When Penn left Philadelphia for the first time in 1684, he left behind a borough with few formal structures of governance (if any). For all practical purposes Philadelphia between 1685 and 1701 lacked self-rule, and was administered and governed by Philadelphia County and Provincial level institutions of governance.
Bordered-sandwiched is a better term– on its north and south by two towns (suburbs) Penn’s urban port city and its economic base was arbitrarily fragmented into three jurisdictions, the largest and central of which had no known government of its own. Although it was the capital city of Penn’s province, arguably what governance it did enjoy was provided by governments whose delegate majority resided in hinterland/suburb non Philadelphia locations. This does not seem to me to be a promising “birth” of a great city.
The tale we tell in this module could logically be how and why self-governance finally came to Philadelphia in 1701. We could describe that governance and offer observations from which the reader might profit. Indeed, that is the first purpose of this module.
But there is another story–an economic one–that is at least as important, if not more important to Philadelphia as city. During the 1684-1701 period Philadelphia was unofficially one of the fastest growing urban centers in North America. With an estimated population of about 1,000 in 1683 (and near 100 in 1682), it grew to about 3,200 over the next decade and half. [99] P. M. G. Harris, “the Demographic Development of Colonia Philadelphia in Some Comparative Perspective” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 133, No. 2 (June, 1989), Table 1, p. 274. These are not big or impressive numbers today, but Boston’s 1680 population was 4,500 and in 1700 was 6,700 [99] http://www.iboston.org/mcp.php?pid=popFig. Boston was North America’s largest urban center at that time.
We could drown the reader with a raft of additional statistics (and we will, just later) that present a picture of a quite impressive development of its economic base–and supplement it with data that reveals by 1740-50 Philadelphia surpassed Boston (or New York) and became North America’s largest city–a position it held until about a century later. We could, and it will be the second purpose of this module to do so, how and offer some why’s that happened.
Perhaps the most valuable module task might be explaining why Philadelphia was a political morass and, yet, an economic gazelle. If Penn failed in establishing a commercially-led Pennsylvania economic base/commercial-political elite with his Free Society, something else wandered into the picture. The quick answer is Philadelphia developed a commercial business and artisan classes. Those classes provided economic and population growth and added political muscle that served as Philadelphia’s engine of municipal governance–the engine that substituted for the merrie olde English guild.
More precisely, we will see the 1701 Municipal Corporation did its best to imitate guild and assume many of its functions. The larger commercial and artisan classes, however, supplemented the Corporation’s initiatives–or compensated for them–and responded to larger urban needs and demands to which the Corporation could not address.
The commercial/artisan classes became the dominant force in Philadelphia colonial municipal governance–yet paradoxically and contradictingly, the main element that limited its participation in Pennsylvania’s drift to independence and revolution, and yet provided the driving force for its entry into the war, and its emergence as arguably the most radical democratic state in the Articles of Confederation.
the Political Task
Penn was always under pressure to incorporate Philadelphia, as its residents and budding elite instinctively saw necessary. His borough incorporation was likely not meant to be permanent, but in the immediate time frame could deal with the urban center’s most pressing issues. His leaving town in 1684, and the political chaos that ensued inhibited Penn from further initiatives. From the time his left left the Philadelphia’s horizon, significant anti-Penn opposition took shape, and in no time joined forces with other groupings, David Lloyd’s in particular, to become an imporant element in the anti-Proprietary political war.
It was very evident that significant elements of Philadelphia residents had concerns with the Proprietary and within five years of its founding, Philadelphia, left on its own was no bastion of Penn’s Holy Grail-Proprietary axis. In these early years, the reaction against the Free Society certainly was the primary reason for the emerging non-Society commercial businessmen.
But the flip side of that coin was that Philadelphia presented favorable opportunities for profit and entrepreneurship for those risktakers willing to venture–and the obvious point made earlier is that in these earlier years, risktakers from other colonies emigrated to Philadelphia in a steady stream. Each newcomer was another non-Free Society member, and was likely not to be a Penn Quaker devotee. As time went on successful risktakers accumulated wealth and their business enterprises grew in size, value, status and their owners, if they wanted, could play a greater role in political decision-making. The Free Society, as indicated earlier, was on the “downward trail” and was drifting more into a Penn-allied country club and business association.
Moreover, as a point of entry for new immigrants, it was a temporary waystation for many, some of which, indenture for instance, it became permanent. Most immigrants would proceed into the hinterland for homestead agriculture, but Philadelphia grew incrementally each year. That meant pressure on its physical development, strain on its non-existent port facilities, and a need to accommodate basic residential needs such as wood for fuel and home construction.
