Port Authorities: A Case Study
Three themes are interwoven in the next three sub-sections which describe the growth of port authorities in the postwar period into first rank economic development organizations: (1) what ways do the evolution of port authorities in this period offer hints to the profession’s future; (2) what forces or factors drove ,not only the growth in the number and predominance of port authorities in postwar economic development, but also produced a diversity of purpose and function; and (3) the variation in structure, governance and scope among port authorities and why such variation is important to our understanding and the history of American state and sub-state economic development.
Ports: Accommodation to Change, Drivers of Variation and Professional Institutionalization
Economic developers, we think, ignore the importance of ports and trade to economic growth. We seem to always talk about global forces and international trade, world cities and the like—but seldom do we ground these drivers of change in a “touchable”, tangible economic development structure whose purpose is to deal with such tsunamis of change. In 1945 port authorities were at the vortex of a new world political, economic and social order. They were the entry and exit point to seas and oceans on which these forces and drivers travelled. We depend mightily on the sea, transport by sea and ports of entry and exit—ninety per cent of the volume (tonnage) of world trade travels by sea[1]. Port authorities handled and processed these cargos and were among the prime recipients of the burden of change and adjustment such tonnage and cargoes forced onto us as a nation and profession.
Also during this time period a great upheaval in transportation-logistical technology occurred and exerted a corresponding transformative effect on economic development. During the late thirties to the early sixties, new port authorities were incorporated in significant numbers. We have identified forty port authorities created in this time span. What’s more at least that number will be created post-1970. There are now several hundred formal port authorities in the United States today. Port authorities through the 1990’s were increasing in number each decade. There are also hundreds of seaports, operated by private firms which are not quasi-public port authorities, but who perform essentially the same functions and activities as port authorities.
We shall discover in the next several topic-sections that port authorities were directly hit by massive changes in modes of transportation, logistics technology, global trade patterns, international finance and new infrastructure coming on line. The older port authorities in many cases were sufficiently supple to be able to adjust to these new forces, but only at the price of becoming a lot more than mere managers of ports. A rather extreme example of these port authority-related dynamics and their evolution in the post-forties is the “path” (pardon the pun) followed by the New York-New Jersey Port Authority[2].
Ironically, upon its first incorporation in 1921 the two state port authority did not enjoy jurisdiction over the “ports” of New York or New Jersey[3]. It’s breakout came with the 1930 Holland Tunnel and the 1931 George Washington Bridge (later Goethals and Bayonne). In 1937 it completed the Lincoln Tunnel. In LaGuardia’s last year in office, the Authority took over the two airports he had initiated (of course, La Guardia and Idlewild-Kennedy, later Newark (1948), Teterboro and recently Stewart). The Port Authority Bus Terminal opened in 1950. Moving into the subway-light rail, the Port Authority took over the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad in 1962 and in its place established the PATH system. This was a 1970 “deal” engineered between the two states, in which New York, inspired by David Rockefeller advocacy, empowered the Port Authority to revitalize southern Manhattan by clearing and building the World Trade Center. On top of all these transportation-related functions, now the Port Authority became a public real estate redeveloper/urban renewal agency. In all this mélange of functions, where are the ports, marine and harbor facilities?
Somewhere in this checkered history, 1948 to be exact, the Port Authority took over the Newark Port Authority. It was an experiment supported by and launched from the newly rehabilitated Newark Port that the soon to be discussed Ideal-X (developed by the McLean Trucking Company) departed. In 1962, NY-NJ Port Authority opened the world’s first dedicated container port, at the Elizabeth Port Authority Marine Terminal. That set of facilities is, in 2013, the third largest port in the United States. In the post-1970’s period the Port Authority acquired jurisdiction over the Howland Hook Marine Terminal, the Brooklyn and Asi Terminals and the Queens West Waterfront Development project.
The heart and the soul of the Port Authority’s marine and port legacy, however, are the Ports of Newark and its Elizabeth container port—and part of its legacy is its innovation pioneered by the Ideal-X. We are interested less in how the NY-NJ Port Authority “backed into” marine facilities, but that the port authority—as did many, perhaps most, older port authorities across the nation became multi-functional or multi-purpose. That proved to be an important reason why port authorities are not considered “mainstream” economic development agencies in contemporary economic development. Many became “transportation-focused” and others concentrated in specialized infrastructure, marine operations, and export-import marketing of their facilities.
