Remember: our initial question, intended to guide us through this ponderous history of colonial America: Why are states seemingly so similar, yet so different from each other?
To Americans, the English Civil War-Cromwell, and Restoration that followed is “their” civil war and political development. Those affairs are not considered relevant to our political development. Americans do not wonder if, or how, “their” civil war” affected us. It is not taught in American history classes, nor is it found in the popular histories most Americans read.
Of course some historians are, and have always been, sensitive to their impact, but not for many, many years–excepting those who focus on the Atlantic paradigm, of course. I argue it cannot be ignored as I have no doubts that, in noticeable ways, these years did bend the twig, in Virginia and each of the North American colonies.
We certainty are very interested in the course of events and dynamic development through this period. A lot happened and we need to appreciate the time line and key historical events and changes. We will differentiate by decades since we have three (1640’s, 1650’s, and 1660’s–and then finish up with the most chaotic period, the decline of Berkeley and Bacon’s Rebellion. Each decade will includes its own set of modules.
This module series tackles what in my opinion is the least known, certainly appreciated period of American history–colonial or otherwise. I suppose there are lots of reasons, starting with “who cares”. But certainly the list includes an intrusion from the most turbulent period in English-British history. The English Civil War through 1649, and the Puritan, Republic and Protectorate which followed, strangely created both a step back in England’s management of the colonies, and counter-intuitively, a step forward in the victor’s efforts to maintain control by formalizing the principles of colonial management-trade coupled with a more aggressive activist colonial expansion. Virginia was differently affected by each period, and in this module we discuss the better years fir Virginia, the first administration of Governor William Berkeley.
In this module series we will continue to examine the interactions within the English hybrid colonial policy system, but will especially focus on Virginia’s policy system and its tobacco monoculture. We shall also continue with our defense and assessment of Virginia’s First Migration, and follow with considerable attention on the start of its second migration in a later module.
Introduction to Berkeley’s First Administration: 1641 to 1652
Instead, in this module we will focus on Berkeley’s first administration which lasted until early 1652, implemented the “Deal of 1639”, and adopted policies that both supported the advancement of the tobacco monoculture, and encouraged some diversification in its economic base. Berkeley also kept a lid on the its Maryland involvements, but was placed on the defensive by a new (and last) Third Powhatan War in 1644-6. What happened after 1652 will be picked up in another module, as will Berkeley’s second administration from 1660 through 1676 in yet another.
Three themes will overlap decades: Maryland, the evolution of political institutions, and the demographic, cultural and social transformation of the oligarchy, the workforce, and the tobacco monoculture. Another theme, which overlaps both the three decades, but the other themes as well, is the arrival and acculturation of the Second Migration into the First. Within that topic we shall outline the first tender “shoots” of an elite political culture, and test the findings of one of political culture’s foundational texts, Albion’s Seed.
But beyond that, in all modules the history will go out of its way to recognizing the impacts of our colonial Mother Country, what we have lovingly referred to as the London-based hybrid colonial policy system. That sensitivity will include a good deal of the Atlantic approach as it recognizes how and in what ways inter-colonial affairs and economic activities played a role in Virginia’s political and certainly economic development. If there is any period in colonial history where these environmental intrusions have more consequence and impact, I do not know it.
Until the Drift to American Revolution after the 1763 French and Indian War, the goings on in other colonies do greatly affect Virginia–and I might add, Virginia has a serious effect on them. The English formalized their trade and colonial policy in this period with the issuance of the 1651 and the 1661 Navigation Acts , and whatever else these acts did or did not do, they mark a significant step in the development of the British Empire and serve as the bible for managing the serious internal changes occurring in the Mother Land in the period that follow.
Another alert to the reader is the English hybrid colonial system of the early Stuarts evolved away from patterns and structures which have dominated our discussion thus far. Americans will normally expect the North American colonies to grow, become more complex, and enjoy different patterns-composition of immigration, but the hybrid colonial system, the London-side also evolved greatly–in some ways more than the North American.
While we have not yet entered into the series of wars that would characterize European political life in the eighteenth century in particular, the Europe that emerged after the Thirty Years war in 1648 would lead to new sets of refugees and trade patterns. The decline of Spain and the rise of France and the Netherlands. That shifts in England, to the United Kingdom, from divine right sovereigns to parliament to the restoration of the later Stuarts under the watchful eye of a new Parliament would mean increased capacity and regulation.
The continued settlement of new North American colonies in the period after 1640 also added a new dimension capable of impacting older colonies. Also the simple realization that over the decades of the seventeenth and eighteenth century the composition of emigration from England-UK, and from other countries –and religions–and, of course, new generational cohorts created impacts in our bending of twigs and American political culture. It took more than a hundred years from 1607 to found the last American colony. Times change as a century elapsed, so does societal patterns, beliefs and values.
For the most part, we can observe that Charles and England were distracted through most of the actual Civil War, and the Puritans who increasingly assumed control over Parliament injected themselves into colonial management. Parliament in the very early 1640’s were responsive to the New Men, who had pivoted from New Kent but were still close to the Sandys factions that dominated the Virginia Company, still desirous of returning to Virginia armed with a new charter. Over the next few years through to the execution of Charles in 1649 this motley collection of New Men exerted a very considerable influence over the actual conduct of England’s colonial policy-making. Thus reflecting the perhaps inevitable reality of a civil war, from 1641 through the end, there were two parallel sets of policy-makers. That is its own story.
In this module series we will employ Governor Berkeley as a focal point in outlining not only the multiple pressures from London, but also his need to navigate the treacherous shoals of Assembly-Council-Claiborne Clique-Mainstream Planters and Richard Kemp. Having dispensed with the politics, conflicts and balancing that Berkeley demonstrated in his first two plus years, we will move into a discussion of those policies of 1642-4. What will be evident is Berkely’s considerable skill, the congruence of his personal goals with Virginia’s elite preferences, and the insulation from the Civil War that emanated from Berkeley’s willingness to set his own course while remaining steadfast to Charles. We will also take note that Berkeley and Virginia were advantaged by the preoccupations of England’s feuding policy-makers in deviance from longstanding Stuart trade policy. As we consider each of these topics notice the growing role of Virginia’s policy-making institutions and make judgements on the fledging new (1639) policy system.
