Big City Progressive Era Policy Systems
The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to describe municipal policy systems that typified the Progressive Era. Despite the over one hundred years that has since passed, the forms of government inaugurated in this period still persist and serve as the foundation for our current jurisdictional policy systems. Strong mayors, city managers, the occasional commission, and political machines along with bureaucracies filled with professional experts recast Gilded Age policy systems. Economic development policy evolved with, and within, these forms of government. Form of government sets in place who decides policy and a good deal of the process flow in a jurisdictional policy cycle.
Moreover, there is a “motif”, a bias reflecting (1) the values each type of policy system maximizes; (2) the standing and effectiveness of various participants in the policy process; and, (3) the constituency and goals of its electoral coalition that affect the definition of policy goals in each policy area. Forms of government do not necessarily produce different policy outputs, strategies or programs, but they do affect who they serve, the intensity that they are implemented or used, and the goals they seek. For example, all forms of government may embrace attraction and recruitment as an economic development strategy; but the programs and intensity of use are likely to vary considerably with the goal pursued ant the electoral coalition underlying the form of government.
For these reasons, our discussion of structural reformers will be more developed and extensive. Of special interest to me is the variation among regions, states and cities, and even within the same city over time. In this chapter we limit attention to Midwest and Northern Big Cities. But even in these regions considerable variation is evident. In chapters that follow (describing the South and West) additional variation will be presented. Pervasive state and sub-state variation is its own story and a constant theme in this history.
As the progressive era unfolded, three distinct reform orientations (structural reformers, social reform mayors, and social/moral policy-based reformers) emerged from late-19th century mugwumpery. These three reform traditions overlapped and blurred, as progressive coalitions formed, broke up, and reorganized with each new reform issue.[1] Structural reformers, social reformers and social/moral policy-based reformers advocates competed/allied with one another, as well as with Gilded Age standbys: the machine, businessmen mayors [Jeffersonian privatists] and weak/strong mayors. In some cases structural reforms were grafted onto previous forms of government; in many others jurisdictions new forms of government were put in place. To remind the reader, the Progressive Age witnessed the establishment of the foundation of today’s jurisdictional policy system.
At this point “issues” become salient to understanding the formation of these policy systems. These policy actors assembled coalitions sufficient in electoral strength to dominated jurisdictional decision-making, referenda, and affect state legislative support to establish a policy system congruent to their ideology. Office-seekers and political parties necessarily adopted positions on key issues relevant to voters in their municipality. Issues, personality and leadership dynamics, flowed from demographics, past history and were often idiosyncratic to the jurisdiction. Three issues, however, were common to most northern Big Cities in this Era; they played a disproportionate role in affecting politics and elections. Coalitions among elements of the working and business classes could be forged by adopting positions regarding some combination of these issues. The policy systems constructed in the Progressive Era rested upon these coalitions and the issue-positions/constituencies they served. Their coalition durability, at minimum, rested upon, competence of its leadership and consistency in dealing with the three issues. What are the three issues? They are (1) municipal relationship/ownership of key community utilities and infrastructure; (2) individual/neighborhood level initiatives including moral and temperance programs affecting alcohol, saloons, prostitution, and gambling—indirectly crime associated with these activities; (3) governmental honesty, economy, and efficiency/competence/capacity.
Each of these issues tended to appeal in varying intensities to elements of three classes that constituted the Big City urban electorate: lower and working class, the middle class, and the businesses elites. The first and third issues, especially, overlapped to some degree all classes—they were the issues of the day and what disagreement existed among the classes was not “if”, but rather how. The second issue-nexus, however, did often separate lower and working class from the middle and business class. The first issue more than touches on economic development; the two contentious infrastructures were street car and energy/sometimes lighting. Utility regulation and the structural organizations associated with it will continue into the future as the definition of “utility” evolves and government relationship to business changes. Street cars regulation, however, lost much of its salience by the end of this period—thanks to Henry Ford, the Model T, and busses.