Simple opportunity from these demands created a “homebuilding” nexus-proto cluster, a collection of timber, woodcutting, furniture, land development, legal/surveyor and homebuilder businesses. Demands from the countryside fueled a need for tools and metal-intensive uses/repair that could not be solved completely by import, and metal-tinkerers, job shops sprinkled the Philadelphia landscape.
The simple scale of a growing urban settlement generated proto-clusters within which business owners, alongside apprentices, and laborers, suppliers–and even consumers who frequently bartered their goods/services for output. “Buy Quaker” support within the Quaker community provided startup resources. Philadelphia’s growth experience was not exception among North American port towns.
These little towns along the Atlantic coast were united by a common excuse for existence. Each served as a trade depot through which the goods of the surrounding countryside existed and imports from abroad entered. They were the chief points of distribution within the colonies, the focus of all buying, selling, and bartering, and trading. Moreover they were the hub of manufacturing–the home of the shoemaker, tinsmith, chandler, and baker. In these settlements the artisan practiced his trade and the merchant bought, sold and shipped his goods [99] Jon C. Teaford, the Municipal Revolution in America, p.17.
All this economic growth created political difficulties for a troubled absentee Penn. Facing increased difficulties in London, Penn made a deal with his ofttimes supporter David Lloyd in which Penn in 1691 incorporated Philadelphia into a city–and governance over to individuals most of which were loyal to Lloyd. From its hesitant start Philadelphia’s municipal governance seemed little more than a patronage for key members of Lloyd’s political entourage–a potential Lloyd political machine. Penn’s hopes that Lloyd would stay loyal were fragile at best, but it may have been the best he could have done. In the end it didn’t matter. Penn’s 1691 incorporation proved still-born. In any case, although still in existence, the Free Society was clearly no longer Penn’s preferred agent for Philadelphia governance.
Lloyd, as Deputy Governor in Penn’s absence, issued and implemented the first corporation charter. Lloyd’s charter barely established of any corporate presence. Several months later,, a seriously upset Crown/Parliament stripped Penn of his sole proprietorship and sent in a royal governor from New York to perform double-duty management of two colonies simultaneously. It would last through 1695. One can well imagine how chaotic those four years were. The corporation came to naught pretty quickly, and Diamondstone suggests the 1691 charter was “nullified in 1692” by the new royal governor (p. 186).
One supposes that after 1692, until 1701 Charter, Philadelphia reverted to its borough status, although no borough governance structures were evident, or elections held other than provincial. Philadelphia governance, such as it was, combined oversight and monitoring by the County of Philadelphia, and whatever legislation emerged from Penn’s Provincial Council and the Provincial Legislature.
In that chaotic period Pennsylvania local politics were almost indescribable–shifting opportunistic coalitions, a complex policy agenda–all of which did little other than weaken Penn and augment an anti-Penn Quaker resident majority. The quality of Philadelphia governance was at best inconsistent, opportunistic, and likely deeply unsatisfying to its residents.
Yet, of course, the city continued to grow, and its needs became so much more intense. When Penn returned to Pennsylvania, the incorporation of Philadelphia was on his agenda–as well as bringing to heel the smuggling and pirate treasure “cleaning” engaged in by its commercial. The Philadelphia matter was also a serious element in Penn’s anti-Proprietary political war, now led by his former sometimes ally, David Lloyd. Lloyd no doubt envisioned a return to his 1691 Philadelphia political machine. As we shall see Penn had his work cut out for him in 1699.
“The mayor and commonality of Philadelphia in the Province of Pennsylvania”
The municipal incorporation of Philadelphia occurred with the 1701 Charter of Privileges. That legislation resulted from Penn himself (within the Charter Penn retained the power to incorporate, but not to create a county), and was his final statement to Lloyd on what he was willing to do in regards to Philadelphia governance. Penn’s complicated agenda and the politics of the 1701 Charter of Privileges are discussed in a previous module, to which the reader is referred for its detail and implications.
The municipal corporation he created left the Free Society of Traders in the dustbin, and interestingly differed in at least one significant aspect, the electoral franchise, from the 1691 Philadelphia incorporation charter that David Lloyd had seized upon. The 1701 Municipal Corporation of Philadelphia (artfully entitled “the mayor and commonality of Philadelphia in the Province of Pennsylvania”) incorporated Philadelphia as a city.