The NY-NJ Port Authority was/is multi-functionalism on steroids, but it was not uncommon in the postwar period for a port authority to be entrusted with non-port functions. Massport, for example, acquired responsibility for Logan Airport and the Tobin Bridge; a slew of other port authorities likewise drifted into airport operations.[4] Smaller port authorities frequently assumed responsibility for marinas and for real estate development, redevelopment and various types of business parks. Other port authorities were empowered to operate facilities and programs designed to attract foreign trade, foreign direct investment, and export and import. Still, other port authorities functioned chiefly in tourism and others became, in effect, a community waterfront authority. They were still in economic development but they became specialized or multi-functional. In some cases, their former chief bailiwick, marine-related activities and infrastructure, had been hugely diluted and in other instances greatly expanded.
As the scope of functions both expanded/contracted becoming in either instance more specialized, port authorities “institutionalized”. They developed their own, separate, picket-fence financing (and politics), constructed internal bureaucracies, hired on the basis of specialized skills pertinent to their functions—and most critically concentrated, appropriately on the services and functions entrusted to them. In effect, larger port authorities similar to the NY-NJ Port Authority (those with airports) tended towards specialization in airport transportation and real estate redevelopment—other functions, like general economic development, may have gotten lost in the shuffle.
In any case, many port authorities as they became “specialized” formed closer relationships with agencies of a similar nature and function than with more general purpose sub-state economic development agencies in their metropolitan area. Also, many of the newer and vibrant ports authorities formed in this period were state bureaucracies and were facility heavy, big budget behemoths compared to a local, general purpose economic development agency. All of these facets of structural evolution are aspects of a process of policy maturation we term “institutionalization”.
Specialization encourages the formation of “specialty” professional associations at both the state, national and, in the case of port authorities, a North American professional association: the American Association of Port Authorities. The identical process will later occur, for example, in regards to IDBs when in 1982 it formed the Council of Development Finance Agencies. We will shortly in the next chapter relate the tale regarding redevelopment and housing agencies and discover it too will follow a similar path. Institutionalization usually leads to the development of a separate professional identity and a professional sub-autonomy with its own expertise, career path, picket-fence federalism, and legislative-operational-public policy needs. As economic development matured we see a pronounced tendency toward fragmentation in the profession; we are not starting down the trail of creating our patchwork profession. Siloization is a defining characteristic of contemporary American economic development and port authorities in this period separate into their own silo.
Growth and Dynamics of Port Authorities
The next question to be considered is where did the postwar growth in new port authorities occur and why? First, there are two obvious factors/dynamics which prompted growth in postwar port authorities: military needs and the opportunities resulting from postwar United States global leadership. World War II which created numerous new posts and greatly expanded old ports and naval-military bases. The need for these facilities diminished to some extent after the war and many facilities were turned over the states/communities. This was especially true of naval airports which accounts for several instances of port authorities acquiring airport functions (Massport is a good example of this).
Secondly, America’s paramount position in the world economy generated enormous possibilities and opportunities for trade, finance and economic growth. We were the leader of the Free World and for more than a decade after the war, we were the only nation whose infrastructure and economic system was not obliterated by the war itself (the decline of the British Empire was ongoing in this period). On top of this, United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Breton Woods, reserve currency transformed our nation into the hegemon of the world economic and finance system. Increased America-centric global trade in this new environment created global demands and growth opportunities for our firms and industries that our ports system that had not existed in the past. In 1945 and after American ports were major hinges in global trade and, inescapably were elevated into a first rank EDO in our economic development system. They remain so today.
These two factors offered great opportunities to our larger and key port authorities such as New York City-Newark, Philadelphia, Miami, New Orleans, Lake Charles-Beaumont, Houston, Boston, San Diego, Long-Beach-Los Angeles, San Francisco-Oakland, Portland and Seattle. As such many shared to some degree in the evolutionary fate of the NY-NJ Port Authority. Less appreciated, however, were bi-modal marine and logistical transformations that greatly affected the utility of older ports and encouraged the development of new, modern facilities—often in other locations. In particular, a number of very significant changes in logistics turned the older American ports upside down. Airports and highways took away much of the location advantages of docks, waterfront piers and warehouses in domestic distribution—and production. As discussed earlier in this chapter, suburbs and more periphery areas were the chief beneficiaries of these two forces. But the real coup de grace for older ports was the container revolution.
