Benjamin Franklin strikes me as a sort of John the Baptist figure in American history. Like the Baptist, Franklin paved the way for our colonies to proceed down the path to revolution and independence a good generation before the Continental Congress. There will be another module that dwells on Franklin’s role and activities in the post-1776 period. In this module he is no John the Baptist as this module concentrates on his impact and role in Pennsylvania colonial politics–the late era politics of the Penn Frame Policy system. Franklin played an important and impressive role in those politics, more than Washington did in Virginia politics of his day. Franklin was more the politician by far than Washington; it is amazing that both were so successful in business, and carried those skills and resources into their political lives but Franklin was more natural and effective. Amazingly, however, given their personalities, Washington was the more charismatic, yet the reader ought to sense Franklin, the Privatist man on a white horse, owed much of his power and electoral success to his charismatic appeal to the general public, and especially to Philadelphia elites.
Benjamin Franklin is another of the great personalities that from time to time populate this history. We saw in Chapter 1 Virginia a never-ending parade of these folk, but Franklin is easily the most known Pennsylvania Founding Father, and here he is. So at this point, for future reference, I would like to explain the manner which I discuss these interesting and extraordinary American heroes. Unlike a more popular history, or an historical biography, this history takes only those aspects of the historical figure deemed useful to its ends. To make matters worse, at least a lot more boring, as a rule this history is a story about policy-making processes, institutions, and structures–and the underlying political culture from which they emanated. There will be fascinating information left to the side of the road, and other than adding a lot more pages to a page-heavy history, there is no alternative. This is not meant to be a popular history, although I wish I could make it so.
So what do I see Franklin offers to this history?
- As an outsider, sort of, to the Quaker political culture that dominated the policy system in which he labored, Franklin was a political wildcatter who one senses approached matters differently than his Quaker fellow politicians. He was an activist, and was sufficiently Yankee Puritan to be willing to use government for larger ends, and to press a point and provide a service. While not lacking in ego or power drive, there are few politicians I know that would be willing to leave the active political scene and go to London on a mission to remove the Proprietorship. Predictably much happened, not all to his interests, while he was gone, and one has a hard time seeing Lyndon Johnson doing the same if he were given the opportunity. Clearly he does not view politics as the typical power politician, and he is not harnessed to achieving a particular office, such as the speaker of the General Assembly (which he would briefly hold). Here is an example then of the Privatist, charismatic, business leader stepping in at a critical time to master a seemingly troubled political situation. We see in Franklin less the proto-typical example of an emerging Midlands political culture, than a sterling example of the emerging elite Federalist political culture.
- Franklin was very willing to use his newspaper or printing office to publish a thoughtful, even conceptual political or economic argument. He did not simply advocate, for example, the use of paper money as Pennsylvania currency, but he also defended it intellectually and pragmatically. He was not afraid to read and use the pamphlets, ideas, and intellectual discussion of his day–demonstrating his wide range of interests, and an ability to develop a serious defense of an issue. Franklin wrote about matters we consider relevant to economic development, and he personally put them into real life initiatives. It is difficult to fix Franklin as a community developer or a mainstream economic developer but the reality is he combined both as logical extensions of the other. That is a view I share; the two are supplementary, and each balances the inadequacies of the other. We will take time to assess his written work relevant to economic development.
- Finally, as Franklin often practiced what he preached, we can see in Franklin’s activities and initiatives the use of structures, processes, and institutions. His use of the “junto” is especially interesting to me. I think of it as a colonial forerunner to the not-for-profit organization (NPO). In his initial advocacy for paper money he presses for a Loan Office (not his invention, of course) as opposed to a bill of credit. The former issues paper money through loans to individuals and businesses using a legislative appropriation that must be paid off at a predetermined year to fund the Loan Office. This is an antecedent of a public revolving loan fund–used to achieve particular policy ends, but foremost to serve as a currency. In the 1750’s however, with Franklin as a legislator, a new bout at issuing public money will employ a bill of credit, which we shall argue is a colonial forerunner of our present-day tax exempt bond. Why did he shift? Another structure with which Franklin becomes heavily involved is the land development corporation, which in its best light is Franklin’s public-private, quasi-government chartered corporation.
- Finally in another module, one can wonder what in the world Franklin hoped to achieve by repudiating the Penn Frame of Government policy system and replacing it with a royal governorship–at a time when when most of the thirteen colonies were already on the road to autonomy, if not independence from Great Britain. Virginia at the time was arguing with its royal governor, and clearly pressing to render him accountable to the Virginia Legislature.
Brief Introduction and Characterization
Franklin’s background was urban, he was raised and lived his early teenage years in Boston, and was trained as a printer and as such was an “artisan”, who had learned his initial trade through a family apprenticeship. He was born in 1706, twenty-five years before the other “old man” Founding Father, George Washington. Those few years were a lifetime for many in colonial America. It is not clear the two ever met before 1774, although they certainly knew of each other. They were not alike in temperament, but shared several important characteristics, not the least of which that each were very successful businessmen, and that included serious ventures in western land development. Franklin was at Braddock’s HQ in 1755, and may have seen Washington there, but I am not aware they actually met in their earlier lives. Upon their meeting, they did become sincere “friends” as fellow political leaders of the Revolution.
He did have some formal schooling, unlike Washington, but both were principally self-educated. That make Franklin’s intellectual and educational achievements all the more impressive. He functioned very well in the worlds of science-experiment, economic theory, and political-philosophical thought. Franklin by the time he seriously entered Pennsylvania professional politics after 1748, was already well-known as a scientific and intellectual figure, and in Philadelphia and in London-Paris was a bit of celebrity–in Philadelphia as Poor Richard’s Almanac and his newspaper activities, in London for his experimentation, principally in electrification. At that point, he was not thought of as a businessman–and his career as a Founding Father did little to sharpen that image. That is unfortunate for this history because that businessman perspective is what we will focus on in this module.
First his early Pennsylvania years were as a start up printer, entrepreneur and arguably Philadelphia’s foremost commentator of human affairs, even humor. His newspaper complex, the Gazette and his printing business, were the core of his wealth and success. He enlarged that business to include partnerships in many other colonial big cities, and hence exhibited his extraordinary ability to think beyond a colonial border, in this case to a multi-colony marketplace. He traveled often, abroad (living in London as a printer apprentice for several years–a story that involves Pennsylvania’s Governor Keith), and networking was natural. Unlike many Philadelphia entrepreneurs, Franklin seldom stuck to his own business “knitting” and crossed occupations, something that being a newspaper editor facilitated. He always dabbled in political commentary, and Poor Richard reminds me much of Samuel Clemens characters. Upon his venture into politics, Franklin was a middle-age forties.