Finally, to ease into the Virginia policy system I begin with a surprising case study: Berkeley’s appointment as governor and what he had to do to get there. The case study provides an entry point into his administration and it segue ways nicely with the last module in our “thirties” module series-its factions, and processes. By the time Berkeley landed in March 1642 on a Virginia river pier, Berkeley had accumulated a wealth of experience and sensitivity toward Virginia issues, power bases and no doubt had acquired a knowledge of the shoals and potential pitfalls he faced once off his ship.
Case Study: Berkeley’s Appointment
We start by introducing Sir William Berkeley and observe how he became Virginia’s governor.
BACKGROUND: Berkeley was a true “cavalier”, a junior member of the British aristocracy, with a heritage that extended to William the Conqueror. In England, the Berkeley family had their ancestral seat at Berkeley Castle built in the 1200’s; “the Berkeleys’ were among the richest and strongest families in England. It was said that at one time the Earl of Berkeley could ride from his castle …to Berkeley square in Westminster [the King’s London government district] without leaving his own land” [1a][1a] D. Huntley, “the Cavalier Flight to Virginia” (British Heritage, Jul 13, 2016) https://britishheritage.com/the-cavalier-flight-to-virginia
Oxford educated, thirty-seven years old in 1642, with limited experience in military, law, arts and politics, William Berkeley purchased the Virginia governorship in the same year as the English Civil War began. His tenure of nearly thirty-five years, 1642-1677, overlapped the English Civil War, the Cromwell interregnum and Restoration of Charles II. He stirred things up sufficiently to be nearly overthrown by a combination of a Dutch naval invasion, Bacon’s Rebellion, and generally cantankerous oligarch administration that prompted 1677 recall and a fleeting reminder of Sir John Harvey. Still, Berkeley, in the opinion of many, probably including myself, regard the man as colonial Virginia’s most effective governor. Messiah, however, he was not.
By any stretch Berkeley is an unusual appointment, one whose past training and experiences had little to do with Virginia. The Berkeley’s were an “abundantly-branched” family whose roots traced to “Norse corsairs” of the Viking age. By the the fourteenth century the family was firmly embedded into the aristocratic status system that made its way into the Jacobean period of which we write. Well-educated, well-connected, oft-times members of Parliament, and accorded knightship , they were perhaps best described as sufficiently wealthy to maintain several estates and a life style congruent with their pedigree and friends, [99] Warren G. Billings, Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia (Louisiana State University Press, 2004), p.6
William’s father, Charles carried on the family traditions and estates, he did enjoy expensive habits that always demanded his imagination to develop new sources of wealth. He bought shares in the East India Company, the Irish Company, and our favorite, the Virginia Company.–none of which advanced his fortunes to any material degree. Charles, a friend to Walter Raleigh was active in the affairs of the Virginia Company, an ally of Ewin Sandys and the Ferrar brothers. Interested in venturing into silk and steel, he probably infused William with some of his hope to raise his wealth from these ventures. He died seriously in debt. [99] Warren G. Billings, Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia (Louisiana State University Press, 2004), p.6
Still Charles and his wife provided their seven children with a proper education, William or “Will” was fourth born and treated to grammar school, Queen’s College (Oxford), and St Edmund Hall. Will took it all in, learned his subjects and graduated First professionally trained as a barrister, William never practiced law or entered into formal political life. Instead he returned to Oxford for a Master’s of Art. William, it seems, loved poetry and play-writing
Upon his graduation he took the customary extended multi-year trip through Europe; the Netherlands seemed to have captured a good deal of his attention, and likely he became familiar with the mechanics and details of Dutch colonial trade. He returned to England in 1632 (about twenty-seven years old). Of need for resources, he used family and friend connections to pry open some position in the the Court of Charles I. He garnered an appointment as a “gentleman of the king’s privy chamber extraordinary”. Whatever the job description, the position did provide access to Charles, and after decade would yield him Virginia’s governorship.
Whatever Berkeley wound up doing during his “workday” (it wasn’t much), he drifted into and between one of two literary devoted “courtier groups” that include John Dionne, Richard Lovelace, George Sandys, and whose sponsor was Queen Henrietta Maria for whom the groups produced singularly or in partnerships a series of plays. William himself produced one, the Lost Lady. If only through proximity on the court and friendships developed therein William wandered into acquaintances,
Thomas Hobbes for one, and with others not close to Archbishop Laud, whose religious values William did not share–not, however, was he attracted to Puritan factions. He did become friends with several colonial rascals (Sir Thomas Roe). This is as close as William ventured into colonial affairs during his Court period–that is if one excludes an important 1638 trip to the Netherlands on behalf of Charles to meet with his wife’s mother and urge her to stay put in the Netherlands and not visit her daughter–for which Berkeley was well rewarded.
During 1638, the war with the Covenanters, earlier described in the previous module led to William being drafted into a calvary unit under the command of the Lord Chamberlain, entrusted with being a guard for “his Majesties person”. In this manner he was engaged in the First Bishop’s War, and out of it was his 1639 knighthood. In August of 1640, however, he appears to have botched an exchange noble prisoners for which he was “sternly rebuked”.
His Appointment to Virginia: Returning to his usual court duties, by May 1641 William decided he wanted out of the court, and turned to his kin for advice and assistance. He initially tried to get appointed as ambassador to Constantinople, but that didn’t pan out. As Plan B, William turned to governorship of Virginia, probably drawing on his father’s experience and contacts. More than anything, It seemed to him that Virginia was the place he could make his own fortune and develop a position there for his family that as a third son he could not enjoy in England.