The third issue was, at root, anti-machine, anti-legislature, and government capacity—all of which were fundamental to any policy system that emerged. In this chapter, discussion surrounding the third issue is emphasized for that reason. The second issue, however, figured prominently not only in this Era, but in succeeding decades as well. This was especially true of saloon politics/police enforcement in an age when Prohibition was a vibrant national issue, and a constitutional amendment was approved that took effect in1920. Alcohol, police, neighborhood programs were so powerful that in some jurisdictions they overwhelmed the reforms associated with the third issue—structural reforms—and created their own form of policy system. Nobody, I am sure, ever expected to read that saloon politics exerted a significant effect on the evolution of American economic development. But it did; so pour yourself a drink, bourbon preferably, and read on.
The plan of attack is to discuss the principal policy systems that emerged in the Progressive Age and that were important to the evolution of our jurisdiction policy system and the economic development policy area. These policy systems are in order of appearance: the social reform may, the socialist policy system, the Progressive Age variants of the political machine, and—the most important to our history—the structural reformers. This was an Age of (Structural) Reform[2] and structural reform is critical to our history and to subsequent urban politics. Hopefully, not surprisingly to the reader, there are a lot of twists and turns to structural reformers and that will consume our attention for many pages—including a wrap up and segue way as well. Finally, the masochists in the crowd, three case studies, Boston, Kansas City, and first of all, Detroit will hopefully convey the policy atmosphere of the Age.
Social Reform Mayors
The Rise of Social Reform Mayors
Over several decades Progressivism evolved from, and into, a multiplicity of “isms” and movements. Their common element was that politics and political action should advantage the “common man”, especially least fortunate of society, the impoverished and much abused immigrant. These social reformers may have been marginally less concerned with structural reforms such as charter revisions, forms of government, budgets or even civil service, but they were not opposed to them. Many structural reforms were useful (strong mayor) to their purposes. The social reform focus, especially in economic development-related policies, was on “people”. Tenement reform, education, mental health reform, immigrant relief, and working conditions (unionism) and social welfare of the poor and working classes were their principal policy concerns—and parks, neighborhoods and playgrounds. In the Progressive Era the most important “people-based reform” was reducing fares on street cars and lowering gas, electric and water bills to urban residents. Regulating the moral behavior of the working class through aggressive police enforcement was regarded more as a misplaced priority—bad working class behavior was the result to low wages, bad housing, lack of recreation opportunities and the like. One should attack these conditions instead of trying to enforce anti gambling, drinking and prostitution[3].
Henry George’s campaign for New York City mayor in 1886 arguably marked the first instance of a social reform mayor in American urban politics. He lost and that was that; but, from that point on wealthy and successful businessmen/professionals, having made their fortunes, entered municipal politics, and got elected as mayors on a “social reform” platform. Social reform mayors advocated policies that addressed the needs of both the average Joe industrial worker/immigrant and middle class. They embraced a “people-oriented” (often neighborhood-level) economic development. The social reform mayor style of economic development was deeply uncomfortable with forms of economic development that assisted the private firm—especially the monopoly capitalists, the utilities, the railroads, and trusts.
Social reform mayors, however, were not immune to adopting physical redevelopment (the City Beautiful) to enhance their city’s competitiveness in the urban hierarchy and promote civic pride among all classes. They were, in their way, competing to be the top “city on a hill”. A cornerstone of their agenda that unified their electoral success was their opposition to local monopolies (electric, water-sewer, and streetcar utilities/franchises). Some prominent social reformers, like Frederic Howe, saw not only monopolistic utilities as harmful, but other sectors, particularly those that distorted the physical landscape for profit (real estate) as well. These early tendencies hint toward an almost instinctive revulsion among social reformers against “growth coalitions” and business-dominated “regimes”.
During these years electric power was coming on line and social reform Progressives believed municipal ownership corrected the corporate abuses of monopolistic private utility franchises and ensured the protection of the average man in a key and necessary service. Over these years, municipal and public utilities were approved in communities across the nation. Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Indiana, Kansas, California, Oregon and even Texas and Florida[4] were leaders in this policy, establishing numerous municipally-owned utilities over the next half-century. The municipally-owned utility presents an almost perfect expression of the Progressive economic development program in that it protected the community from distortions created by private profit.