In Franklin we see yet another (Free) Mason. He would be Pennsylvania’s Grand Master. OMG, the academics reading this are now recoiling in horror, many have fainted and are now on the floor. Yet another crackpot idea, tossed into a babble posing as a history. Sorry, but in my world, freemasonry played a core role in the elite culture that framed the Declaration of Independence, the Constitutional Convention and at least until 1792, the Federalists. Washington too was a freemason. When he laid the cornerstone for the capitol building, he included masonic materials, and as we mentioned in his discussion, the masons promoted his Washington D.C. land sales with a parade and fireworks.
The key to freemasonry, and federalist elite politics, however, is much less the sharing of common viewpoints, shared system of beliefs or anything of the sort. Masons would be both federalists and anti-federalists–but with few exceptions they were also elites supporting American independence. Masons were the common association meeting ground of colonial, anti-British elites; by 1800 there was an estimated 350 active masons lodges, and they were found in every colony, and certainly in urban centers of any size. Masons were the rolodex of the budding federalists, the back door of the populist anti-Stamp Act agitators (the Indians of the Boston Tea Party, including Revere, changed into Indian garb at the Masonic Lodge). Having observed the value of freemasonry as a primary associational vehicle for federalist development, and a useful and durable vehicle for Franklin’s coalition-building and lobbying, I repudiate any position that the values, the content of freemasonry, had any major impact on the conceptual and theoretical development of the American Republic, the Constitution per se or any of the great documents.
Washington used the Masons for his land development business; Franklin was way more eclectic. He used them to forge his juntos. In France he joined a Parisian Lodge; while in London he also joined a lodge. He became a freemason in 1731 (?) and was Pennsylvania’s Grand Master by 1735. In 1752 he was placed on a committee to build the first Lodge Building (in Philadelphia) in the United States. In any event, freemasons played a large role in the development of a colonial American federalist elite. It was an elite version of the more populist Sons of Liberty. Franklin was pretty explicit in his motivation for joining–and I include it here to support my inclusion of freemasonry as a legitimate association that played a great role in coalition-formation, and less a role in policy-making. The below quote is taken from Franklin’s letter to his mother–who was not happy with his joining freemasonry:
I assured her that they are in general a very harmless sort of people, and have no principles or practices that are inconsistent with religion and good manners. He respected his Brothers for their peaceful ways, strong morals and dedication to self-betterment [who believed] in the Great Father [Deism] and worked towards a universal Brotherhood of all mankind [99] John Dicklie, the Craft (Public Affairs, 2020); https://freemasoninformation.com/2015/01/illustrious-brother-ben-franklin-and-freemasonry/; https:/www.azuremasada.org/founding-fathers; http://projects.leadr.msu.edu/uniontodisunion/exhibits/show/freemasons-and-the-murder-of-w/freemason-and-the-founding-fat; https://www.masonicworld.com/education/articles/THE-IMPACT-OF-MASONRY-ON-THE-CONSTITUTIONAL-CONVENTIONhm; https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/freemasonry/freemasonry-in-colonial-america/.
I don’t think Franklin, if only because of his generation cohort, did not operate on that level, fully embraced the average man perspective. His intellectualism and renaissance proclivities pushed him in opposite directions. We are talking about a man who could deal with Parliament and the Privy Council, as well as the French court of Louis XVI. Politically Franklin’s skill set was that of a lobbyist-coalition builder, with a bit of Machiavellian manipulator tossed in. Franklin was a pragmatist in science, and in politics and policy as well; he was not a paradigm-builder, nor an ideological theoretician. Franklin deal with ideas and coalition-building–a perfect match for the Grandfather Founding Father. But does this carry over to 1750 Pennsylvania politics-policy. Absolutely!
There is some point to this seeming digression: Franklin was not a Quaker, was not especially sympathetic to many Quaker values, and to my sense, not comfortable with much of the politics and political values that he saw in Quaker Pennsylvania daily life. I believe his tendencies display more Yankee-Puritan values and inclinations, but he fit in very well at Philadelphia coffee houses, and in its elite society. Like many a Westerner today, not being native born may have set him apart, but did not impair his integration into the Philadelphia way of life. His business career was his own and he forged meaningful friendships with many a Quaker, almost all the powerful ones, but his relationship with the Penn Proprietary, and the Penn family were, let’s say, “complicated”-antagonistic on a good day, and totally opposed enemies on a normal day. As time went on, the latter was victorious.
There has been much discussion by Pennsylvania historians regarding Franklin’s motivation for entering 1751 political life as an “independent” allied with the Quaker Party. Franklin did “dance to his own music”, and was not a tool of the Quaker Party leadership, and that he developed his own network (Joseph Galloway being the most significant) is undoubtedly correct. I will contend that Franklin’s chief source of electoral-relevant power was his charismatic hold on Pennsylvania elites and the general electorate. That power relationship was personal and based on Franklin’s non political reputation and experience, and no doubt an assessment of his character and personality which was possible to develop in what today would be thought of as “small town or coffee house politics”. His natural tendency was not to burn bridges but to maintain some semblance of a relationship.
As I insinuated in the above paragraph Franklin’s own positions, such as his feelings about the Germans, were not congruent with Quaker culture nor Quaker Party official tolerance. In that regard, Franklin, if anything, more reflected the attitudes and dispositions of the Philadelphia Anglican commercial elite and Pennsylvania entrepreneurial community. That from time to time we can see a egalitarian tendency in his politics–and definitely will see it after 1774, he was never really an egalitarian in his politics before then. His personal abolitionism came late in life, and even in these years, Franklin owned household slaves. Not surprisingly then, we find in Franklin that his politics were complex, changeable, but were comfortably within the British Whig traditions–until of course 1774 or so. We also shall see characteristic of the temper of the times that public-private conflict of interest was blurred, and that Franklin was never adverse to using public action for personal benefit. In this regard he is no saint, nor is he an egregious sinner. His late 1760’s involvement in western land development, a story we shall tell, is amazing (at least to me), and is every bit as self-serving as Washington’s use of Dinwiddie’s veteran land grants. As we have already discovered, Franklin had no qualms in advocating the use of paper money, and then when successful, accepting a government contract to print it. Economic development brings out the best in all of us.