Once again enjoined his friends and family he directly approached the king, and despite the reality Virginia already had a popular and effective governor, Francis Wyatt. Never the mind, on July 31st, 1641 Charles appointed him as “governor and captain-general of Virginia”–issuing to William in a matter of days his gubernatorial instructions and seals such that he took the oath of office from the Privy Council on August 10th. Berkeley’s biography, Warren Billings succinctly describes the final process that put William Berkely in the governorship–a scant ten weeks since he had first decided to leave the king’s court for a new position:
Berkeley entreated the king to appoint him in Wyatt’s stead, and pressed his brother Charles and his friends, Lucius Cary, second viscount Falkland, and Sir Edward Hyde to level the path for him. Each was well-suited to help. Falkland was now Secretary of State, having replaced Sir John Coke. Sir Charles Berkeley (Williams older brother) was personally close to the king, and Hyde had recently come over to the king’s side [in the Civil War]. The three worked promptly. Indeed they brushed Wyatt aside with startling speed.[99] Warren G. Billings, Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia (Louisiana State University Press, 2004), p.32
Isn’t that a pretty snappy policy making process? I must confess, I witnessed several of these policy making episodes in my tenure as a ED CEO. Ca plus Change
Billings presents an assessment of why Charles ditched Wyatt and appointed a thirty-seven year old novice such as William Berkeley. First and foremost, he asserts because “Virginia rarely figured high in his thinking” and in August 1641 he had other matters more truly weighty on his mind–and agenda. Indeed Charles left London the very day he signed Berkeley’s appointment, headed to Scotland to resume battle and his struggle with Parliament. His close advisors pressed him hard and the matter and timing did not suggest he make a stand or even hesitate to take their advice. Wyatt, of course, three thousand miles away, never knew this was happening; it was a fiat accompli whenever he heard about it. [99] Warren G. Billings, Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia (Louisiana State University Press, 2004), pp. 32-3
Instead he apparently turned to George Sandys, who had served with Berkeley in the court and was a member in one of the courtier arts group in which Berkeley participated. Cut the best deal you can to save me from financial ruin and salvage what you can of my reputation. The agreement was reached in early September–and Berkeley perhaps wisely cut Wyatt some slack and guaranteed Wyatt would be paid until he took over the governorship which would not be before January 14, 1642. Berkeley agreed to pay Wyatt three hundred pounds in three annual instalments as recompense for “any great, losses hee shall susteine by his removall”, followed by his agreement to buy Wyatt’s Virginia house in Jamestown “att the rate hee paide … for it, with further allowance of what hee hath expended thereupon.
Wyatt retained his seat on the Council of State. Most amazing was Berkeley’s concession that he would appoint “several councillors “that are left out of my [king’s instructions], and [to] ranke them in their (former) places [These were “Captaine William Claiborne, Captaine William Tucker & Mr. Ralph Wyatt (no relation, see “Wyatt or Wiatt, William and Mary Quarterly, Vol 10, No. 1 (Jul, 1901), p. 3), for the appointees, see Billings, A Little Parliament, p. 23. Berkeley’s final concession that, notwithstanding any direct order from the king or Privy Council, he would permit “noe recriminations rehearings or reversals of judgements which have or shall bee given or determined by Sir Francis [Wyatt] and the Councell [of State]. [99] Warren G. Billings, Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia (Louisiana State University Press, 2004), pp.33-4.
Not only did Berkeley stipulate he would seek no action against Wyatt, but he safeguarded that concession with a restructured Council of State that included Wyatt–and as it turned out William Claiborne, and watered down Wyatt’s opposition from Kemp’s allies. It must be noted that Berkeley himself, likely held few, if any, personal loyalties on the Council, other than what he could muster by virtue of his appointment by the King. Given the power of the Council and its centrality to the executive decision-making process, Berkeley had isolated himself from this body before he had even packed his bags to leave for Virginia.
But we are not over. Lacking his own standing and wealth, Berkeley had to have guarantors of his conformity to the terms of the Wyatt agreement. Berkeley enticed his powerful supporters (his brother Charles, Hyde, and and Falkland) and Wyatt had William Claiborne, in London at the time. This occasion of the signing may have been the first formal meeting of the Berkeley with the formidable Claiborne whose recent victory at the Council, in alliance with Wyatt, had stripped the lucrative signet ring from the Secretary of the Colony (Richard Kemp. That) meant his return to standing and power in Virginia.
As to Kemp, he too was in London, and still Secretary of the Colony, campaigning against Wyatt and Claiborne–but also there to defend himself from accusations of his arch enemy Reverend Panton who was arguing his case before Parliament.
Trip Across the Atlantic: It seems September 1641 was Virginia’s Old Homes Month in London. Whatever it was that triggered Panton to accelerate his attack on Kemp, Panton filed a petition in August that Berkeley’s appointment as governor was “surreptitiously obtained” with the involvement of Kemp. Open to question was Berkeley’s sympathies to Kemp and his sharing of values and tyrannical tendences. The tyrannical treatment of Reverend Panton had outraged many in Parliament, and god knows who else, Panton had become the cause celebre in Virginia–and now in London.
Because Berkeley was “on the other political side” he knew not what was transpiring in Parliament, and simply proceeded to find transportation and book a ship to Virginia. It took some time and it wasn’t until October 25th that he finally left London. But in the meantime “the House of Lords ordered Berkeley’s voyage delayed while they examined the case. The House of Commons, on the basis of an earlier petition from Panton, had similarly prevented the return to Virginia of Richard Kemp“. [99] Wilcomb E. Washburn, Virginia Under Charles I and Cromwell, 1625-1660, p. 15. On his ship heading out of London, Berkeley somehow received word Parliament had taken action against him and commanded him to appear at that body and answer to Panton’s petition. He immediately returned and Kemp and Berkeley presented counter petitions to Parliament.
