and mares killed for meat, with no seines or a sufficient number of boats for fishing, and with no assurance of aid from the hostile Indians they decided to abandon the settlement, and make for Newfoundland, where they hoped to meet with fishing vessels that would either give them employment or take them back to England [99] Charles M. Andrews, the Colonial Period of American History, Vol. 1 p. 111
Once there De La Warr concentrated on restoring the city, its infrastructure and fields, securing the latter with raids on the Powhatan and other tribes. We shall pick on this topic below.
[999] Lord Delaware, whatever his failings as the first governor of Virginia, personally returned the colonists to Jamestown, rebuilt Jamestown’s infrastructure, imposed the new military policy system, commenced raids against the natives, and began the process of stabilizing, if not saving, the Virginia colony. Bad health may have brought out the worse in him and sent him back to England. But Delaware he did retain the office of governor, and exercised its powers while in London. His would be the very first plantation (1613), and it was he who introduced “Pocahontas” to the King ad the larger court society. He died in route back to Virginia in 1617, a voyage necessitated by the need to resolve instability caused by Governor Argall. The label “Delaware”, often attributed as an Indian word, was first used as a derivation of Lord Delaware’s formal title: Lord de la Warr. The state of Delaware owes its name to him. [999]
Immediate (1609-1611) Aftermath of Gates and De La Warr Expeditions
Debate in London: How are we going to pay for this?
Events in Jamestown forced reactions in London. More than any other factor the London reaction was driven by the fiscal fragility and consistent inability to pay the costs of settlement, supplies and immigrants especially—and that drove changes and micro-management in its settlement strategy; the colonists were tasked with supplying exports to compensate for those costs incurred. Whether the colonists would have had an appetite for producing staples to consume is probably an exercise in hope, as the gentlemen in 1606 at al were by no means pastoral in their aspirations. They developed a dependency on the tribes they encountered, and that worked to a point until relations declined noticeably in 1608-9. John Smith, however, was able to introduce order and authority and more effort than ever went into food production. Still even under Smith London micro management to send over exports to be sold so bills could be paid was quite prominent.
It’s All About Money: As to London had any illusions that Virginia was on the upward trail; it was the reverse of course. The more obvious problem was figuring out how to confront the pending implosion. The Company had one more chance to get it right—or likely it would have to close down the Virginia colony. If that happened no one would look good; investors would loose their principal and England would be shamed as unable to compete with its mercantilist rivals. But until the loss of Gates was known in late 1609, hopes sprang eternal and the quest for a third charter placed on the mind’s backburner.
But the Second Charter, whether a good start or fumbled pivot, put obstacles and cul du sacs in the decision-making needed for a broad, comprehensive pivot away from an obviously failed business plan and its initial vison of permanent settlement Incomplete, it needed fleshing out, and updated to reflect the Somers Island latent opportunity. The second charter was generally conceded as not likely to be the last change–it was always a compromise, as much as could be obtained from James at that point in time—so advocates and Company managers knowing the problems (less so the solutions) gravitated, probably inevitably to having to solve/confront the threat of fiscal deficiency, if not bankruptcy, which was so evident that it no doubt clouded, if not overwhelmed, new and or costly solutions to the several problems. It it all revolved around money and the resources it could buy.
To bring in more investment, the Company’s future plans came face to face with an investor’s willingness to invest new money, under extended, more realistic time lines, that limited payouts and return on investments. Over the previous two or so years, however, the Company realized inadequate volumes of share subscriptions intensified reliance on new bond issuances to pay for each expedition were a dead end. The threat of future cash dividends that still remained on the books was a sword of Damocles that only discouraged new investment. More realistic payouts rewarding investors not with cash, but other forms of payment were the only realistic way the Company could satisfy their future debt and dividend obligations.
As we discussed above, the 1609 investment and subscription campaign resulted and on appearances it was an enormous success. The cost of the Gates expedition, however, were not completely covered and were supplemented by more debt, issued and secured by Smythe’s own financing skill and his financial contacts, and by his own purchase of some of the notes.