An early concern of Franklin/Pennsylvania historians concerns the intensity of Franklin’s antipathy to the Penn Proprietary and his drift to be a Founding Father. His role as an influencer of Pennsylvania politics becomes a way station for many [99] for a very detailed histological reconstruction of this question see James M. Hutson, “Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 1751-1755: A Reappraisal” (the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol 93, Issue 3, (July, 1969), pp. 313-15. That the highest levels of the Proprietary, while exhibiting some restraint publically, did not hold Franklin in great regard privately suggests to me there was little going on behind the scenes.There is some evidence, in my modest opinion (sincere), that the antipathy deepened after the Paxton Brothers affair (1765), but the irreparable break was around 1755 (to be discussed in this module). In any case, as we shall see in 1755 the break was as complete as one can imagine, as Franklin went to London to lobby Parliament, Privy Council and whoever was pertinent to replace the Proprietary with a royal governor. I take the position Franklin was never comfortable with the Proprietary, but as a businessman-politician always tended to maintain personal relationships and a balanced or moderate political relationship with as many of the rich and powerful Pennsylvania elites as he could. Franklin, as I see it, was not a community developer people-oriented as Sam Adams, but was chiefly elite-based, not unlike John Adams and James Madison.
Franklin Steps into late 1740’s Pennsylvania Policy-making
1748 was the transition year from the politics of the 1740’s ro those of the 1750’s. That timing illogic is explained by the sheer impact of the War of Spanish Succession and its subsidiary, King George’s War. Both ended formally in 1748. The political turbulence of the early 1740’s (through the 1742 election) was due to the fractures in Quaker unity caused by the War, and by the opportunistic putsch led by the Proprietary faction leader William Allen. His hope that he could seize if not outright dominance over the General Assembly, at least administer a strong pushback to the Assembly’s assault on the Proprietary. Doomed to failure, or not, the result was a complete electoral repudiation of the Proprietary by the Quaker Party. The hold that party through its core Quaker element and the alliances it was able to form, reduced the Proprietary faction o a very rump minority in the Legislature. From there on, the reader can safely assume the Quaker Party, and its coalition, would safely remain in power through most of the 1760’s.
A second political fight that disrupted the early 1740’s was the Legislature’s battle with the Deputy Governor. This again exposes the fractured nature of the Penn Proprietary, but previous to 1748 the Penn appointee Governor Thomas was consumed by the Allen-Quaker Party electoral insurgency, during which his salary was withheld by the Legislature. Between navigating unpaid through the Board of Trade demands for war and Quaker resistance, holding the Legislature back on paper money issuance, and coping with the factions within the Proprietary, Thomas was at constant war against the Legislature. Not inclined to an active use of government, the war, especially after 1746 changed nature as eastern Pennsylvania was threatened with direct attack. The battle of “self-defense” described in the last module, personified the non-involvement/activism of the Legislature which, left to its own devices was unwilling to protect its homeland from invasion. Enter the private corporation, the Association, volunteer militia, and Benjamin Franklin as its privatist leader.
In any event, it was the war engendered rise in Quaker pacifism that consumed most of the political oxygen in the Pennsylvania colony-level system. Most of the war pressure found its way to the Legislature which had to cope with British efforts to make it contribute to the war effort. Quakers responded in what by this time was their traditional “no”, and then when pressed severely, with legislation providing support for non-war activities, knowing full well that those funds would be used to fight the war. A side issue that festered through the war was the Quaker Party pressing for the issue of more paper money, which of course, the British opposed for the colonies, but during the war were forced to allow some paper money to finance colonial war effort. Nevertheless as the war continued it was very clear to the colonies that the British, if anything, were stiffening their resolve to deny colonial paper money issuances, or keep in as low volume as possible. The Legislature, while approving periodic legislation to issue paper money, did no press the point after a Governor’s veto. By the end of the war, the issue was put on hold, as it appeared a London policy was forthcoming. After 1744, the Legislature and Deputy Governor reached an accommodation of sorts, more a cease fire, and both sides entered into a “quiet war”, with Governor Thomas, in increasingly poor health, on his way out to greener pastures.
It was the war the closed the gap between Quakers and Germans, while the Great Awakening stirred up some Scots-Irish passions. That aggressiveness toward established churches and a migrational pull that led Scots-Irish still arriving in considerable numbers out to set up homesteads in western periphery areas. That meant as discussed previously, land sales for the Penns, and trouble with the Native Americans (and the behind-the-scenes French). The legislature played a less than prominent role in 1740’s Indian affairs. Negotiating out these issues was pretty much left to the Penns, their executive branch, and a negotiating team that included, at times led by, a hard-line Quaker elite that attempted to maintain the traditional Quaker program of working with Native Americans for the sale of land, and fair treatment in general in colonial law and administration.
European migration to periphery continued, Indian lands were still being “seized”, and the bifurcated Iroquois-local tribes distinction, made a choice available to picking either the British or the upstart French who were seriously exerting influence (along with the Spanish in the lower colonies) in Pennsylvania’s northwest frontier (around Pittsburgh). All this, however, did little to deter the formation of new settlements, and a Pennsylvania steady push into its interior. The Penns, who were a constant in these negotiations and western land sales on balance were less interested in ameliorating Indians demands and insecurity than acquiring as much land as they could from them, and then selling that land quickly for the best price. As any need arose, however, for expenditure of funds, the Penns remained determined to continue as untaxed as possible. Paying any taxes of their unsold inventory of land was their key hot button, and next was their unwillingness to step to the plate to contribute fiscally toward paying of Indian negotiations, western defense, and infrastructure.
Negotiation was constant throughout this period, and although several treaties were signed and sizeable land sales culminated, but the underlying tensions between Europeans and Native Americans, if anything intensified. As western land migration inevitably shifted the balance of Pennsylvania’s population to the west, new counties were formed from the older counties–but these new counties were statutorily permitted fewer representatives to the General Assembly. Malapportionment, then, impacted on the legislature’s interest in playing an active role in western periphery matters, and did little to abate the drift of Scots-Irish toward working with the Penn Proprietary.