In the midst of the intensifying civil war, Berkeley had got caught in the crosshairs of the King’s principal opposition. Berkeley appeared before the parliamentary committee and asserted that he didn’t know Panton, that he had not been charged with anything other than a suspicion and, like Peter with Christ denied he knew Panton or had any sympathies or knowledge of what he was alleged to have done. Berkeley then made a case that is reminiscent of our present day argument that colonial administration, England’s water’s edge’ required something like bipartisan cooperation despite this Civil War thing. I
Proclaiming his award of the governorship, and earmarking the considerable sums of money he had spent to assume the responsibility, and how any obstacles would seriously hurt the former Governor Wyatt, he asked for the permission to go to Virginia, promising to return and defend himself if evidence was found on the Panton matter. Moreover, he wrapped himself around William Claiborne, a close friend of Wyatt–and as we know deep in the pockets of the still powerful Virginia Company–whose close association with Edwin Sandys’, a noted leader of Parliament, was, after his death, picked up by his brother George and the Ferrar brothers. That association was itself timely because the Company, believe it or not, was once again midstream in pushing for a revamped charter to return to Virginia’s governance. It is hard to determine if his distancing from Kemp affected his relations with arguably one of the most powerful Virginian officials, but the antipathy Kemp felt toward Claiborne had to have rankled.
By November 5th the House of Lords allowed him to leave for Virginia and passed the buck on the Panton matter by referring it to the Governor and Council of Virginia for a decision. That meant of course, Berkeley had inherited the scandal and it would be waiting for him upon his entry into Virginia. Likely Berkeley left town within a very few days, not wanting to wait around for still another complication emanating from the London side of the colonial policy system.
Unhappily, the delay caused him to cross the Atlantic amid winter storms, winter winds, and adverse currents. His ship’s captain therefore avoid it by heading south. His route was stymied several times and the ship went as round about a path as one could imagine, to the Canaries, to the West Indies, and only then northward to the Chesapeake. He probably arrived in Virginia, made landfall, in early February and as suggested by Billings settled into Wyatt’s old house–and Wyatt moved out to new accommodations. That must have been fun for Wyatt. Only on March 8th did Wyatt formally surrender his position, and Berkeley took the oath and assumed responsibilities as governor.
When he looked out over his audience and through the window he saw a Virginia policy system in place, actually finalizing its governance institutions and practices in accordance with the Deal promoted, authored, and implement thus far by now former governor Wyatt, who was off to the side on the dais. What ever his royal instructions said, it was Berkeley’s task to work through and where possible with, that crystallizing policy system. Let’s take a moment to refresh ourselves with its main features.
Virginia’s fundamental unit from which policy inputs issued and which outputs were directed, and which overlapped the economy and society, was the (tobacco-export) plantation. The size of a Virginia plantation could vary greatly (lots smaller than our contemporary hindsight envisions it), but displaying in miniature the essentials we will see a hundred years int the future. Given the practicalities of tobacco export, size mattered greatly, with the larger ones gaining wealth, advantage, status, and occupying a key position and the performance of necessary tasks and system requisites.
Gradations of size, laced with a hierarchical set of interrelationships, created groups of small and even moderate size planters within a given settlement area in Virginia’s shredded community, left in their wake a lower government and economic system that was dominated by these larger plantation owners, many of whom were appointed by king and governor into the Council of State–as early as 1629 and certainly by 1639.
Lower government–counties-were havens for the elites very early on, and were simply incorporated into the 1639 deal by both Wyatt and Berkeley. By that time counties had become the electoral district, and their franchises elected the two members of Burgess. The provincial level of the Virginia policy system had seemingly back-end into a system wide elite-governed policy system whose principal actors drew their sustenance, economic social and religious from the institutions and structures that populated their county policy systems and their shredded community plantations settlements.
That dynamic evolved a bit over the next hundred and twenty-five years, but George Washington would have seen continuity from the earlier first generation years–his antecedent will be one of these second generation immigrants recruited by Berkeley, amazingly his mother Sarah Ball had traces of first generation parentage. In any event Washington inherited a economic and social class system and an elite controlled policy system whose roots were well established by 1650.
Inauguration & Settling in Administratively:
On March 8th, a bit less than a month after he had arrived, Berkeley was inaugurated at the Council of State meeting room. The date had been chosen to accommodate the Council which had to meet in a required “”Quarter Court” session. The Quarter Court was primarily a judicial-like court that also performed functions associated with provincial bureaucratic powers and functions–including the annual appointments for county offices. That meant immediately after taking of oaths, Berkeley would preside and participate in the Quarter Courts activities and decision-making. That meant his “honeymoon” was over and he had to deal with those council members who formed the quota for his inauguration and the Quarter Court.
These included Secretary Richard Kemp (also back from England) John West, Christopher Wormeley (an ally of Kemp who had also been petitioned in the House of Lords Panton charge). The small grouping did not included the Claiborne Clique, and several powerful Mainstream planters such as Menefie. West, the senior member presided the quorum and tasked the council clerk to read Berkeley’s instructions from the king, and on the Bible administered the oaths of office (3) to Berkeley. There was no Berkeley speech, and Berkeley administered the annual oaths to the Council members in attendance.
Over the next several days, new councillors drifted in, were inducted, and set to work on the Council-Quarter Court. For the most part they were Mainstream Planters like Menifee, Claiborne clique members such as Mathews (Claiborne was still in England), and the former Governor Wyatt. The latter wasted no time in questioning the admittance of one councilor who had been booted off by the council previously.