Sir Thomas Smythe was now quite definitely the chief … [he] had he courage to launch the new campaign for funds to which the adventurers committed themselves in the fall of 1610. The estimated need ran to L30,000. All former subscribers were urged to subscribe another stock purchase at L37, 10s, on agreement that the subscription would be paid at the rate of L12, 10s per year over the next three years. Others were invited to subscribe on the same terms. The Lord Mayor [of London] appealed once more to London companies, and plans were made for inviting the other towns of England to contribute … [99] Wesley Frank Craven, the Virginia Company of London, 1606-1624, p. 16
They mustered an additional L18,000 in stock subscriptions through a variety of measures– holding in place the gentry recruited in 1609. The money went out as quickly as it came in. In March 1611 Sir Thomas Dale left London with 300 settlers, soldiers, craftsmen—with tweaks, it was the usual suspects sent over since 1606. In May, Gates sailed with another three ships, with 300 more settlers and a literal horde of livestock, fowl, and seed grain. The latter was hoped to encourage self-sufficiency and to mitigate the reliance on the Powhatan for food to survive. Incredibly, while not reaching its goal, the campaign attracted L18,000 by the spring of 1611. Scott was more critical: Early in 1611 it was recognized that, unless a large amount of capital could be procured, the situation was desperate. It was estimated that L30,000 was required to be paid in two years. Of this sum [only] l8,000 had been promised [but not yet paid]”. [99] Scott, pp. 251-2. With the debt as bad, or even worse than it ever was, with sufficient new funding unlikely from shareholder subscription, it is at this point, revenues from other sources than investors had to be devised.
To avert the crisis seemingly induced by Gates’s loss at sea in 1609, Scott reports that Smythe “was forced to borrow largely on the the security of unpaid calls [share subscriptions], and from the funds raised in this way the expedition of 1610 under Lord De La Warr was supplied”. [99] Scott, p. 251.
At this point the reader ought remember our initial characterization that from the start in 1606, the Company, particularly its fiscal and business plan were not realistic and congruent with the Company’s mission, but that its investor base was too narrow, and investor goals were not compatible with the likely returns of their investment. In some measure, this problem was traceable to the initial use of the older merchant investment “closed”, unregulated, joint stock corporation and traditional merchant adventurer financing.
This uneasy calm until November, 1609 was shattered, of course, with the news of Gates shipwreck. Discontent only skyrocketed when the surviving ships returned to England, bearing the wounded, and very frustrated John Smith. Smith’s criticisms, some fair, some less so, did expose the diversion of the settlers from staples production to their search for exports, gold being the most troublesome. The politics/leadership of the local council never looked pleasing, either from close up or far away, and that spurred the London advocates to question the form of local governance that was required of the project.
When these vessels returned to England [the surviving ships from the Gates expedition], the full extent of the misfortune which had visited the first effort [Gates] of the new patentees [1609 new shareholders] became known. It was also seen that the colony was left in a precarious position. Some who had returned with the vessels [John Smith, who, while wounded, had been sent to England ‘under charges’ from the council at Jamestown] began also to spread evil reports concerning the colony and the management of its affairs. This caused discouragement among the adventurers and many now ceased any longer to support the enterprise. But the group among the patentees, whose hearts were wholly in the work, devoted themselves all the more to its prosecution [99] Herbert L. Osgood, the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, Vol 1 (Forgotten Books.org/MacMillan Company, 1904), p. 65
Osgood ties the “True and Sincere Declaration” to the efforts of the latter merchant adventurers, i.e. Thomas Smythe, and he also asserts these fellows fell behind De La Warr and selected him as leader of the rescue expedition. De la Warr and his three ships holding about 150 settlers departed in April 1610 for Jamestown—almost overlapping with Gates’s unknown arrival in early June at Jamestown. In any case, concerns with the political instability within the Virginia had intensified and created new input in the instructions provided De la Warr (and previously to Gates) that lead to the imposition of a military regime.
The contemporary utterances of the company show it to have been convinced that the failure of the [Virginia] experiment had been due at least in part, to negligence and the lack of discipline among the colonists. It was therefore resolved that there should be no lack of rigor in the future. Up to this time the settlement had no written laws. A code was now prepared for it, the enforcement of which was entrusted to Gates, afterwards to Delaware, and later to Dale. It was a civil and martial code combined, the former part having been composed by William Strachey, while the latter is said to have been borrowed from military regulations in force in the Netherlands, but greatly extended by Dale in 1611.