“In April 1956, a refitted Second World War tanker, the Ideal-X, sailed from Newark carrying 58 containers (to Houston)…. It signaled the beginning of a revolution in global transportation, for at a time when it cost $5.83 per ton to load loose cargo … the cost of loading a ton onto the Ideal-X was $.15.8 cents”.[5] The changes built-into containerization were enormous. Containers are filled “at their point of origin” and shipped by truck or rail dire to the port dock and hauled up on ship by crane—and the process is reversed at destination port. There is no need for warehouses, just big parking lots and rail sidings to handle truck traffic, store containers and accommodate holding of inventory. The work is specialized and skilled and the workforce gangs typical of “On the Waterfront” are drastically reduced in scale and centrality. Access to rail switches and highways are they key attributes required of the 1960’s cargo port. The older labor-surplus, land-locked and space-constrained pier-based harbors could not match these physical requirements now needed, nor accommodate the huge containerships that quickly followed. [6] The ports themselves needed to be more accessible to the shipping routes and time constraints of water-borne shipping.
As late as 1955, New Jersey announced that it was building the largest containerport in the country, and within five years, it was handling more than half of the region’s cargo. By 1970, New York City was down to only one-fiftieth of the tonnage it had a decade earlier, and most of the Manhattan and Brooklyn piers stood empty. The same cycle was repeated in other maritime cities. Oakland took the majority of shipping business from San Francisco, as did Seattle from Portland. Unlike a traditional port, the containerport does not have to be close to a city. … The old urban port of New Orleans, for example, now handles cruise ships; its freight function replaced by the sprawling Port of South Louisiana (fifty miles to the North of New Orleans almost to Baton Rouge).[7]
Not all older ports responded quickly or adequately to the container revolution. Philadelphia’s municipal port authority (a city department) was one of these. It was not until 1965 that led by the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, the city joined with the State of Pennsylvania to form a new Philadelphia Port Commission (PPC).
The PPC oversaw the development of Philadelphia’s two container terminals, the Packer Avenue Marine Terminal [completed eleven years after the voyage of the Ideal-X] … in 1967, and the Tioga Marine Terminal … in 1972…. In 1978 the Philadelphia Department of Commerce released a study … the study concluded that [the two new container ports] … would reach container capacity by 1984.[8]
In short, Philadelphia (not alone by any means) was slow and a bit hesitant in its adjustment to containerization and the consequence was that, combined with a less than perfect one hundred miles upstream and inland location, Philadelphia was unable to maintain a first order competitive port position. Instead, the Delaware River evolved into a “100-mile ‘marine highway’ (with) more than 40 public and private port facilities”[9]. Philadelphia, still a major port (15th nationally in 2005), lost tonnage which went to other ports. It is also worth note that Northeastern and Great Lakes central cities lost an important “golden era” functionality because of containerization; it is also an early example of how innovation/productivity wreaks havoc on worker skills and employment.
Obviously, containerization was a critical driver of any increase in port authorities (especially after 1960) post 1958. But there was a large number of new port authority incorporations in the 1940’s and 1950’s.Why and where are two questions which necessarily require an answer? In large measure, the immediate postwar growth in port authorities was driven by two significant pieces of infrastructure which were either completed or expanding during this period: the Intracoastal Waterway and the St. Lawrence Seaway. The latter, particular impacted heavily (long-term negatively) upon the Great Lakes economies (and the railroad industry) and the former impacted the coastal areas of the South, Florida and the Gulf.
The St. Lawrence Seaway (opened in 1959), little known, is the world’s longest deep draft navigation system and for the first time connects the Great Lakes directly to the Atlantic Ocean. At one level the transportation of bulk commodities by sea made those industries considerably more profitable—on the whole, however, that benefited Canada and marine transportation. The impact on the railroads, the American Great Lakes cities being more railroad-hubs transshipment points were dramatically hurt in that finished goods, as opposed to mineral and agricultural commodities, were rerouted (containerization) to Eastern seaports. On balance, the logistics impacts disrupted existing logistics of the American auto-based, finished goods industry sectors and diminished the profitability of their rail hubs which disproportionately transported these sector goods and supplies.
Predictably as this became apparent, the Great Lakes states and communities responded by creating port authorities and devoting more attention and resources to their ports. Ohio (1955), in particular, approved legislation which over the next several decades established both a sub-state (large cities, counties) Great Lakes port authority system as well as an internal, river-based port authority system. Locally controlled, this system functions to the present day and is a significant element in Ohio’s present-day SSS. Erie PA (1962), Illinois (Chicago) Port District (1955), Indiana (1961), Toledo-Lucas County (Ohio’s first, 1955), Waukegan (1955),Oswego New York (1955), Lorain Ohio (1964), Brown County (Green Bay WS-1965), Buffalo-Niagara Frontier (1967), and Cleveland (1968) were port authority initiatives triggered either by anticipation of the Seaway or in reaction to its opening.