So in 1748, with the war at an end, and a new Deputy Governor (James Hamilton) was appointed by Penn (1748). Hamilton, 38 years of age, was a native Pennsylvanian, a Scotsman, Episcopalian, whose father had been a political powerhouse in past decades. James Hamilton had himself extensive political experience with service in Philadelphia and the General Assembly–as well as Penn Proprietary cabinet-like Governor’s Council. To help matters along, he was a friend and associate of Franklin. Known to all as a fair and temperate man, he was no hardliner, and his appointment by Thomas Penn suggested a willingness to cooperate in governance. The lull in the paper money issue provided an opportunity for a honeymoon period between the factions and contenders–an Era of Good Feelings (that lasted about two years}.
The events of the war with Spain and France, it has been shown, did not in the least shake the people’s faith in the Quaker Party, despite the fact that the great majority of the inhabitants no longer were either Quakers or pacifists. Quaker government in the eyes of the people were synonymous with good government, freedom and low taxes. When in the later stages of the war fear arose for the safety of the province, the people saved the Quaker Assembly embarrassment by adoption of Franklin’s extra-legal [more precisely private militia, funded by popular lotteries] military association. The war ended, the popularity of the Quaker Party reached new heights by its spirited crusade for more paper money [99] Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776 (Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1953), pp. 23-4.
Still, looking at actual goings on, this era of good feelings was pretty shallow–more a description of one’s vacation sent on a postcard–wish you were here (and I wish I wasn’t).
The paper money lull was not really a lull at all. It was expected the Board of Trade was going to ban the use of paper money imminently, and Hamilton was able to dissuade the Legislature from passing its annual bill appropriating a large issuance by pointedly observing to legislative leaders that would like prod the Board of Trade to issue the edict immediately, and blame Pennsylvania for its action–not endearing Pennsylvania to the other colonies. The arrival of a new charismatic force, Benjamin Franklin was more troublesome. His self-defense initiative had lead to the formation of nearly 100 volunteer companies, independently funded by popular lotteries and minimal government funds. Most commentary confine its assessment of the Association to Philadelphia where about ten companies included around 1,200 volunteers. About 90 companies were raised in the non-Philadelphia hinterland [99] Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776 (Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1953), p. 22. That military force was estimated about 10,000 volunteers (May, 1748), and although Franklin had declined an appointment as its Colonel, it was clearly Franklin’s outfit, and would follow his lead. The appearance of such a militia in Pennsylvania was a new experience for Pennsylvania, and to have it come in a form largely uncontrolled by its government–a volunteer force populated by “the people”, aka, the Mob, gave the appearance that Franklin himself was a potential populist with an army. It certainly could function as an “electoral constituency” as well. It may be little accident that Franklin began his formal political career in 1748.
In any event, the Association and its 10,000 volunteers caught the attention of William Allen who up to then had been a close associate of Franklin. Not so in late 1748 and after. Allen recruited Penn’s Provincial Secretary (Peters) and “worked on’ Thomas Penn to bring him around to check Franklin (Penn in the height of the invasion was supportive of the Association–or at least its capacity to protect his colonial enterprise). It is not hard to fathom why the Proprietary was unnerved with the Association, and the behind-the-scene reality was Franklin had been briefly tempted to use it but the war ended. The strength and unity of the Quaker Party convinced him it was the better part of valor to work with it. By 1749, the Association had ran its course, and no records exist of it thereafter. [99] Jessica Choppin Roney, “Ready to Act in Defense of Government: Colonial Philadelphia and Voluntary Culture and the Defense Association of 1747-8“, Early American Studies (Vol 8, No 2, Spring, 2010), p. 384
In 1748, Franklin had reached his agreement with his Editor Peter Clark, and handed his business over to the latter’s management. Franklin, of course, was still the owner, and received sufficient income to maintain himself for the remainder of his almost forty-five year lifespan. Much is made in Franklin’s various biographies of the asserted reason for Franklin’s retirement as allowing him the time and opportunity to conduct his much wanted scientific research and philanthropic/philosophical endeavors–the last of which will be considered shortly. True enough, Franklin did fly his kite on June 10, 1752 with his son William in tow. He had actually started research and experimentation on electricity earlier in 1746, and he did in 1749 intensify his efforts. For example in that year he killed several turkeys with electric shock, proclaiming the method of death produced more tender turkeys for eating. His other experiments were published widely, he was a printer after all, and it was these initiatives and his findings which genuinely conveyed global celebrity status. Most of his study of electrification was done by 1753, and published by 1755-6.
Timeline and Overview of Franklin’s Political Activities through the French and Indian War and Stamp Act
Renaissance man, proto-scientist-intellectual, Franklin in this history is an institution-builder, an activist whose constituency is Philadelphia’s elite. We cannot forget his generation; he was twenty-five years older than most of his Founding Father contemporaries. Certainly,he was of the Enlightenment without doubt, but he did not “learn” his enlightenment from books like Jefferson; rather it came from his own inner drive and light. Franklin did what he did, instinctively, and from his experience he developed his concepts. Franklin overlapped Washington in many skill sets, values, beliefs and priorities–but the two are different in key aspects, an example Franklin could overlap Washington’s developing Mainstream ED business and western development growth. But Franklin could do business with Sam Adams-Thomas Young, and his policy instincts pull him in directions that Benjamin Rush and Coxe were to follow. Whether the latter was his Yankee Puritan upbring, or socialization within the Quaker-inspired Philadelphia elite I do not know, but Franklin unlike Washington could deal with the “people” aspect of economic development–if only through elites, not as a agitator. His writings were his catalyst,-and his medium was working through elites for social-political ends. Franklin was a renaissance man of economic development.
All of which brings me to add a layer to political culture, a brief insight into the culture of political elites. Thus far I have not gone out of my way to add meat to the bones of the political cultures of elites. Other than asserting there are at least two levels of political culture, a mass-based political culture, and a culture of elites. I don’t think I overdid my discussion of Tidewater political culture in terms of its being an elite-based political culture–never a mass-based one (which BTW will be a major distinction between Tidewater and Deep South political cultures)–but in the end I hope the reader captured its core argument that it was the culture of Virginia’s planter oligopoly, and not the overarching culture of Virginians. In Quaker political culture, especially after it integrated the German into it, the Midlands culture is the Tidewater antithesis, the anti-elite average man political culture.