Through the whole of this body of law was probably never enforced in the colony with rigor, and in detail, it was in being there for nine years, and the governors throughout that time can hardly have failed to use it for a variety of purposes. No other extant authority reveals so clearly the type of plantation which it was the purpose of the company and officials to encourage in Virginia. [99] Herbert L. Osgood, the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, Vol 1 (Forgotten Books.org/MacMillan Company, 1904), p. 69
As to the departure of traditional merchant adventurers, it suggests pertinence of the Somers Island adventure in the retention of merchant adventurers, but also that the 1606 coalition led by Smythe had weakened considerably as early as this time period. Counter intuitively that may rebounded by involving the king in an effort to prop up his constituency in the Virginia Company. By 1610-11 the king would not have been comfortable with parliamentary intrusion into his foreign and trade “ royal jurisdiction”. In contemporary terms the Virginia Company was showing signs of “politicization” and “partisanship” within its shareholders and its newly elected corporate leadership.
If so the “trading factory” constituency also lost some momentum. Osgood further suggests that broadsides went out seeking to attract more” artisans and farmers as colonists”. The bloc of new (parliamentary) shareholders, dominated by Sandys, could easily have picked up some of that momentum (Parliament was still in session) and filled in the gap within Company deliberations. There is evidence Sandys was active in regard to the Virginia Company during this time period.
But it was obvious that the need to find resources other than cash from subscriptions and debt issuance was imperative. That fed into the 1609 Charter, granting to the Company king’s land which the Company could sell for income. If so, the fiscal pivot had begun before Gates ever left London. With shifts in the Virginia Company shareholders evident one suspects their enthusiasm in regards to the crisis may have generated hopes of Virginia success. After all in this post-1609 scramble “the company had dispatched to Virginia no less than 22 vessels, and close to 1,400 colonists”. Craven sensed the company leadership may have felt proud of this achievement, and it gave them some confidence they could launch their national campaign and felt they had the situation under some measure of control of Virginia [99] Craven, the Virginia Company, p.17.
If returns on investment/dividends and costs repayment could come in the form of land grants, how these incentives and return on investment could work within the Company’s monopoly of Virginia ownership was disturbing. The early investors relied on that monopoly to provide that return on their investment and export and trade was how they saw they could recoup their investment; that the Company could make more money, and reduce its costs by giving away its land and tapping individual entrepreneurship needed time to jell in the corporate mindset. The new set of debt issuances had offered in return for a six year term, a payment in land. But the Somers Island wreck and the series of costs incurred to respond to that crisis, upset what precious little fiscal balance the year’s fundraising had accomplished. The question of how they were going to pay the bills with each and ever ship sent over had not been solved.
During this period, a wide-spread series of blogs/pamphlets and publications converted the Virginia initiative from a settlement for the benefit of wealthy investors in a joint stock corporation, to a national endeavor-one paramount to asserting England’s position in foreign affairs and preserving English benefits derived from mercantilist trade. Without Virginia, England would be at the tender mercies of its neighboring European competitors—especially Spain and Portugal. This was the angle that of necessity appealed to James, whose relations, despite the recent peace, with Spain were still fragile, highly controversial, and soon to prove largely unsuccessful.
In November, a formal publication, “a True Declaration of the Estate of the Colonie in Virginia” was published, putting forward their view of Virginia, and “refuting ‘scandalous reports’ tending to discourage subscriptions. [99] Wesley Frank Craven, The Virginia Company of London, p. 16 An author, Silvanus Jourdan, took another tack by describing Somers and the wonder of its economic potential; it was written he disclosed that he wrote the work because of his “love of my country; … and the good of the plantation in Virginia. [99] Wesley Frank Craven, The Virginia Company of London, p. 16 During the same period another remarkable initiative was also launched that made Virginia a “cause celebre” by recounting the Gates shipwreck story, telling the tales of its various participators, complete with distressed aristocratic heroines, as they confronted a tempest, shipwreck and survival.