The 1691 Lloyd charter had entrusted the electoral franchise to adult male residents who had met the residency and tax requirements. The 1701 Charter franchise was restricted on to “freeholders of property” admitted as members to the member-based Municipal Corporation of Philadelphia. The initial membership was appointed directly by Penn. The difference between the two shifted the Municipal Corporation from a more democratic political base to a closed membership corporation of landowning appointees, the its future members of which required confirmation by the existing membership. At first glance one wonders if Penn wanted to ensure Philadelphia did not fall into the hands of his opposition, and would not be an offshoot of the Provincial Quaker Party and the Legislature.
What ever else this legal corporation was, whatever other purposes it was meant to achieve, the 1701 corporation charter set Philadelphia governance apart from the interests and control of its residents, and placed them into the hands of a potential political machine. The question of which political machine was left in a confused state, as Penn’s initial appointees were as often as not Lloyd supporters as his own.
Although Penn named the four principal officers from among his supporters, fourteen of the twenty aldermen and councilors chosen [by him] had signed Lloyd’s petition of protest [which had triggered Penn’s reluctantly issued Charters of Privilege] [99] Joseph E. Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania: a History (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), p. 74 This none-too-subtle bipartisan composition of the Corporation’s governing elite suggests the political compromise that underlay the Charter of Privileges.
A behind the scenes deal with Lloyd may have been arranged to ensure passage of the legislation after Penn’s departure. In any case, from its inception, the Municipal Corporation of Philadelphia presided over the city, and was not representative nor accountable to its residents and voters.
Penn feared London was still considering yet again, revoking his proprietorship (it was), and he wrote several pieces of legislation which he submitted to the Provincial Legislature immediately previous to a final departure from Pennsylvania to England (1701). In his mind the extension of the democratic franchise to the New World mirrored his beliefs of a election franchise limited to elites–as it was in England–and to those elites supportive of him and his purposes. He also reinforced the Quaker constitutional provisions associated with equality, religious tolerance, separation of church and state.
My research did not find support for a Penn overly concerned with the disparity between Philadelphia’s growth-related needs and resident demands. The seeming political and administrative cattle stampede that “governed” Philadelphia’s core neighborhoods was poorly, if at all, connected to the population that lived within its truncated boundaries. Demographically the city from its get-go followed a different path than its neighboring and more homogenous Quaker townships.
Even by 1700 Philadelphia was a major urban center, a growing city whose governance required more government than a hinterland township or county seat. Its role as a port city, essential to provincial export and import trade, required specialized infrastructure. Its density and congestion not only hindered access within the city, but inhibited performance of its role as the hub of hinterland trade and commerce. There is no hint of this in his 1701 incorporation.
If anything the disparity between Philadelphia’s residential population and the 1691 adult male franchise on which the Lloyd incorporation rested had increased. Workers, former indentures whose term of contract had expired, household slaves, and apprentices and sailors settled in its confines, and, lacking property, or the funds to acquire property, were left out of the Pennsylvania electoral franchise–they formed a late medieval lumpenproletariat.
There is reasonable evidence from his writings that Penn had no special affinity to these folk, and little to no inclination to extend democracy to them; his writings often would label them as “the Mob”, a term used with great frequency to describe a rootless and “mobile” mass with few ties and little commitment to responsible voting and citizenship. So it should be little surprise, that manor-born William Penn did not create a truly democratic franchise in Philadelphia. There is no doubt Penn identified the working classes of Philadelphia as linked more to the Lloyd Quaker Party than to his Proprietary axis. Hence, once sees his very closed membership-based municipal corporation that was created in his 1701 Charter.
What also is equally valid is that it is “a private corporation”. Penn had replaced guild-certified freeholder franchise with a Quaker moneyed elite–who did not necessarily reside in Philadelphia–with private individuals often from a selected set of families who over time looked more like a Roman Senate oligopoly whose interests in the affairs of a Roman Mob was negligible if not oppositional. Penn had “privatized” Philadelphia governance, yes, but he did so in a very distinctive “style” than what would evolve in other American cities of size (New York City being the most conspicuous counter-example).
the Position of the Municipal Corporation within the Provincial System of Government: Structural Autonomy Meant Political Isolation and Degeneration of Effectiveness
Our previous English to Philadelphia municipal corporation discussion alerted the reader to several “moving parts” (dynamics) that would play a role in its organization, policy-making, and effectiveness: these included the tradition of guild-Managed Privatism, the absence of the guild in America, the vagaries of personal rule/administration by the sole proprietor, the “herding cats” value system of Quakers and First Purchasers
About fifty families were included in its initial membership. This was far from Athenian democracy at its best. The members were the Corporation’ voting franchise, and they elected a “city council”. The lowest level of the Philadelphia Corporation, the city council, elected a higher level legislature , the aldermen, who themselves elected the mayor and recorder annually. The mayor possessed little formal power, and no pay for his efforts and troubles. Reimbursement for expenditures was all they got. The office was so inherently undesirable in later years that a fine had to be paid if one did not serve. Many paid the fine.