Franklin entered politics not like Napoleon with his artillery and military unit; he entered in as the behind-the-scene leader of a militia movement and quickly pivoted into Quaker Party-Philadelphia Municipal Corporation elite-based politics. His pivot into politics, however, was not complete, nor did he afford it exclusive priority over other activities. To the contrary, his greatest scientific exploits occurred in the period after this and 1756, and during this period he also engaged in several significant civic projects. (which we will discuss in a separate module) More germane to this module’s scope was in this initial period of politicization, Franklin, although working within the Quaker Party electoral and legislative networks, maintained a degree of autonomy from each, and in particular, did not pursue an anti-Penn crusade, espousing a moderate tone, and engaging in dialogue and cooperation with the Proprietary on key issues.
Nevertheless, his core political platform was not congruent with that of the Proprietary, and on the main was congruent with the Quaker Party. We shall see that as the years went by, Franklin moved steadily to a position of leading Pennsylvania to firmly request the cessation of the Proprietary and the Crown imposition of a royal governor in its place. The reader should note the period 1751 to 1755 was characterized by a pronounced drift to war with France, Spain, and most importantly, with western periphery Native American Tribes. In 1755 Pennsylvania became ground zero for the start of the French and Indian War (labeled by Churchill in his History as the “real” first world war). If Pennsylvania had largely escaped previous wars, it was the principal mid-1750’s battleground. The war started around Pittsburgh, and the British army suffered its worst North American military defeat, Braddock’s Massacre (July 9, 1755), on the road to Pittsburgh. As Pennsylvania’s Third Rail, that war could be expected to generate intense heat on Pennsylvania Quaker Party-Proprietary politics. Western settlement, Native American relations, the use of paper money as currency, and the fiscal crisis threatened by a future war and payment of debt for the past war combined and climaxed ending the earlier-mentioned era of good feelings. Franklin was”on board” through it all.
Unsurprisingly, we start out our period review with the longstanding use of paper money as currency issue, an issue that engaged the Legislature in a struggle against London and the Proprietary. The struggle was launched by the Board of Trade in June 1751 with its expected passage of the all-North America colonial “Currency Act”. The statute forbade the unregulated issuance of paper money as currency, but by its terms ONLY in NEW ENGLAND. Expectedly, Pennsylvania and other colonies took the Board of Trade at is published word and immediately and in its first session after the act (February, 1752) approved the issuance of 40,000 pounds–and it was promptly vetoed by Proprietary Deputy Governor Hamilton. Franklin, BTW, was first elected to the Legislature in 1he fall of 1751. Hamilton would summarily reject every subsequent legislative bill to issue paper money currency for the next eighteen months (to the onset of the French and Indian War). Initially, Hamilton claimed the Currency Act applied to Pennsylvania, but abandoned that position claiming Pennsylvania did not need paper money, and that Pennsylvania’s issuance would prod the Board of Trade to include Pennsylvania under the terms of the 1751 Currency Act. The Legislature did not take either of these rationales at face value, and instead believed Hamilton was acting on behalf of Thomas Penn and their Proprietary. Franklin, to remind the readers, had a more than twenty year history of advocacy and being a beneficiary of paper money as currency.
The underlying reality was a bit more complex. Penn did not forbid the Deputy Governor to deny the issuance of paper money, but he did insist the issuance of a “reasonable” sum by managed and directed by Proprietary officials–and the terms of the act be acceptable to the Proprietary. Penn wanted paper money to be used and issued in a manner to which he was comfortable. This was a backhand way to reduce the power of the Legislature, and to preserve the Proprietary balance of power. To understand the real battle going on, and, I might add to understand the structure of colonial use of paper currency (including Pennsylvania) we need to decipher the intricacies of the form of paper money issued: the bill of credit.
In defense of our focus on the bill of credit, several points need be noted. Bills of credit are only one form of paper money, BUT, it was the preferred form used by many colonies during the colonial period. It was certainly Pennsylvania’s. Secondly, bills of credit were used by the states during the Articles of Confederation–so they were a critical source of funding for fighting the American Revolution, and sustaining early states during and after the War. Because of the latter use of bills of credit, which shall be considered in their proper time by this history, state issuance of bills of credit were precluded by Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution. The reason was the voting majority of the Constitutional Convention believed the states use of bills of credit during the American Revolution depreciated/devalued the national currency. The early prominence of this provision in the Constitution should indicate the importance of this issue in the minds of the Founding Fathers. In the 20th Century, Federal Reserve Bank Notes were an approximate version of a bill of credit. In any event, as we review bill of credit in detail, it should be apparent the structure does apply to modern economic development financing–apart from its use as a paper currency. Paper currency in our history is regarded as an “institution”, a financial institution which is fundamental to the structure of the economy and economic base, and therefore a foundation or prerequisite to economic development financing.
Each colony handled currency in its own manner. Massachusetts rocked the boat by asserting its right to issue coins–hard currency in theory, but without sufficient reserves backing or redeeming it, verged into paper money. Bills of Credit, likewise, were not identical across colonies or even time within one colony. There was variation in the structure of the bill of credit. The core or basic structure required the legislature to approve a specific issuance amount, which was then converted into debt obligations which were sold to investors, the funds of which constituted the monies available for the bill of credit. Since bills of credit were controversial and not backed by any cash or hard currency reserves, a time period of their use was usually specified. At the end of the time period, the specific “notes of issuances” or loans if made, were required to be paid off, or redeemed, and the proceeds returned to the original issuance to redeem any debt obligations that raised the funds for the bill of credit. Finally, the issue of paper money in Pennsylvania was pretty much “settled”; the battles for it had been waged and won in 1723 and 1729. Paper money had been around since then and earlier notes had been reissued or extended. Opposition to them in the 1740’s had the feel of Penn stubbornness than anything else to the general population who “in general” were predisposed to using them as promoters of economic growth and a partial solution to consumer liquidity.
The proceeds of debt issued under authorization of a bill of credit, could be used directly as currency by the colony simply by establishing a mint to make coins for dissemination into the economy–today’s U.S, Mint. In Pennsylvania, previous bills of credit proceeds had also been sent to the Legislature’s Loan Office, to be made available to itself and to counties for public lending–usually for loans/mortgages for agriculture , business startups, or business investment. This loan element meant the colony-level government had become a public lender, and was using government funds for private loans and investment. Since there were no “banks” as we know them today in colonial America at this time, in effect the bill of credit was not only a currency, but also a government loan program whose primary target or goal was to make loans for economic development-related purposes.