Amazingly, however, it also seems there was an opportunity that fell out of the earlier described discovery and inadvertent colonization of the island of Bermuda (Somers Island). Making lemonade out of a shipwreck-fiscal disaster for new investors who saw the Somers Island as a new and different opportunity offered a path for old 1606 investors as well. Accordingly a host of younger aristocrats, for example, young Thomas Hobbes invested in 1612 joined with merchant adventurers and colonial-privateer aristocrats..
A noted aristocrat, Richard Rich, probably encouraged by the merchant adventurers trying to sell bonds, published his “Newes from Virginia, the Lost Flocke Triumphant”, a poem with aspirations to the Aeneid. https://encyclopediavirginia.org/primary-documents/newes-from-virginia-the-lost-flocke-triumphant-by-lord-robert-rich-1610/ . [999] There is some confusion as to whether it is Richard or Robert, but the difference is considerable. Robert is the First Earl of Warwick, a figure of considerable importance to the Virginia Company—and English colonial history.
Warwick did in fact become a shareholder in the Company in 1612, and was to play a major role in the founding and development of Somers Island colony, a derivative of the Third Charter. His future rivalry with Smythe, the marriage of his son to Smythe’s daughter, and a his subsequent alliance of convenience with Smythe against Sandys testifies to his centrality in our story. For those unfamiliar with English history, the First and Second Earl of Warwick heavily impacted, and a times dominated, English colonial history into the Restoration.[999]
William Strachey (the Virginia Company Secretary of Virginia) followed up with his own version of the wreck and the stay on Somers. “A True Reportory of the Wracke and Redemption of Sir Thomas Gates, Knight” became the talk of the taverns—and the court. [Strachey was Secretary of Virginia and a participant in the expedition on the Sea Adventure]. Almost overnight, Company promoters made the lemon of the Gates Bermuda disaster into lemonade. It seems to have been an instant hit. Everybody seems to have read it—even a playwright named Shakespeare. It may have been in this period that company officials, Sandys has been suggested, “leaked” private documentation and letters to a noted playwright of the period, one supposedly strongly committed to colonization. That, of course, was William Shakespeare
Both Gates and Dale were employed by the Earl of Essex, and the Rich Family (Warwick) had wide networks that extended into politics and as patrons of literature and the arts. The latter angle offered a wonderful tale of shipwreck, adventure, and character narrative which, as we shall see, raised popular awareness and emotions at this most critical time, 1611. Evidence exists that Shakespeare read Strachey’s work, and there are also suggestions an original “letter” on correspondence from one of Strachey’s sources had been provided to Shakespeare through the covert agency of Edwin Sandys. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tempest; [99] Charles Mills Gayley, Shakespeare and the Founders of Liberty in America (1917), pp. 75-6; https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/sea-venture/ . However, it attracted Shakespeare’s attention, the bard wrote his new play, the Tempest, modelled on that experience. The play was performed, with the King in attendance on November 1, 1611, with the members of his court also in attendance.
While long believed by many that the Tempest was a play profoundly linked to early English colonial experience, it was never associated with a specific Virginia Company “campaign” or promotional effort. The symmetry of the campaign and the play’s opening is too strong for me to ignore its implications. My sense is the play certainly raised the interest on Virginia, and set it apart from the Ulster Plantation. J.P. Conlon, among others, makes a case it was anti-colonial in its intent. [99] J. P. Conlon, The Tempest and the King’s Better Knowledge” (Edinburgh University Press, Ben Jonson Journal, Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp 161-188, 2016
If I must take a position, I would state that anti-colonialism was not in vogue in 1611, and Virginia was the first successful, if 1611 Jamestown could be called successful, colonial venture. That the Second and Third Charters fit neatly into James’s foreign policy of the time, it it gave credence to the private nature of the colony’s operations, but, in no way could his participation in it be wished away. To me if the Tempest was in part tied to the Virginia promotional campaign—which I can by no means offer compelling support—it was supportive of the endeavor. Having said that I acknowledge I have no special competence regarding Shakespeare and his politics. Just saying there is some circumstantial-based commentary on this matter.