Berkeley was in the middle of a dilemma and he punted by tossing the question to the general council which eventually allowed the gentlemen to be seated. Today, in the dog that didn’t bark category we discover that, As Wertenbaker makes a great deal out of Berkeley’s unwillingness to “persecute Harvey’s conspirators, or of picking up on issues and quarrels of the past troubled days. In ‘Not doing” Berkeley “Whether proceeding under directions from the English government, or actuated by a desire to rule legally and justly, he conferred a priceless blessing upon the colony by refusing to use the judiciary for political persecution“. [99] T. J. Wertenbaker, Virginia under the Stuarts, 1607-1688 (Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 71
Wertenbaker concludes, and I concur, that this translated into a public perception that Berkeley himself was an honorable, fair and prudent man. It certainly must have come with some comfort to the mutineers and to the Claiborne-Mathews sympathizers. It certainly allowed Berkeley the freedom from having to play the heavy. In the Wyatt-contested membership issue, Berkeley opened the matter to general debate whose conclusions seems to supported his retention on the Council. That relieved Berkeley of a decision that could have forced his deviance from the king’s instructions, which required Berkeley to retain him.
Wertenbaker ascribes to Berkeley (at least in these years) the position of contrasting himself with Harvey who ” had assumed that since the King was absolute and so could do no wrong, he, as his substitute, could trample on the rights of the people at will. Berkeley, in contrast, acted on a theory that at a time when the Throne itself was in peril, it was his duty to show that under royal authority there could be justice, security, and even freedom” [99] T. J. Wertenbaker, Give Me Liberty: the Struggle for Self-Government in Virginia (the American Philosophical Society, 1958), p.55
A series of civil suits followed, judgements of felons, trading licenses, and granting the son of John Rolfe permission to enter the colony to visit his Indian relatives. Berkeley then signed onto appointments for sheriffs and county judges, drawn from a list of three selected at the local level. There was no questioning of his selections from the Council. Berkeley on his own initiative updated the “County Commission of the Peace” responsible for the oversight and appointment of county judges (who were both political, legislative and judicial in function and actions as the concept of separation of powers was not yet recognized nor accepted in English governance).
Heretofore the county courts did not conform to English common practice of acknowledging the king as sovereign and responsible for the the oversight and appointment of county courts. Berkeley’s instructions from Charles, however, delegated his powers to “dispense justice” through the Governor, and over local magistrates. Berkeley spelled out the domain of the courts in more specificity, provided that each resident council of state member had a seat/vote, on the county court, and retained the Commission of the Peace, but on his own discretion.
As controversial as this was, potentially, Berkeley injected previously undisclosed royal instructions, [99] “Instructions from Charles I” in Warren M. Billings (Ed), the Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill, 1975, p. 52. which, when combined with the formal acknowledgment of council members membership on country courts, and a fleshed out-expanded scope of county governance, seemingly overcame any opposition.
Consciously or not, the 1642 reform pretty much legitimized and integrated the past twenty years of Virginian-driven county development. That past development was driven by, and responsive to, local Virginian situations and needs; using past English precedents like hundreds and shire, and finally county only in 1634 there had been no direct importation of the then-current English local government framework. The 1642 Berkeley reform opened the door for that to happen. But was it Berkeley’s idea-initiative or somebody else’s?
If suspect at first glance it was Charles and Berkeley extending the “Deal” of 1639 to Virginia’s local governance institutions, and if so amending what they needed to adjust, and leaving other Virginia differences alone. That is so uncharacteristic to Charles, and so early in Berkeley’s Virginia vision that I strongly suspect something else was afoot? If so, it is an instance of a more complex “inheritance” of English governance. If so, was Berkeley a partner in these actions, or the implementor of a decision made by others?
Many readers may feel I have been wandering in the weeds and woods for the last several paragraphs. But what we are seeing in this action before the Quarter Court, I believe, is Berkeley leading, from the first months of his administration, an incremental implementation of of the 1639 Deal. My suspicion is, given the sovereign’s lack of focus on such detail, the previously read (at the Inauguration) instructions, which obviously were in some way separate from those read to the Quarter Court. Likely I suspect they were relevant to the Quarter-Court whose powers and range of action embraced lower levels of government. Interestingly, they were not referred to the Assembly which was to meet shortly.
I suspect (without any evidence) the unread instructions were the byproduct of some backdoor London negotiations and may, or may not have been incorporated into the appointment of Berkeley. Wyatt is the “usual suspect” for me. Given the conformation of council seats on the county court, one wonders if they are a derivative of the coalition that negotiated Wyatt’s 1639 appointment–and which incorporated unchanged the essentials of a county reform which Wyatt had conducted over the two plus years of Wyatt’s second administration. Wyatt had been about to complete this vision at the January 1642 Assembly meeting when he got fired and was replaced by Berkeley. Doing the right thing, Wyatt prologued the Assembly on the verge of this approval, and brought Berkeley willingly or not into the coalition. Once it was approved and implemented, Wyatt moved on and returned to England–where he shortly after died.
By implication, the changes were not within the jurisdiction of the Council of State. That they came form the sovereign’s instructions indicates strongly that Charles reserved the authority to make serious structural changes to himself, with the governor at best his agent. That is more Wyatt than Mathews or certainly Claiborne. If that were the case than Charles, probably only semi-consciously, was limiting Virginia self-governance so that it could not restructure itself, at least in basic and meaningful ways. This position was always a bone of contention in the form multi-headed renegotiation of the Virginia Company charter and so the Virginia Company was certainly not behind it. My suspicion is the fingerprints on the second instructions were royalist.
But to make such an assertion of authority effective, however, Virginia had to be monitored from London more than it had been thus far. The past open-ended deferral to Virginia’s decision-making seems to have ben curtailed. As we shall see in the future this effort at centralization did not seem to work out in the immediate future–one cannot not forget events of the English Civil War could easily have made effective monitoring of Virginia difficult to impossible–whatever the intentions may have been.