(W)henever, the House emitted paper money in peacetime, it did not put it into circulation directly, but rather loaned it to the inhabitants in small sums at interest on landed security. As a result the Assembly became the largest creditor in the province and received interest payments which averaged 3000 pounds annually. This money it spent as it pleased accounting for its disposition to no one, least of all the Governor [Proprietary]. The second way in which the Assembly made money from money bills was by ‘rigging’ excise rates [sales tax on specific transactions, commonly liquor]. The [proceeds of the excise] would be paid into the Treasury so that the [principle] of the [paper money debt issue] would be destroyed, so that at the end of ten years the entire sum would be eliminated… Consequently, during an average year, the Assembly received unrestricted revenues of between 5,500 and 6,000 pounds [a notable sum of money to spend on matters independent of the Proprietary] [99] James M. Hutson, “Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 1751-1755: A Reappraisal” (the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol 93, Issue 3, (July, 1969), p. 322.
Since his very powerful economic development tool was in the hands and control of the Legislature, we can now see why Thomas Penn was reluctant to allow the Legislature free rein in the use of “paper money”. In practice that meant legislature approved end-users, legislatives purposes would be achieved, and very importantly, whatever interest payments were received on the loans went to the legislature–a sum of some attraction to Penn. The closeness of Assembly political leaders to the Loan Office became more apparent in 1750 when the all-powerful, long standing Speaker of the Assembly (and Chief Justice), John Kinsey, died.The handling of his estate revealed his use of a sizeable Loan Office misappropriation for Kinsey’s personal use. Also, the Legislature had denied the Proprietary any say on nominations or lending decisions since the inception of the Loan Office in 1723.
While there are other issues associated with the bill of credit (many of which we discussed in an earlier module), the “structure” of the bill of credit was the outstanding issue of contention between Penn and the Legislature in the 1750’s. “Believing that the Assembly’s financial strength [created by is management of paper money] had enabled it to ‘usurp’ the proprietary prerogatives …. Were he be able to regulate its revenues, he was confident he could restore the Pennsylvania executive [branch] to its proper eminence and create a balanced government” [99] James M. Hutson, “Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 1751-1755: A Reappraisal“, p. 322.
The original bill authorizing 40,000 pound paper money issuance was introduced in the Legislature and passed by February 25, 1752. Deputy Governor Hamilton in accordance with is own inclinations and Thomas Penn’s conditions expressed to the Deputy Governor previous to his appointment, vetoed the bill on March 6th. What followed for the next year and half was a torturous exchange of rationales, terms/conditions, and past history brought up as baggage to complicate negotiations. It was always one step forward, two backward. As the “good times” rolled on without resolution of this issue, the firmness and inflexibility of each party increased. The negative reaction to Penn’s perceived intransigence by popular opinion, however. played a decisive role in finally compelling Thomas Penn to agree to a paper money issue, without any strictures on the legislature. That break in the logjam allowed the authorizing legislation to be approved and sent to the Deputy Governor for his signature. The struggle, however, had made it apparent to the Deputy Governor that he wanted no more part of Pennsylvania politics, and giving a year’s notice (which turned out to be longer) he resigned his position formally.
The issue had passed in August 1753, but the now lame-duck Deputy Governor Hamilton blocked it, adding several clauses, one of which required the signed agreement of the Board of Trade. There was no consensus the Deputy Governor could add clauses. His action was taken as a suspension of “liberty” and had denied the rights of the Assembly. Hamilton, understanding, incurred the full wrath of popular opinion and the fury of the Legislature. The struggle between the two parties continued into 1754 (when the War commenced). The start of war caused Hamilton to reverse his opinion and approve the paper money legislation, but the War had once again raised Quaker legislative pacifism, causing its unwillingness to executive the legislation–for fear the proceeds would be used in whole or in part in fighting the war. Only when Pittsburgh (Fort Necessity] was captured by the French in May 1754, did the Legislature authorize a note for 10,000 pounds–and a rigging of an excise tax on liquor which would pay it off in ten years, while also yielding a surplus for unrestricted use by the Legislature. The earlier authorizing bill was, in effect, left on the table as no agreement was yet reached on the implementing legislation that was required to make it operative.
So, Thomas Penn had reversed his position on unrestricted paper money–putting Deputy Governor Hamilton in a doubly awkward situation. To deal with the situation, Hamilton put yet another stipulation into the contested legislation, a stipulation that required the debt issue to be paid off in five years [not the ten authorized by the legislature]. With frustration and hopelessness on all sides, Hamilton resigned as Deputy Governor in August 1754. The new Penn-appointed Deputy Governor, Robert Morris [not the Morris of the American Revolution]-whose background and past action in New Jersey stiffened the back of the Legislature against Penn. Penn in the meantime had taken the preventive step of having his position legitimized by the Board of Trade, thus further frustrating the Legislature. In December 1754, Deputy Governor Morris submitted his own bill for 20,000 pounds paper money issue to be used in support of the war. In the ensuing chaos that was called negotiation (a chaos in which all manner of terms and conditions were introduced and deleted) finally prompted Deputy Governor Morris to resolve publically on December 30th 1754 that agreement between the parties was not possible. Over the next six months the Legislature sought to keep the bill alive in some form, including a direct missive attacking the King for Crown’s role in this five year cattle stampede-style policy-making. As 1755 wore on, in would step the man on the white horse once again: Benjamin Franklin had a plan.
Franklin was in the Legislature until he was appointed Deputy Postmaster for North America in August 1753. He had been Philadelphia’s postmaster since 1737. In his new position Franklin was responsible for postal affairs of Philadelphia and north to and including Nova Scotia. Interestingly, Franklin did not resign his position as delegate to the Legislature but his travels during this period until he left for London in 1756 were frequent, and did prevent him from playing a day-to-day role in its activities. It is widely acknowledged that Franklin during his first four years as a Pennsylvania legislator did not go out of his way to confront Thomas Penn, William Allen or the Proprietary–despite his own personal and Whig political dispositions. This was still well in the period Franklin was devoting considerable time to scientific experiments, and in the course of promoting his civic duty in founding a hospital and a university–both seriously involving Penn, Allen and conservative Quakers. Franklin was an unabashed Whig, who favored extensive legislative powers in accordance with his interpretation of the British Constitution.