There is a pronounced geographic (Great Lakes) flavor to social reform mayors, laced with a distinctive population migration trend (Yankee Diaspora and immigrant German-Scandinavian). Social reform mayors were working classes, but were either successful/wealthy businessmen or successful/ wealthy professionals. The ultimate fate of most social reform mayors proved to be an inability to sustain the unity of working and middle classes electoral coalition. Future elections tended to be won by business structural reformers or machine-style policy systems. In a few cities Socialist Parties increased strength (New York City and Milwaukee). In some cities, during World War I and Twenties, the working class was able to elect mayors, frequently described by academics as “populist”, who were tolerant of ward machines.
Social Reform Mayors:
After the late 1880’s several large cities elected mayors who proceeded to enact a series of Progressive social and economic reforms. Social reform mayors “stressed sharing political power with the lower social orders, support for organized labor, toleration of ethnocultural differences and human weakness, and the expansion of urban services at costs affordable to the city dwellers”[5].
Examples include Detroit’s Hazen Pingree, the nationally renowned Tom Johnson of Cleveland, Samuel “Golden Rule Jones” and Brand Whitlock of Toledo, Edward Dunne of Chicago, and Mark Fagan of Jersey City. Some were one-termers; some stayed around awhile and even got elected to higher office. Others, like New York City’s William Randolph Hearst and Chicago’s Robert Merriam were “wannabes” that never made it into the mayor’s office. Social reform mayors were elected in Toledo (Samuel ‘Golden Rule’ Jones, Republican, wealthy oil drilling manufacturer (1897-1903). He was known for his park system, public baths and was a follower of Henry George (land tax—or single taxer). Jones prematurely died, and was followed by a second social reformer, Brand Whitlock (D) (5 terms) a journalist and lawyer.
In Cleveland, Thomas Johnson, a wealthy businessman who acquired his wealth through an innovative streetcar technology/ownership[6], ruled for four terms (1901-1909)[7]. He was followed by Nelson Baker (1911-1915) who further enhanced and refined the Progressive social mayor model. In 1910 Cleveland’s population was about 28% native American (that’s what they called English/Scottish back then), mostly Yankee Diaspora background, with 18% German being the largest foreign stock, with Slavs, Irish and Jews in descending order. Other than the Ohio state political machine, ward machines did not play a significant role in Cleveland politics—in fact the attempt to create a Republican municipal machine by Johnson’s predecessor, Robert McKisson. Cleveland’s first truly “strong mayor”[8] aroused opposition from the Chamber and the formation of the Municipal Association (today’s Citizens League). Frederick Howe was appointed its secretary, but tension developed between his Progressive social reform agenda and the structural reformers that financed the Association.
Mayor Tom Johnson (D) (1901) followed in Pingree’s footsteps. A more or less rogue Democrat and a devotee of Henry George (he was buried next to him in New York City). Johnson’s 1901 election was owed to the city’s native Protestant business vote. The Chamber was a significant power in that first administration, particularly in educational policy, pollution control, and building public neighborhood baths. Forming a cabinet of experts as department heads (Bemis, Cooley and Howe, for example), Johnson cleaned up Cleveland’s police and criminal justice system, developed a strong parks and recreation program, and Johnson, with Chamber support, hired Daniel Burnham thereby initiating a path-breaking Cleveland city beautiful initiative that flirted closely with early urban planning[9]. His regime was honest, efficient, supporter of the merit system.
He also followed the policy adopted by Toledo’s Golden Rule Jones relaxing police intrusion into lower and working class crimes (misdemeanors, drunkenness, truancy, and vice-related behavior)—“replacing an inflexible policy based on moralism with a discretionary policy based on realism”.[10] Johnson’s subsequent elections reduced dramatically his reliance on white native and business vote and increased his support from working and lower class wards. After 1903, the Chamber opposed him; indeed in that year the President of the Chamber ran against him as the Republican nominee. The Socialist Party also opposed Johnson. In both instances, Johnson’s three cent municipal ownership of street cars divided the traditional business community. They were also highly critical of his failure to crack down on immoral behaviors and lower class crime. Many businessmen believed Johnson’s true mission was to, like McKisson before him, create a political machine—filled with experts loyal to him.