For us, the effects of this acceptance of the form and structure of county governance institutionalized what I have referred to as “The Tilt” or thirty-five year decentralization of Virginia’s provincial governance and policy system, an acknowledgement of legitimacy which had not yet been made. Thus if the 1639 Deal had acknowledged the role and function of the Assembly-Burgesses, this reform by administered by Berkeley did the same for Virginia’s county-level governance.
What Do You Mean the Assembly is in Session? When Berkeley arrived, the Assembly was in session, and in the midst of the final debate on its county and governmental reforms that Wyatt had pursued for his entire second administration. “Out of regard for his replacement, Sir Francis prorogued the assembly until April 18″. He did this despite having a clear legal sense what sending the legislature home and calling it back into session entailed. The risk was that the work of the assembly to that point could be lost, and also a new leadership could replace the previous one.[99] Warren G. Billings, Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia (Louisiana State University Press, 2004), p. 38.
Berkeley had no choice in the matter, I contend, Wyatt did it, just at the time when Berkely was moving him out of his Jamestown home. To my mind, Wyatt was thrusting Berkeley into the fray, with his only option being to, as Harvey would have done, insist on his way, or as Berkeley came to do, integrate the new governor into the local processes and give him time to learn in action who was who and what was what. So much for the honeymoon.
As Billing’s describes in his biography Berkeley made his way by working with the locals and joining with them into their governance. Literally from the start Berkeley instinctively was going to “go native”–and as we shall see over the next one hundred and thirty years, that was the best approach the royal governor could make if he was to be effective. Whether Wyatt sensed that about Berkeley, I do not know, but in my mind the author of gubernatorial “going native strategy” was without doubt, Wyatt.
the Virginia Company Yet Again! While deference to Berkeley was a factor, the extra month could be important for Berkeley to come up to speed on the important issues under discussion. But, as Billings observes, Berkeley had reasons of his own to meet the Assembly, quickly: a report on the latest regarding the Virginia Company charter. That was a report with enormous repercussions and was compelled by the reality the Assembly and Virginians knew the matter of the charter revision was being considered. The wild card in all this was that in the midst of a civil war the Parliament could pass the bill, and the king could refuse to implement it.
Indeed, a week after Berkeley had left England, George Sandys had filed a petition in House of Commons; that petition if approved would have returned governance of Virginia to the Company. Whatever Berkeley could have benefited from meeting soon with the Assembly, the restive volcano that was the Virginia Company could not wait. Billing reports that previous to April 18, the Assembly upon its reconvening would like devise a response, adamantly rejecting the Virginia Company’s restoration.
Since Berkeley was quite aware Charles had no intention of revising the charter, so he was in a position to assume leadership on the matter and join with the Assembly majority on a common action. As much of a novice Berkeley might have been, so far he had done well and in adopting an anti-Company position he likely saw opportunity to get a good start with the Assembly with no fear he would antagonize His Majesty. Of course, this was not going to be popular with the Claiborne Clique, except, of course, the New Kent business plan had been ciphered out–except in the minds of Claiborne himself.
Billings, believed the Mathews-led Claiborne faction (composed principally of councillors) was a minority in the Assembly and since 1632 had not been able to exert its will on the Assembly, but had put up some time-consuming resistance to the passage of the “Declaration”. He thinks they may have tested Berkeley to see his inclinations on the Company, Maryland, and the macro economic trading and finance monopoly they still espoused. In that Berkeley was unequivocal regarding the company and its monopoly the Declaration in Billing’s thought was the first concrete evidence, and may have been “the first signal of his [Berkeley’s] gravitation toward leading planters [our mainstream planters]. [99] Warren G. Billings. a Little Parliament, p. 26
So whatever the risks associated with the reconvening of the prologued January Assembly, it reconvened on April Fool’s Day, that is previous to April 18th. As expected the assembly was ready to fight. It compiled a response , “The Declaration Against the Company“–which Billings suggests bears the literary style of Berkeley. The Declaration aggressively rejected the Company’s petition–even though George Sandys, its author, had been sent a year earlier on behest of the Assembly to argue its positions before Parliament. If so it was a clean break with the Company, a commitment to work with royal authority, and a propensity to assert itself as the spokesman and leadership for Virginia’s political and economic development.
The Declaration stated Sandys had misinterpreted the Assembly’s intents, and equally important the Assembly claimed to represent “the name of the Adventurers and Planters in Virginia”. The Declaration then went on to make a “clamorous attack on the wrongheadedness of returning Virginia to its former regime [asserting] the “old Corporation (could not) with any possibility be again introduced [ into Virginia governance] with absolute Ruin and dissolution to he Colony“(boldness mine). In so doing the Assembly reiterated its position on free trade (with the Dutch and others), and rejected any “monopolies’ (the Magazine and the Claiborne Clique contract). [99] Warren G. Billings, Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia (Louisiana State University Press, 2004), p. 87.
To reinforce its commitment, the Assembly enacted its response into law. The vote was unanimous of the Burgesses, Wyatt approved, and of the Councill of State even Claiborne Clique (the latter still in England) such as Mathews, Bennet and Pierce signed on. [By this time, the New Kent business plan was effectively dead, and New Kent was seized and incorporated into Maryland–as such it was little more than dead horse, not meriting the risk of voting for it]. When received by the King the Declaration was well-received, and he made a firm commitment not to sign any new Virginia Company charter. Parliament, literally on the way to war, and it did not vote on the petition. Sandys, by that time was on the outs with Parliament.