So between 1610 and February 1611 discussion among the Company shareholders and corporate leadership likely focused on fiscal matters. In September, 1610 Gates, superfluous as governor, returned to England. His report touched off great concern, the update of course was nothing but bad news. But he did make several observations that offered long-term hope. He believed that over a period of time, left undefined, a variety of exports (sugar, wine, silk , iron, sturgeon, furs, timber, rice, aniseed), if the infrastructure for which could be provided. Gates also opened corporate eyes on the opportunity the Somers Island offered the Company; in his words it was “an encouraging sign of God’s providential care of His willingness to support the English in Virginia”. [99] Wesley Frank Craven, The Virginia Company of London, p. 16
Craven argues that in this period, Smythe led an national campaign “for funds which the adventurers committed themselves in the fall of 1610. They estimated a need for L30,000, and began an effort to sell new shares to former subscribers (and new subscribers as well), at high compound interest rates of a three year term. The Lord Mayor London (Smythe was a former Lord Mayor, BTW) was encouraged to press London companies to join in; moreover, the outports of the Plymouth Corporation (from Bristol and other outports) were also approached to participate.
Sir Thomas Smythe was now quite definitely the chief … [he] had he courage to launch the new campaign for funds to which the adventurers committed themselves in the fall of 1610. The estimated need ran to L30,000. All former subscribers were urged to subscribe another stock purchase at L37, 10s, on agreement that the subscription would be paid at the rate of L12, 10s per year over the next three years. Others were invited to subscribe on the same terms. The Lord Mayor [of London] appealed once more to London companies, and plans were made for inviting the other towns of England to contribute … [99] Wesley Frank Craven, the Virginia Company of London, 1606-1624, p. 16
The Company announced additional L18,000 in stock subscriptions through a variety of measures– holding in place the gentry recruited in 1609. The money went out as quickly as it came in. In March 1611 Sir Thomas Dale left London with 300 settlers, soldiers, craftsmen—with tweaks, it was the usual suspects sent over since 1606. In May, Gates sailed with another three ships, with 300 more settlers and a literal horde of livestock, fowl, and seed grain. The latter was hoped to encourage self-sufficiency and to mitigate the reliance on the Powhatan for food to survive.
Within days of Gates’ departure in May 1611, De La Warr returned. His report to a shareholder meeting on June 25, 1611 spent much time describing his ill health wrought by Virginia, which, he claimed, carried him to death’s door. Brought back to health in warm baths of the West Indies, and the fruits of the Azores, he had survived.
This was by no means a “Virginia is for lovers’ report, and the reaction to it was decidedly negative. De La Warr two years earlier had been projected as the hero tasked to save the colony, the cornerstone of the public relations campaign that accompanied the 1610 subscription effort—but now the hero was saying Virginia had nearly killed him. His comments were released to the public and were negatively received, an unforced error that put more pressure on the national campaign. And as usual, finances continued to deteriorate.
Craven doesn’t seem much impressed with De la Warr’s return home, and he was not alone. West-De la Warr was to be the Company’s big hero, its go-to man. Go-to doesn’t imply come-back, and to have nearly died from the Virginia climate was hardly an endorsement. Rather than cut bait, the Company decided to reappoint De la Warr as governor, but stipulate that while he would (someday) return to Virginia, for the time being he would be governor in England. Gates, already on his way was, and would remain Lieutenant Governor, and would assume local responsibilities. Whether De la Warr had been kicked upstairs, I know not, but Smythe was the London big cheese, and so De la Warr wandered in the London background until 1618.
Putting a smiley face on De la Warr’s report, the Company took some pride on its fund raising. Scott was more critical: Early in 1611 it was recognized that, unless a large amount of capital could be procured, the situation was desperate. It was estimated that L30,000 was required to be paid in two years. Of this sum [only] l8,000 had been promised [but not yet paid]”. [99] Scott, pp. 251-2. With the debt as bad, or even worse than it ever was, with sufficient new funding unlikely from shareholder subscription, it is at this point, revenues from other sources than investors had to be devised.
But again, the unspoken Virginia reality lurked through the shadows. Virginia had not changed due to these rescue efforts. One can argue they only made things worse. Little had changed in Virginia: when the rescue fleets landed” “one half to three fourths of every shipload failed to survive the seasoning period … After five years and [sending over] 1,600 colonists, two-thirds of them were already in their graves” [99] D. Alan Williams, Introduction, p. xxxvii. Instead of sending over a horde of ill-suited immigrants, a much smaller set of artisans and appropriately trained workmen, along with more females, and fewer children/early teens would have likely yielded better results—if they survived that is..