Johnson obsessively pursued a three cent streetcar fare, and did all he could to seize control of Cleveland’s private electric plants. Like Hazen Pingree in Detroit, he was stymied in his efforts to control streetcar fares and acquiring control of the electric facility—in his case by forces led by the Ohio Republican state machine. While called by Lincoln Steffens as the “best mayor of the best city”, Johnson was frustrated, especially in regards to his two signature projects. Four years later, his city lawyer, Newton Baker, Johnson’s corporation counsel, was elected (1913) mayor. Baker ran on the Progressive agenda developed by Johnson and his support was principally from the working class foreign stock. Considerably more disposed to consensus decision-making, Baker was able to forge relationships with structural reform/business elite organizations (like the Municipal Association and the newly formed Cleveland Association) and diffuse fears of establishing a machine. Baker, seizing upon a successful passage of Cleveland’s Home Rule charter (which rejected city manager form of government), was able to take over the electric utility and convert it into municipal ownership. Subsequent Progressive mayoral candidates, however, were unable to maintain the coalition between the middle class and working class that Johnson had forged, and Baker had enhanced.
Tom Johnson has come to be regarded as the poster child for social reform mayors. Hazen Pingree, whose case study in Detroit is presented below, is the pioneer of this policy system, however, and the mayor who popularized it—and its electoral coalition and policy agenda. For more than a decade, these social reform mayors were the buzz in the media and Policy World. Their attraction to “experts” frequently provided employment for Policy World figures—in fact, this period may be the one in which Policy Worlders crossed over into the Practitioner World the most. Social reform mayors are widely regarded as characteristic of the Progressive Era, so this section does not include an individual I regard as the most important social reform mayor of all time, Fiorello LaGuardia, three term mayor of New York (1933-1945). Our history will, of course, discuss Mayor LaGuardia in a future chapter, but keep in mind the Progressive social reform mayor did not die out after World War I.
[1] Mohl, the New City, op. cit. p. 115.
[2] Richard Hofstadter, the Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1989); originally published in 1955.
[3] Kenneth Finegold, Experts and Politicians, op. cit., pp. 19-22.
[4] As of 2013 there are an estimated 2000 municipally-owned utilities remaining in the United States. See Five Star Consultants, “Municipal Electric Utilities: Analysis and Case Studies” www.fivestarconsultants.com
[5] John D. Buenker, “Edward F. Dunne: Limits of Municipal Reform” , Paul M. Green Melvin G. Holli (Eds), the Mayors: Chicago Political Tradition (Rev Edition) (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1995), p. 34.
[6] The irony of Johnson’s inability to obtain the three cent fare on Cleveland’s streetcar system was that the streetcar innovation from which he made his fortune was the streetcar fare box.
[7] Cleveland’s social reform politics exposes an important weakness of Ohio’s (and Pennsylvania’s) state-level Republican Party machine. From 1895 to Johnson’s victory in 1901, three insurgents challenged Hanna’s control over Cleveland-two successfully. State-level machines focused chiefly on control of federal offices and national politics; they were surprisingly inconsistent in controlling their Big City municipal governments. While Mark Hanna (head of Ohio’s state political machine) was electing Presidents, he lost control over both Cleveland and Cincinnati.
[8] The result of 1891 charter reform, the so-called Federal Plan, which provided the mayor control over department heads and created the potential to form an “administration” or, absent civil service, a political machine.
[9] Thomas S. Hines, “The Paradox of Progressive Architecture: Urban Planning and Public Building in Tom Johnson’s Cleveland”, American Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct, 1973), pp. 426-448.
[10] Kenneth Finegold, Experts and Politicians, op. cit., p. 87.
Ron W. Coan 