In one respect the Assembly 1642 remonstrance against the Virginia Com[any seems an about face in regards to the prospect of a return of Company governance. In the 1630’sconcern was more precise a concern with the Clique’s monopolization of the Company Magazine. In that period a return of the Company meant to most planters a confirmation of their rights of ownership, personal liberties, and support for their local governance institutions. This it seems had changed with the Deal of 1639. Freed from the fear of their loss of property rights in particular, the planter class was ready to separate from the Company and manage their own affairs, thank you. Kukla summarizes it best–and also provides insight as to the isolation of the Clique from the more numerous small planters outside its export influence. He also observes the rapid change in the temperament of the Burgesses once freed from the unicameral Assembly:
For two decades after 1619, the unicameral structure of Virginia’s General Assembly had reflected a commonality of interest among the colony’s small, geographically precise population and its leadership. The change to bicameralism corresponded with the suddenly enhanced visibility of rival interest groups in the colony’s socioeconomic system. No governor could survive the opposition of a unified populace led by the same men that had expelled Harvey, but Berkeley perceived that the Mathews-Claiborne faction’s goal of a tobacco monopoly and the exclusion of Dutch traders was antithetical to the smaller planter interest. Before the Crown’s formal recognition of land titles in 1639, most Virginians seemed willing to revive the Virginia Company of London and give it a tobacco-trade monopoly as a quid pro quo for firm titles for their lands. After 1639, however, the only men with reason to support the reinstatement of the company were the prominent members of the Mathews-Claiborne faction and their allies in the circle of the London merchants around Maurice Thompson, author of the Navigation Act of 1651. The specter of a rived company served Berkeley well for he began his career in Virginia by crushing the idea so masterfully that historians cannot race the efforts of those that favored it. With land titles finally secure Sandys spoke only the same merchant-councilor faction that had ousted Harvey. Those ‘who with the most secret reservation and most subtility argue for a company’ the Declaration charged, sought both propriety to the land and the power of managing the trade, which word ‘managing’ [is but] a convertable [that is a synonym] is monopolizing. [99] Jon Kukla, Order and Chaos in Early America: Political and Social Stability in Pre-Restoration Virginia (American Historical Review, Vol 90, No. 2 (April, 1985), pp. 289-90
Bicameralism then provided an institution with the independence and autonomy from the dominant faction in the Council of State, a faction with substantial influence and impact on the physical export of Virginia tobacco. Freed from this faction’s influence, the mainstream planters could forge their own program and policy within the Burgesses, and then turn that institution into a powerful check on the Council–and if motivated, the governor as well. T
he Clique and the London merchants led by Thompson were no fools, and likely realized the golden days of the Thirties were over in Virginia, and that, I suggest, may have redoubled their anger and opposition to the colony that had blocked, then crushed their New Kent monopoly plans: Maryland. It may be they began to recast their perspective toward Maryland, watching its vulnerabilities for the opportunity to take advantage of any weakness in order to convert that colony to adoption of a similar New Kent-like initiative. With the English civil war still in its early period, and previous to any war with the native tribes, risks relative to opportunities no doubt seemed limited in 1642 and 1643, but not in 1644-6.
The reader is advised to take the last paragraph in particular as prophetic. She will see this topic reappear in the next module series. It should not be a surprise that Maryland and Virginia politics and policy are on the eve of an overlapping turmoil, whose author lies in London, and whose agents resident in Virginia. The Claiborne Clique may of necessity be restrained in Virginia, but lurking on the seemingly quiet plantations of the Claiborne Clique a storm is brewing.
Craven’s take on Berkeley, the Virginia planters, and the 1642 Virginia Company episode is both interesting and as we would expect insightful. He credits Berkeley’s support for the anti-Virginia Company as the key reason for his skyrocketing popularity. That rested on his “bearing new assurances from the Crown on the ever-recurring threat of a revival of the Virginia Company. “It had been [he relates] through the cooperation of [John] Pym] [the perceived leader of the Parliament’s Puritans] that George Sandys had so recently co-operated with the old Virginia adventurers [Claiborne Clique] in an attempt to reestablish their charter through parliamentary action. In shirt, Virginians on the very eve of the war had occasion to see in the action of Parliament a challenge to the security of their most cherished rights [secured by the king’s 1639 Deal] and to find in assurances from the King their chief guarantee” [99] Wesley Frank Craven, the Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Louisiana State University Press, 1949, 1970), pp. 225-6. He cements this position and extends it to the colony’s reaction to the 1649 reaction to Parliament’s regicide, and to Berkeley’s unwillingness to abandon the Charles II, by asserting:
This meant in Virginia … all lawful authority stemmed from the crown … The colonists had no charter, visible evidence of rights conceded and bulwark for their defense in the courts. Instead public authority, which is to say all law, order, and security for life and property, rested on custom and usage sanctioned merely by the more mutable forms of royal consent. Virginia, first of the royal colonies, was thus uniquely tied, even in the most minute detail of its administration, to the royal right of government. [pp. 226-7]
Craven’s hindsight assertion locks in the heritage of the Virginia Company as it applies to its structures of governance, and to the post-1624 unique political development of the colony. That Berkeley (not Wyatt) proved the ultimate beneficiary of the 1639 Deal at minimum repairs much of the damage created by Harvey, but in 1642 confirmed the loyalty of Virginia planters to royal not Parliamentary government, a loyalty that would hold most of Virginia planters through to the Restoration.
Can we finally, if carefully, venture the return of the Virginia Company to Virginia governance was finally off the table. That was a page turner for Virginia and it was literally the first action taken by the Assembly in Berkeley’s first administration.
It appears the debate on the Declaration consumed so much time and effort that the Assembly prologued itself, and agreed to meet in June to finish up its agenda. Oh joy, they no doubt said, “summer in Jamestown, how wonderful”. But hidden in plain sight was that the Assembly wasted no time in exercising its new found power to control its own schedule by voting to adjourn, not recess which all pending bills would lapse immediately–the past practice. While it is a bit ironic to observe the use of “an adjournment” was the first act of an independent legislature, on such simple actions was democracy kicked started in Virginia.