During the paper money struggle with Penn and the Deputy Governor, Franklin wrote that “the extraordinary powers which the Pennsylvania Assembly had acquired were perfectly legitimate. Penn, for example, insisted that the Assembly’s pretension to absolute control over the [proceeds] of the money bills was ‘exercising a Natural Right, inherent in every Body of Men, antecedent to all Laws,’ the right to ‘dispose of their Money by themselves or their Representatives’. During this cantankerous period of negotiation, Franklin’s vote for the position of the Quaker Party was never likely in contention, but there is some evidence that he worked with both sides to avoid a complete rupture between the parties, and in the process to keep everyone onboard with his civic initiatives. He is likely to have worked with Hamilton in this buffering of the conflict. His new job of North American Postmaster no doubt removed him from much of the back-and-forth that followed in 1754-5. He did involve himself after the Assembly adjournment in the summer of 1754. In a letter he expressed concern with the perceived “instructions” that Thomas Penn had laid upon Deputy Governor Hamilton–it appears this perception mischaracterized Penn’s actual “instructions”, but the letter also, in Franklin’s usual fashion, did not attack Penn directly so to corner him in opposition.
He did assert the right of the people, expressed through their elected legislature “to spend their own money as the pleased”. In this letter, sent second-handedly, he urged Thomas Penn to find a way to reach agreement with the Legislature [99] James M. Hutson, “Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 1751-1755: A Reappraisal“, pp. 334-5. The complete breakdown of negotiations that followed the December 1754-January 1755 spasm also did not bring Franklin into the fray–he was hundreds of miles away in the midst of a six month tour of his postmaster positions, and did not return to Philadelphia until March 1755. This absence in what was a very disruptive period in which the parties, including the Deputy Governor and Penn, as well as the outraged Legislature, may have helped Franklin in the events that followed. He may have been in what Huston believes was “a singular position, which he, ever alert to the possibilities of public service, perceived he could use to promote the province’s welfare. What Pennsylvania needed, as he saw it, was a broker or a mediator, who could make the Governor and the Assembly cooperate …” [99] James M. Hutson, “Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics, 1751-1755: A Reappraisal“, pp. 344-5. Amazingly, it was not to find agreement on the underlying causes of the Legislature-Proprietary paper money struggle, but rather on the specific issue of paper money that would be used to support the war resistance effort against the French and Indians. His involvement began with his return in March 1755. To continue this paper money discussion any further than the abrupt early January 1755 acknowledgement by all parties in the paper money struggle, that any further effort was futile, and negotiations had broken down to the point there was no hope of restarting them. They would restart in a few months (March 1755), but in what wold be a pressing of a “reset button” and the entrance of a moderator
Western Settlement–Land Grabbing–the North American Drift to the French and Indian War
The seemingly never-ending, convoluted struggle to approve some sort of paper money issue, as the reader will testify, has taken so many twists and turns that by early 1755 it makes little sense to add yet another. But add we must: the French and Indian War enters into the paper money free-for-all. This twist is doubly important because it allows Franklin to play his now traditional role as the calvary riding in to rescue a completely overwhelmed Pennsylvania policy system. Unfortunately for us, while the paper money struggle wage these oh so many years, so did the drama that was unfolding in Pennsylvania’s western counties and hinterland periphery. The War started in large measure to the increasingly complicated events and involvement of a increasing number of actors, and, surprise, the continued inability of Pennsylvania negotiators to reach some meaningful understanding the with Native American tribes.
Needless to say, the fuel for this unsettling picture, land sales to a never-ending horde of European immigrant settlers, by this time mostly Scots-Irish had not abated, and was perceived as increasing–causing no end of conflict, misunderstandings, and simple seizure of land under whatever pretext worked. That the Penn Proprietary used it for their benefit, the reader can rest assured. Unfortunately for us, the Penn Proprietary land grabbing was a relatively secondary player in what evolved in a rather huge landgrabing nexus. That landgrabing was the underlying disease in this western Pennsylvania-Ohio Valley is perhaps the only constant in the rather sad tale I am about to start. This saga should be thought of as yet another episode in our “It’s the Land, Stupid” module ministry.
Earlier we had described the productive, if land sales were the principal goal, but fruitless if peace and tranquil Native American relations, series of negotiations between the assorted Native American tribes, and the assorted and sometimes sordid cast of characters sent by Pennsylvania to negotiate some sort of mutual agreement on who and how Pennsylvania western settlement could happen. If necessary the reader ought to review that melange to determine who did what to whom during the forties. Until the late forties, Pennsylvania officials had dealt principally with the Six Nations, the Iroquois Alliance with which Great Britain had reached an alliance and had negotiated land and boundary issues. The Six Nations asserted their “ownership” over the Pennsylvania and Ohio Valley lands relevant to Pennsylvania–but were not residents of that area. Rather they asserted their dominance over the resident tribes, having reduced the latter to a tributary status.
That relationship, real or imagined, was not satisfying to the resident tribes, and so, Penn and Pennsylvania were able to secure land sales agreements, they did so without dealing with the native tribes–and in particular resolving a past land sale, the Walking Treaty” –that rested uneasy on the resident tribes. The resident tribes, caught between the Six Nation agreed land sales to European colonial authorities and the relentless in-movement of European immigrant settlers were over the course of the decade pushed further west from Pennsylvania’s western counties and into what was then thought of as the Ohio Valley–a land mass drained by the Ohio River that included much of northwest Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) and eastern Ohio, and touches of Maryland.
To add to this confusion, Virginia asserted that land grants to it by the Crown during the seventeenth century extended land ownership to that colony as well. As we related in Chapter 1, a faction of the Virginia planter oligopoly, the Fairfax Northern Neck crowd, had organized in the middle-late 1740’s and incorporated a land development corporation, under Virginia law, the Ohio Company, and granted to it by the early 1750’s the right to settle in the Pennsylvania-Ohio Valley area. They did in fact establish a settlement in this period. What escapes us thus far, is that there is another powerful player as well: the British Crown’s Superintendent of Indian Affairs, William Johnson. If we are talking raw power, Johnson is 800 lb gorilla in this jungle. Johnson, oh sad to relate, was also deeply involved in landgrabing.
