The Great Subway Race
Henry, the elder brother, moved to Boston, forging its premier streetcar and residential development empire. By 1890 an estimated 114 million rode electrified streetcars of his West End Street Railway Company. But Henry wanted more—he wanted to go underground. In 1887 he had proposed to the new Democrat Mayor Matthews at the annual meeting of the Boston Real Estate Exchange that his company be given “the main avenues wide streets; give us room for the development of transportation interests.” But Matthews wanted something different:
It was not … the job of the West End Street Railway Company to dictate the course of the city, to decide which neighborhoods got trolley stops or wider streets and which did not, or to determine how far into the suburbs the transit lines went … As their mayor he pledged that it was time to take back the streets from the corporations that rule them and return control to the people. (Most, 2014, pp. 190–91)
Caught between a Privatist rock and a Progressive hard place the subway had little future in Boston. In New York, however, newly elected Republican Mayor Hewitt had (in 1888) proposed that the city would pay for the subway construction built by and leased to private enterprise so long as they would operate/maintain the system and pay interest on the bonds. The city would not go bankrupt in building and operating the system—and the private sector would run it and make such profits until the line, upon payment of the bonds, would convert to city ownership. There was a fly in the ointment, however: New York City’s largest streetcar owner and potential Democratic presidential candidate, William Whitney (the other brother), was opposed. And so the race to build America’s first subway commenced.
Boston surprisingly got digging “firstest with the mostest.” Henry made a critical decision which made the subway technically possible—he partnered with Frank Sprague and converted incrementally his West End Railway to electric-powered cable. That decision uncomplicated the construction and cost of subway construction, and made the ride more comfortable for passengers. While both accepted electrification, Mayor Matthews and Henry Whitney could not agree on who should build and where to build. Henry, in frustration, retired from his business in the fall of 1893, taking the West End Railway Company out of the subway business and leaving subway construction bidding open to the lowest bid. So, in 1894, Mayor Matthews, having gotten his way, secured approval from the Massachusetts legislature for the city to own and build a subway and to lease its operation/debt repayment. An 1894 referendum approved municipal bond issuance (by only 1250 votes), and construction commenced in March 1895.
On September 1, 1897 the first subway train, Car 1752, powered by Sprague’s electric system, rolled out loaded with invited dignitaries for America’s first subway grand opening (Mayor Josiah Quincy IV ignored the invitation). The Tremont Street Subway (the first section of the “T”’s Green Line) opened for business. The race was over. Boston won. However the more interesting story was the New York City subway.
Mayor Hewitt’s 1887 proposal for subway municipal ownership got off to a good start as the New York City Chamber and the Real Estate Exchange quickly endorsed it. The Times opposed it, and so did the voters—they tossed Hewitt out of office in the next election. Satisfying Dillon’s Law (see Chapter 3), the proposal was signed into law by the state in 1891 as the Rapid Transit Act. Recognizing the continuing power of Tammany Hall, that legislation required the private sector to finance construction and system operation (to keep Tammany out of subways). The 1891 legislation led to the formation of the Transit Commission chaired by piano-maker William Steinway. The Commission was entrusted with design and routes, and to bid out its construction. William Parsons (later of Parsons Brinckerhoff fame) was appointed the Commission’s Deputy Chief Engineer.
Steinway poured his heart and soul into making the subway work—but William Whitney and other streetcar owners were not interested. They were investing in the elevated system—subways only complicated matters. The Panic of 1893 killed any hope of private financing, and so New York City, as far as the subway was concerned, seemed in stalemate. But in 1890 London opened a new and improved electrically powered subway, and it appeared that 1894 Boston was on the verge of subway approval and financing—so New York City’s urban competitive juices got its elites re-motivated. Although the NYC 1890 Steinway Commission was dead in its tracks, former Mayor Hewitt, also a former NYC chamber president, convinced the chamber to take over subway advocacy. The NYC chamber formed a committee and resuscitated Hewitt’s hybrid EDO (public financing, private construction and operation).
Believing that city government (and Tammany) would frustrate the project, the chamber secured city authorization to form an independent (self-perpetuating) Subway Commission, with six of the eight members (including the chamber president) being chamber leaders. The Tammany-controlled state legislature attempted to assert control over the Commission, but the chamber rebuffed its efforts. The Chamber Commission drafted and submitted a bill (1894) to the state legislature which was approved/signed by the governor in three months. The state legislature’s 1894 Rapid Transit Act embraced Hewitt’s hybrid EDO, but added referendum approval before any bond issuance. The referendum endorsed the chamber’s plan by three to one. The Subway Commission quickly issued public bonds and subcontracted construction and contract oversight to the chamber itself (Mead, 2014, pp. 144–5; Teaford, 1984, pp. 190–91).
So, by 1895 both cities had approved a similar HEDO, adopted similar technologies, developed a route system and approved municipal financing. The race was virtually a tie. In March 1895 Boston broke ground; New York City broke ground the same month—but five years later in 1900. What happened?
New York City downtown property owners had to concur on routes through downtown areas; they refused, and the state Supreme Court affirmed the action. Crushed, the Subway Commission was put on hold, Parsons, went to China, the United States entered the Spanish–American War—and the New York subway was stopped in its tracks. Enter William Whitney.
Whitney (with Jay Gould) controlled the New York City transportation system, and nearly all light, heating and power lines underneath his routes through another organization, the New York Gas and Light Company. The tangled mess that was streetcar transportation/energy/light franchises was untenable—and Whitney knew it. In his frustration he asked his brother Henry what he would do. The reply was to hire Henry’s chief engineer and electrify and build a subway—all of which William did. He proposed a plan to the city in which he would essentially, own and operate the line but pay the municipal debt incurred to construct it. In the Progressive Era, that monopoliststyle control would never fly, especially in a city that had seen Henry George run for mayor. In 1899, once again stalemate.
The city called for construction bids under the 1894 financing plan, but only two bids were received. The construction firm closest to Tammany was approved; it secured financing from a wealthy investor, August Belmont Jr., who formed an operating company: the Interborough Rapid Transit Company (IRT). The IRT, however, found no bankers willing participate, even though it had secure municipal financing; the IRT also found when it went to the New York state legislature for a corporate charter to operate a subway line that state legislative support was not forthcoming. Belmont solved both problems in a secret meeting with the person responsible: William Whitney. Weeks later, William Parson’s pickax broke ground for construction. On October 27, 1904 the subway officially opened.
Ron W. Coan 