The National Park Service summarizes this year and half of fluid London policy-making into a short, snappy few paragraphs:
In 1609, the Virginia Company received its Second Charter, which allowed the Company to choose its new governor from amongst its shareholders. Investment boomed as the Company launched an intensive recruitment campaign. … Unfortunately, …, Sir Thomas Gates, Virginia’s Deputy Governor, bound for the colony was shipwrecked in Bermuda and did not assume his new post until 1610.
When he arrived he found only a fraction of the colonists had survived the infamous “Starving Time” of 1609-10. All too soon the Mother Country learned of Virginia’s woeful state. The result was predictable: financial catastrophe for the Company. Many new subscribers [shareholders] reneged payment on their shares, and the Company became entangled in dozens of court cases.
On top of these losses the Company was forced to incur further debt when it sent hundreds more colonists to Virginia. There was little time to counter this crushing debt. …Increasing bad publicity, political infighting, and financial woes led the Virginia Company to organize a massive advertising campaign. The Company plastered street corners with tempting broadsheets, published persuasive articles, even convinced the clergy to preach of the virtues of supporting colonization. Before the Company [‘s charter was dissolved in 1624] it would publish 27 books and pamphlets promoting the Virginia adventure.
To make [its] shares more marketable, the Virginia Company changed its sales pitch. Instead of promising instant returns and vast profits for investors, the Company exploited patriotic sentiment and national pride. A stockholder was assured that his purchase of shares would help build the might of England to make her the superpower she deserved to be. The heathen natives would be converted to the proper form of Christianity, the Church of England. People out of work could find employment in the New World. The standard of living would increase across the nation. How could any good patriotic Englander resist? [Policy advocacy never changes it seems]
The English rose to the bait. The gentry wished to win favor by proving its loyalty to the Crown. The growing middle class also saw stock purchasing as a way to better itself. But the news was not all good. Although the population Jamestown rose [new immigrants came over] high settler mortality kept profits unstable [those greedy investors!]. By 1612 the Company’s debts had soared to over L1000. https://www.nps.gov/jame/learn/historyculture/the-virginia-company-of-london.htm
There is one last take away from the period between the 1609 Charter and the approval of the Third: the role and status of the Virginia Company as a national symbol and an extension of the commitment of the Crown and private sector to a permanent North American colony. That public-private partnership now demonstrated definite links to the emerging majority in parliament, but also an overlapping commitment of all parties to a patriotic endeavor. To dismiss the Virginia Company as merely a boat loaded with greedy and impatient shareholders, infused with subjection and missionary religious conquest, a first expression of modern colonialism and capitalism is also misguided.
Neither of these infamous conceptual paradigms where anywhere near their time period of coming of age. Simply put the hallmark of the first noted “bending of the Virginia policy system and economic base twig” was to occur due to its very early time line in the history of English colonization, English democracy, and English capitalism. The Virginia Company was a national as well as private-public initiative—more a Stuart version of contemporary “put a man on the moon first” enterprise.
To dismiss the driving character of the Company as simply the vehicle for shareholder profit is very mistaken and perhaps purposely introduced to serve ideological ends. The shareholders in 1606—and even in 1609 and 1612—were principally drawn from the governing class. The departure of merchant adventurers in this period, suggests their preference for the trading factory—implemented in Asia-Mediterranean , and to a lesser extent in the West Indies—and their hope the Somers Island was more congruent to their approach.
From this early period, I see evidence the Virginia Company had begun its pivot to the permanent settlement strategy, and could see more clearly how that affected the nature and type of immigration necessary. But the Company still could not escape the fiscal bind it had got itself into. Finances and a plan by which the company could pay for the permanent settlement simply had to be confronted and dealt with as best as could, incrementally likely, and experimentally as well. Necessity would prove to be the mother of inspiration, i.e. creativity and innovation.
That inspiration would play into the development of subsequent American colonies, but the tale I relate in this history, is that it did not come to fruition fast enough for Virginia to develop. That meant England and London-based actors, unable to “get their shit together in time”, left that development mostly in the hands of Virginian resident Englishmen and women.
Ron W. Coan 