In any event, the country reform bill was not tackled until June, In that session “Berkeley sanctioned all of Wyatt’s improvements in local government and the legal structure, which drew both nearer ‘to the law and customs of England in proceedings of the court and trials for causes’. He also approved changes that clarified parish boundaries and refined the solution of cases of disputed land titles“. At this point I inject that this is the institutionalization of the details involved in the 1639 Deal and that the instigator for it was Wyatt, now sitting on the Council and ensuring the new governor did not sandbag his hard work. Warren G. Billings, Little Legislature, pp. 26-7
Billings, however, rightly takes another perspective. He asserts that Berkeley’s role in the approval process of this fundamental legislation was more than mere following of royal instructions; “it also signaled something more trenchant: his willingness to accept Virginia’s institutional order as he found it> More overtly [Berkeley went one step further by his] bid for popular support by signing a repeal of the head tax [very unpopular] whose proceeds had been paid into the governor’s pocket [i.e. salary imposed by Harvey]. The assembly returned the favor. giving him an orchard and two rental properties in Jamestown that offset the loss of income. Finally to tie up loose ends, he received authorization to conduct trade talks with Maryland, and opened up discussion on Wyatt administration-approved legislation (1640) which was schedule to go into effect in 1642. [99] Warren G. Billings, a Little Legislature, p. 26
The legislation, “Settling of Peace and Friendship with the Indians … In Writing” came last, but knowing what lies only two short years ahead, deserves some comment. The 1640 legislation was an attempt by Wyatt to place some parameters on the movement into the Rappahannock River region, a movement sure to arouse the Powhatan. The intent was to reduce dramatically the settlement except by those able to secure grants and “settle” them with the securing of headrights and Assembly formal approval.
Virginia’s population was gathering momentum since 1635 and by 1642 pressure on the expansion into the Rappahannock was intensifying and in that area individual homesteads were too small to offer any defense in what was a very hostile and isolated areas. In his 1640 legislation Wyatt required grantees negotiate land transfers with the Powhatan, and stipulated Opechancanough be provided fifty barrels of corn per year for each land transfers. At the June 1642 legislative session, Berkeley apparently opened up discussion on the matter. Certainly with security in the region in question, likely Berkeley hoped he could minimize conflict with fair treatment and consideration for the interests of the Powhatan. Billings also notes the legal reorganization had also clarified parish boundaries, and reformed the process of resolved contested land titles–a matter of some urgency and an occasion of some long-standing corruption and misuse. [99] Warren G. Billings, A Little Parliament: the Virginia General Assembly in the Seventeenth Century (Library of Virginia, 2004), pp. 26-7
But last on the agenda, this complex and controversial Indian relations discussion, a first-order and fundamental issue, seemingly exceeded the patience of the Assembly; Berkeley, under such pressure, called an end to the session–postponing the matter to the next Assembly Session which convened the next year in March.
So, in June 1642, a year after William Berkeley started job-hunting–time to move on from his decade long court position. In May 1641 he started with an opening for the ambassadorship of Constantinople, but in June with that out of the quest, Berkeley switched his attention to the Virginia governorship. And now a year down the road, he was not just the governor, but had finished five months in office very successfully.
That his appointment process was rocky and complex , his initial administrative period Berkeley working in ways congruent with former governor Wyatt’s signature agenda, Berkeley had guided the initiatives, including critical county and parish, plus legal institutionalization he had truly extended the terms of the 1639 deal to the lower levels of Virginia’s policy system. Most importantly he had done so with a style and personality hugely different from that of Harvey–endearing himself to the legislators and officeholders, if not to the mainstream planter owners.
Revising the laws soothed local magistrates by strengthening the county courts in ways that enhanced the reach and prestige of the justices of the peace … Adding to the power of the county courts incrementally decentralized authority and invested county elites with nearly unchecked control of local affairs. [99] Warren G. Billings, A Little Parliament: the Virginia General Assembly in the Seventeenth Century (Library of Virginia, 2004), pp. 27-8
What ought be mentioned at this critical transformative session was the solidification of county government did not alter its representative distortion. The day-to-day distortion in civil liberties and indenture contracts which reduced a majority of voters to an owner’s property , an illiberal a society as existed in North America, meant in practice something much less than a step forward in America’s drift to democracy.
While I have repeatedly noted Virginia’s tilt to decentralization, its disproportionate reliance to county and parish governance, I have hopefully called attention to the oligarchic rule that persisted in these counties. While no doubt correct, the small size low population levels in these communities and settlements created face-to-face decision-making that could offer opportunity for one’s better angels, it also meant there was little check on the actions of its worst angels. Even if decentralized, the character and the compelling dynamic of this policy system was that governance was in the hands of an oligarchic elite. The structures and institutions of governance in that system were in the hands of a few, a very few, once they sat down in Jamestown.
The year between June 1641 and June 1642 had been hard, complex, wide-ranging, but it also was amazingly successful–a career blitzkrieg that settled him into Virginia. Still the remainder of 1642 went well. Seemingly satisfied with the course of affairs, former Governor Wyatt returned to England, permanently (he died in 1644). While Wyatt may have been the blocker and tackler behind Berkeley’s quick success, his departure provided Berkley with the opportunity to blaze his own trail without Wyatt looking over his shoulder. Wyatt’s departure gave Berkely a seat on the Council, that he combined with two other open seats to make three appointments. Claiborne, as mentioned previously would gain a seat and Berkeley secured one loyal to him.
Council meetings in the second half of the year “were uneventful, though orders were drawn for the planting of settlements in what became Gloucester County. More ominously were portents of trouble with some of the natives. Maryland governor, Leonard Calvert, sent an urgent plea for a hundred militiamen to go ‘against the Indians’ [which Claiborne blocked]. There was some discussions of recent ‘outrages’ closer to home. But no one seems to have heard the warning bells, and only minimum efforts were made to make preparations. So 1643 arrived on Berkeley’s doorstep and in many ways that year proved to be one of his best and most successful.
Ron W. Coan 