The Policy System: Political Leadership and Business Coalitions
It may seem strange to start this discussion with a Washington-based, business-led EDO—the Committee on Economic Development (CED)—but corporate America’s new EDO played an important role in immediate postwar western municipal policy systems. Through a network of local chapters, and supported by CED-member branch firms present in the West, influential businessmen advocated a sub-state policy agenda that stressed “progress,” modernization/reform of public sector capacity, and railed against corruption, machine bosses and parochial jurisdictional leadership unfit “to guide their city into the modern age.”
That latter description fit the older, and very tired, business leadership that dominated many western cities’ political and economic life. This now third- or fourth-generation native business leadership, whose family forebears initially founded and scratched progress and growth out of the western wilderness, had settled into a closed, stagnant, semi-corrupt old boys’ policy system—favoring limited growth, and little change. That ran counter to growth expectations of the young GI business community and the horde of war year residential newcomers.
Electorally pressured, these tired local elites faced another serious threat from new branch firms (many CED members) and their local network of small business supply contracts and jobs. Branch corporate leadership was uncomfortable with tired native business elites that controlled chamber leadership and obstructed their growth plans. Branch business newcomers allied with GI entrepreneurs/startups that pressed hard for municipal growth strategies perceived as favorable to their business prospects. To these young businesspeople, nepotism, no growth and closed networks that the old business order protected needed to be broken.
Young municipal business reformers remained faithful to the principles/reforms of the old City Efficient movement which were also cornerstones of the CED approach:
Their immediate goal was often to update antiquated municipal administrations, and provide a fuller range of city services at lower costs. Beyond the classic Progressive goal of efficiency [reform businessmen] hoped to mobilize public and private resources to build the necessary physical facilities for economic growth. (Abbott, 1998, p. 39)
They advocated for a modern, efficient, honest and open city government; a strong annexation program to capture existing or prospective suburbs; a modernized downtown, highways and airports; new port facilities to accommodate America’s international trade and financial leadership; and were concerned with water access and air pollution (Abbott, 1998, p. 39).
Many western cities (including Denver, Phoenix, Albuquerque and a ton of smaller California cities such as San Jose) inherited a postwar sleepy, clubby and mostly closed policy system populated by burnt-out, very comfortable, crony patronage—descendants of the original business booster class. If one wanted slow, to no, growth, these were your guys. Things got hot when the soldiers came home and newcomers moved in after the war: “Aspiring entrepreneurs and professionals and prominent business executives sympathetic to the goals of the National Committee on Economic Development (CED) … stood to benefit directly from a growing population and expanding market” (Abbott, 1998, p. 38). Unable to access the closed old city hall policy system, and at odds with its no-growth tendencies, they gravitated to, and then transformed, chambers into instruments of political and ED change. Between 1945 and 1955 these elements combined, conspired and organized civic action groups—political parties by any name—successfully competed in at-large, non-partisan elections that saturated western cities.
Using Phoenix as an example, future Senator Barry Goldwater broke into politics as its charter government’s candidate for the 1949 city council. His platform included making “city government more efficient at annexing outlying districts and attracting new industry” (Findlay, 1992, p. 21). Business neo-progressives took over city halls, installed growth coalitions and held on for dear life until collapse in the seventies. Once in power they upgraded and modernized city administration (city manager) forms, strengthened planning, budgeting, the civil service and fiscal administration, and promoted lean and efficient management to deliver low-cost (therefore low-tax) city services.
Growth was their middle name, and infrastructure and annexation were their favorite economic development tools. Airports and water, the West being dry, infrastructure were first-order priorities, as well as highways and streets. Proud of their city and the growth it was enjoying, these Abbott-labeled neo-progressives took special pride in their downtown, a driver of growth in itself and a symbol of both metropolitan and regional status and power (Findlay, 1992, p. 31). A succession of annexation initiatives followed. By 1960, 75 percent of Phoenix residents lived in areas that were suburbs in 1950.
Success in 1950s neo-progressive-led annexation drives sowed seeds of future frustration. During the 1960s suburban Scottsdale, Tempe, Glendale and Chandler put the kibosh on Phoenix’s annexation drives.
Mesa boosters energetically pursued both industrial and residential growth. [Mesa] bought up water rights, promoted its downtown, and sought new businesses. Glendale offered a $20,000 bonus to the first citizen that could bring a 100,000 sq. ft. factor to town. Business and civic groups such as the East Valley Partnership, the West Valley Partnership and Phoenix Together gave lip service to regional cooperation, but competed for everything from sports facilities to educational institutions. (Luckingham, 1982, p. 267)
New suburbs such as Del Webb’s Sun City (Arizona) exploited the pervasive demand for suburban lifestyle, On January 1, 1960 Webb opened up six model units for inspection. By the end of the weekend an estimated 100,000 had traipsed through, and nearly 250 homes were sold. After 1961, Phoenix was successful in only one annexation.
So, in western city after city these three elements (newcomer voter, CED branch corporate leadership and young GI entrepreneur reformers) combined into businessman-led “growth coalitions” that rose to power in the late forties and fifties, persisting, with ebbs and flows, through the sixties and early seventies. In some cities these reform movements jelled into more or less formal civic organizations (Phoenix), in others to more erratic political/bureaucratic leadership (Portland). Economic development policy initially focused on annexation/infrastructure/highways/public services to foster growth and consolidate control over the immediate hinterland. Eventually this proved expensive, hard to implement and generated intense opposition in second-ring suburban communities. At that point their strategy shifted to CBD-focused urban renewal—and highways.
Reform policy systems contained many moving parts that did not always mesh well, or that unleashed new forces such as public bureaucracies that had their own agendas (economic development and planning the most obvious, but also water authorities and transportation agencies). The coalitions and civic organizations ebbed and flowed as one might expect due to personalities, competing interests and perspectives and normal political wear and tear. Public sector reforms, including budgeting and planning, installing city manager form of governments were one thing, but more problematic electoral reforms (at-large versus wards and non-partisan elections) crippled local political parties, engendering more personalistic and charismatic tendencies that chipped away at the coalitions’ effectiveness and stability. They also created a policy gap between city government and the increasingly ethnic/racially homogenous low income neighborhoods.
In the 30 or so years these coalitions dominated western municipal policy systems a number of ED strategies, programs and tools were employed. Through the fifties annexation/infrastructure/public services/transportation—and the tools important to them (bonding, eminent domain, planning)—were common. The motivation underlying the strategy reveals a subtle but critical difference from Big City strategies during these periods. Western economic development resembled an earlier movement, the City Beautiful, that stressed a “coming of age,” growth, prestige—and a breaking of the colonial shackles accomplished by their forthcoming entrance into a national urban hierarchy. They were not trying to preserve a central city hegemony, but rather to establish one. They tried to replicate the path Big Cities had followed in earlier decades. They were, after all, trying to become “Big Cities.” The choice, as posed by Carl Abbott, was whether each western city was to “enter the big leagues” or develop into a “sad sack city” (Abbott, 1981, pp. 141–3). East of the Mississippi Big Cities were fighting a totally different battle.
In the section below, selected municipal descriptions of policy system change and ED policy provide some “flavor” and depth to this brief overview. The city of Albuquerque serves as a “typical western second-tier city.”
Ron W. Coan 