The council had the right to enlarge itself at its own discretion. As the city grew in population, the council “drafted” the election of members, and then “qualified” them as “freeholders” eligible to vote as Corporation members.
The Council and Aldermen came into session about four times a year–although as we shall see there were bursts of sustained activity periodically. A bare quorum was usually in attendance, but formal record keeping, vote tallies and description of agenda and legislation was minimal. An accurate assessment of the Corporation’s policy-making is not possible given the historical records now available. Usually the members met at the annual meeting, and attended Corporation affairs after only to the extent they were called to action.
Changes in the Common Council–a body of twenty-two men in 1701–depended on the wishes of whatever faction held a majority vote there; the dominant party decided who to choose to membership [in the powerful Board of Alders], and whether new members be chosen at all. The [Philadelphia] Corporation government was thus closed … in striking contrast to the New England town to full or even meaningful citizen participation” [99] Judith Diamondstone, “the Government of Eighteenth Century Philadelphia” in Bruce C. Daniels (Ed), Town and County: Essays on the Structure of Local Government in the American Colonies (Wesleyan University Press, 1978), pp. 243-4.
That these Quakers were likely to appoint their sons or male relatives as their successors meant that the Municipal Corporation’s membership could evolve over time into a oligarchical aristocratic body. almost a family affair, and that families could develop coalitions and rivalries with other families given sufficient time–and the possibility future descendants may or may not retain their Quaker beliefs or redefine them meant the body could lose much of its Quaker legacy. In the Municipal Corporation we see the seeds of a body that resembled the Roman Senate than Parliament.
In fact all these scenarios did to some degree occur over the next seventy-five years would hint the 1701 Municipal Corporation of Philadelphia was not thought out very deeply by Penn, and the structure of the Corporation was faulty from its start, and prone to evolve in ways not helpful to effective governance of the city. There was precious little of Winthrop in Penn and less commitment to responsible governance in Quakerism than in Puritanism.
In fact political responsiveness of the general community does not appear to have been an important goal of the Corporation; response to the interests of the Philadelphia upper class or at least of those well-to-do families from which most Corporation members were drawn, was far more important. Private self-interest animated the Philadelphia Corporation far ahead of service to the community [99] Judith Diamondstone, “the Government of Eighteenth Century Philadelphia” in Bruce C. Daniels (Ed), Town and County: Essays on the Structure of Local Government in the American Colonies (Wesleyan University Press, 1978), p. 248
The reader may assume correctly that I have given her a glimpse in the crystal ball of the Philadelphia Corporation. What the reader might not know is this Corporation “governed” if that is the word, Philadelphia into the 1776 Revolution. In that year it was overthrown by outside agitators (Massachusetts Addams’ Family (Sam and John) and Thomas Paine). It was replace by a radically democratic city governance, hints that the gap between the Philadelphia Corporation and its residential base widened considerably over the next seventy-five years.
Philadelphia’s Policy-Making Quandary
The municipal corporation established by the Charter of Privileges in 1701 had to find its niche in the competitive cacophony that was Pennsylvania’s post-Charter of Privileges policy system. The Philadelphia Corporation overlapped by Philadelphia County, was given some autonomy and representation in county decision-making. But the County was ascendant in several policy areas, including judicial and land development, and the setting of taxes and tax rates.
At the beginning there were few precise boundaries between the two, and that set the stage for some county involvement in city policy-making, outright conflict, and the city’s commercial role as the hub of Pennsylvania commerce and trade. Expensive port infrastructure fell mostly within the city, and the city was dependent on vital goods and produce from the hinterland meant the two were in constant tension. Density created the need for services and institutions (the Night Watch and Custodians of the Poor) for which some level of approval, if not resources for which county concurrence was necessary.
It was not the County that was to become the nemesis of the Municipal Corporation, however, it was the Provincial Legislature. The Provincial legislature (reduced to one branch in 1701) met in the capital city. Unique in the Thirteen Colonies, a unicameral legislature meant by definition the lower house, the Assembly had a monopoly on provincial legislation–there was no appeal to an upper legislative body. The only meaningful check on the Legislature was the Proprietary Executive Branch (Deputy Governor, and the Cabinet-like council). That, of course, meant the Municipal Council got dragged into the nasty brutish political civil war that befell Pennsylvania politics over the next seventy-five years.