Let’s start with George Croghan, a Scots-Irish immigrant who in the early 1740’s ranged western Pennsylvania/Ohio Valley as a fur trader. He learned Native American languages, and developed a reputation as a honest trader. Accordingly, Croghan made inroads on French traders who heretofore had a near exclusive trading monopoly in this neck of the woods. James Logan, our Proprietary fur trader’s reach did not extend as deep as Croghan who concentrated on the extremes of northwest Pennsylvania and the Ohio Valley. Croghan got hired by Sir William Johnson, as served as his unofficial Indian Affairs Deputy, until he formally acquired that title in 1755. In this capacity Croghan negotiated treaties, and made large personal land acquisitions and were awarded large land grants in that area, as did Johnson–hundreds of thousands of acres. Naturally, Croghan and Johnson worked principally with the Six Nations.
In August 1749 Croghan purchased from them 200,000 acres in northwest Pennsylvania. EXCLUDED from this purchase was a two square mile parcel at the forks of the Ohio which was intended to be used as a British fort. It was Pennsylvania’s intention in the early fifties to settle this area, purchase it for the Proprietary, and it would build the fort. Croghan realized if Pennsylvania was able to assert its ownership over this disputed territory, then his last purchase, and two other purchases/grants would be discredited–he would lose hundreds of thousands of acres if this were to happen. What Pennsylvania was doing at this point was negotiating with the resident tribes to acquire title and ownership–potentially undercutting the Six Nations land deal.
So Croghan scrambled and made a deal with the new (1751) royal Governor of Virginia Robert Dinwiddie. Dinwiddie took the job with the expectation he could and would participate in land development as his preferred tract o acquire personal wealth. When he arrived on the scene, the southern Ohio Valley was in turmoil under serious Indian attack. Dinwiddie wasted little time in injecting Virginia into the turmoil, and he also quickly invested personally in the aforementioned Ohio Land Company. Dinwiddie was hugely controversial in Virginia, as the other leg of his plan to create his personal fortune was to unilaterally impose a transfer land tax, which he would exempt the Ohio Land Company. Croghan by 1753 negotiated a deal with Dinwiddie to empower the Ohio Company to formally own the land, and settle the area. Oops, did I mention the French by this time had determined they had better move in fast, build a fort on this disputed territory–and then proceed to actually do so. By that time the French were building a series of forts from the Great Lakes into the Ohio Valley, and in particular at the dispute fork in Pennsylvania on the banks of the Ohio River. In 1753 they constructed a fort, and since possession was nine-tenths of the law even in colonial America, Dinwiddie resolved to get them out of there.
In October 1753 he appointed a young Virginian surveyor, a half-brother of a founder of the Ohio Company, to be his commander in the military district that included northwest Pennsylvania. The young major set out to negotiate with the French (and Indians if necessary). The trip was successful, confirming the French had indeed built a fort on the dispute fork, and having successfully negotiated an agreement with the Six Nations chief resident in the area that he would join Virginia in removing the French. On a second trip in 1754, the young major, now colonel led a force to the area to make the French a deal they couldn’t refuse. They did, and that set off a series of events which triggered the French and Indian War. Of course, we are talking about Fort Necessity, aka downtown Pittsburgh, battle of Great Meadows, and the officer in question is George Washington.
So that’s how Virginia became involved in northwest Pennsylvania. It also set off its own series of events that made George Washington one of the area’s largest landowner.
The reader might now be wondering just what was Pennsylvania doing while all this was going on?
Through the forties, the Penn Proprietary, under its Provincial Secretary James Logan had been heavily engaged in fur trading and land acquisition in the surrounding territories. Like Johnson and Croghan they had been working with the Six Nations for the land sales, and then moving down the chain, evicting the resident tribe, usually the Lenape. They hired a Palatine German (Conrad Weiser) to negotiate both ends of the deal. It was Logan, John and Thomas Penn, along with Conrad Weisner who in 1737 negotiated the infamous Walking Treaty, as they would say screwing the Lenape. As a good Palatine German, Weiser was troubled by his duplicity, and he left Penn’s service and entered into a Moravian German religious community (Ephrata) for several years of pious contemplation and fathering lots of children. He was back on the job with Logan by 1741 and was the chief negotiator for Proprietary dealings with the Six Nations–included in which were an 1744 agreement with Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania on ceding Iroquois Ohio Valley land to the colonies–the one that Croghan thought he was getting 200,000 acres in northwest Pennsylvania.
Thomas Penn in the mid forties realized the implications of the multi-party competition and did step up to the plate. He requested Governor Hamilton (February, 1749) to arrange for Pennsylvania funds to fortify the area with forts, and indicated he was prepared to contribute 400 pounds and 100 annually to match. The initial cost of the fort was estimated about 800 pounds. The offer was turned down by the deeply Quaker, intensely pacifist, pro-Indian Pemberton-faction of Quakers (Pemberton was known at the time as the “King of the Quakers”). Penn then negotiated indirectly with the Ohio Company to secure his interests in the area–a negotiation that was compromised by its London negotiator, a pacifist Quaker. The Assembly did step up also.Between 1748 and 1751 it appropriated 5,000 pounds for the Indian negotiation payments. What was missing, of course, was a financial contribution from the Proprietary. [99] Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776 (Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1953), pp. 31-3. With Penn’s earlier proposal off the table, Penn countered that he was purchasing the land, and that was his contribution. Expectedly, the Assembly saw this as little more than Penn’s quest for land sales profits. The Assembly countered by proposing a tax on unoccupied land, and Penn demanding an exemption for Proprietary-owned land. The reader no doubt is beginning to see where this story is going.
Things got complicated in 1751, when both new non-Iroquois tribes moved into western Pennsylvania, and internal rivalries about the resident tribes threatened primacy of the chief with which the Proprietary had been working. At this point it was Weiser who successfully convinced the Proprietary to directly negotiate with the resident tribes, and bypass the Six Nations. Weiser’s rationale was that he had met with new Six Nation chiefs, who at that time were leaning to join the French. This is the time the French are engaging in their fort-building and claim assertion over the Ohio Valley. The entry of Virginia’s Ohio Company further compounded the competition. In this atmosphere, with Native Americans having a viable champion in France, met with a delegation led by Franklin, and several prominent and powerful Quakers (Norris), and the new Provincial Secretary Peters at Carlisle in 1753. The resident tribes demanded the horde of immigrant settlers into their territory be stopped. Thayer p.32
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/education/teachers/resources/money-in-colonial-times; https://eh.net/encyclopedia/credit-in-the-colonial-american-economy/;
Ron W. Coan 