The Corporation held two seats in the thirty-four seat Assembly and hence the rural-hinterland bias of the legislature was rather pronounced. The Pennsylvania General Assembly was very much involved in Philadelphia governance in its day-to-day affairs. More damaging was many Legislative delegates were residents of the city, but not members of the Municipal Corporation. The reverse was also true.
Still with no natural path to a legislative majority for actions it proposed, the Corporation was at the mercy of the Legislative leadership, and the dominant Quaker Party which held sway in the Legislature through most of the colonial period. Committee chairs were speaker-appointed, and the small but important bureaucracy that was created over the years also largely within the purview of that leadership. Less obvious was the Legislative, as a body, did not “identify” with, nor was it dependent upon, the Corporation for much of anything.
As Judith Diamondstone asserts “The Philadelphia Corporation played second fiddle to the provincial government on every count. It suffered from the Assembly’s presence in Philadelphia and from its tendency to interest itself in the details of city government“. Citing the classic historian of American cities, E. S. Griffith, she further asserts this situation was common in the colonies, quoting Griffith that “In many instances, notably in the capital cities, the assembly (lower house) appeared to regard itself as the actual government of the town” [99] Judith Diamondstone, “Philadelphia’s Municipal Corporation, 1701-1776” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography (April, 1966), p. 183.
What is not evident to the reader is Penn’s 1701 Charter of Privileges granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly the power to regulate cities. The Pennsylvania Corporation whenever it desired to enter into a new policy area, exert some specific power or program would have to appeal for approval from the State Legislature because the Philadelphia Corporation lacked specific authorization to do so.
That, as we shall see, allowed the Legislature the opportunity to either consent to empowering the Corporation and enlarging its sphere or operations and resources available–or figuring out its own way to resolve the issue or problem, without necessarily employing the services of the Corporation, i.e. it could bypass the Corporation and set up its own administrative channel into Philadelphia city-policy-making and implementation. Oh what a tangled web we weave when we write constitutions and charters.
The original 1701 Corporation (entitled “the mayor and commonality of Philadelphia in the province of Philadelphia”) was little more than a collection of elective offices. What it did retain from the English municipal corporation, however, was its purpose, the functions and policy areas assigned to it, both of which mirrored those of the traditional English municipal corporation.
In Penn’s words the function of the Philadelphia Municipal Corporation was “for the more immediate and entire government of the said town, and better regulation of the trade within“. which Diamondstone summarizes as “the Corporation was both a commercial body, and a political and administrative one ..As a commercial body it supervised the markets and fairs, the wharves of the port, and the commons of the city” (parks and public buildings) [99] Judith Diamondstone, “Philadelphia’s Municipal Corporation, 1701-1776“, p 186-7 .
Implicit in this assumption of English guild-led municipal responsibilities was the Corporation was held responsible not simply for its own operations, but for a substantial portion of the province’s economic base. The Corporation was “both a commercial body and a political or administrative one” p. 186)
The” better regulation of trade” included maintenance of several market areas and public fairs, constructing the buildings associated with each, setting the price of food staples and necessities, establishing and inspecting weights and measures, establishing and regulating the rates of modes of transportation, and constructing and maintaining facilities. Philadelphia’s problem, not evident in 1701, was how to pay for expenses and debt related to these functions–the administrative power to tax for specific purposes was the key administrative power not specifically mentioned in the corporation’s charter.
While Philadelphia’s economic functions were reasonably precise, its urban administrative functions/powers were loosely defined: “and to make … such and so many good and reasonable laws, ordinances, and constitutions (not repugnant to the laws of England and this government {proprietary] as … shall seem necessary and convenient for the government of said city“. Colonial courts and the state legislature, however, were “literalist” and biased toward limited government/low to no taxes: if the constitution does say it outright you don’t have the power.
With an incredibly nasty, chronically polarized elite-dominated partisan policy system, the average Pennsylvanian was virtually untaxed and ungoverned, burdened by little governmental regulation, and free to improve and prosper economically, and accordingly move up into the colony’s political elite. If ever a city could be compared to a enterprise or opportunity zone that endured for nearly a century, 18th century Philadelphia would be it–no wonder Sam Bass Warner found it the bastion of privatism.
It is perhaps possible that even Ayn Rand would have been happy there. It is also little wonder the City became America’s largest, its port the biggest, its piers the entry way for America’s first horde of foreign migrants, its merchants the wealthiest–they would found America’s first commercial bank, and by the time of the Revolution it served as the capital of the Articles of Confederation,. Until 1840 Philadelphia was North America’s most heavily populated urban center (if one counted its two suburbs).
Ron W. Coan 