The impact of the Intracoastal Waterway on state and sub-state economic development is extraordinarily little noticed (but we do not intended to over exaggerate its impact either). By way of description:
The Intracoastal Waterway, navigable toll-free shipping route, extending for about 3,000 miles along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts …. It utilizes sounds, bays, lagoons, rivers and canals and is usable in many portions by deep-draft vessels. The route is federally maintained (Corps of Engineers) and is connected to inland waterways in many places. It was originally planned to form a continuous channel from New York City [it actually starts in Boston although its “official” milepost 0 is between Norfolk and Portsmouth VA] to Brownsville. Texas, but the necessary canal link through northern Florida was never completed; hence, it is now in two separate sections—the Atlantic and the Gulf.[10]
The Intracoastal Waterway has a long history[11], almost as long as the National Road, beginning with its first proposal by Treasury Secretary, Albert Gallatin, in 1808. The first actual construction began in 1885 with the dredging by the Florida Canal Company.[12] From that time through World War II various portions were completed in spasms. World War II, however, (with its need to protect coastal trade from German submarines) promoted a serious acceleration in construction in both sections of the Waterway. The Atlantic Waterway south of Norfolk tends to be more tourist-pleasure boat—small seaport- waterfront-oriented, but the Gulf Waterway (connecting the Mississippi river inland waterways to Gulf industry centers), the discovery of oil (keep in mind our earlier case study on the Houston Ship Canal) and oil/chemical refining, and later oil/gas exploration/production and small-firm fishing in the Gulf rendered the Gulf section primarily industrial-commercial in use. The financing and the legislation which drove the Waterway is federal and this should be considered a federal government initiative—promoted and supplemented by local and state business and governmental interests[13]. The railways were usually its chief opponents.
Texas for obvious reasons took a leading interest in the Gulf Waterway and by the 1920’s many key Texas coastal ports had quickly formed port authorities and had linked slightly inland cities to the Gulf. In 1975 the state of Texas assumed responsibility for the main channel of the Waterway. In the postwar period, Beaumont (1949), Calhoun County TX (1953), Port of Galveston (1940), Greater Baton Rouge (1952), Mississippi State Port Authority (Gulfport-1960), Jackson County (Pascagoula-1956), Port Arthur (1963), and South Louisiana Port Commission (1968) testify to the impact of both growth in oil-related sectors, inland Mississippi River trade, and the Intracoastal. For those of us wont to use the energy sectors as our explanation for the huge Texas growth in the Rise of the Sunbelt period, the centrality of ports, port authorities and port-water-related infrastructure ought to be given greater prominence and respect in economic development.
Despite a bias for tourist-related usage, the Atlantic Waterway also generated considerable port authority incorporation, especially in Florida in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The Cape Canaveral Port Authority (1939), Tampa-Hillsborough County (1945), Dade County (Miami) Seaport Department (1960) and Jacksonville (1963), however, suggest that international trade and intracoastal access prompted port authority EDO formation in key deep water international trading geographies. The early postwar (South Carolina excepting) incorporation of the South Carolina State Ports Authority (1942) Georgia Ports Authority (1945) North Carolina State Port Authority (1945)—and in 1970 the State of Virginia Port Authority and the Maryland state Department of Port Administration (1971), however, cry out as departures from a form of EDO up to this point mostly municipal-county level.
Today these port authorities are quite formidable economic growth machines. South Carolina Port Authority in 2012 is credited with $45 billion in trade, for example and Georgia Port Authority 67 billion[14]. These three state legislatures projected the state into a perceived, risk-laden but forward thinking economic development initiative in international trade and attraction of industry in a very key period of economic transition. One must offer praise in that this little-noticed venture was a rare example of a state anticipating an opportunity to develop growth and jobs through export and international trade by empowering an EDO and devoting sustained resources for their operation and growth. That these port authorities have been extraordinarily successful, and that, as we shall observe in later chapters, that the growth of these states owes much foreign direct investment and export-trade, we must credit their early postwar decision to commit to port authorities to organize, construct and lead in infrastructure, port operations, and marketing. Moreover, these were state-led and are further examples of the increased involvement of southern states in economic development during the postwar period and further testimony that the post-seventies rise of the New South can be traced to World War II and the postwar periods.
Research Note: How Port Authorities are Different and Why Variability Matters
Understanding variation in EDO structure is important to us in that (1) the general literature tends toward categorization schemes which collapse a complex program or EDO-type into one over-arching classification: tax abatement, TIF, IDB and in this case port authority. We believe that ignoring the complex variation can, frequently does, produce findings which are less than helpful, although often ideologically heuristic. Also, (2) on a more positive note, explaining variation can create greater understanding of what is being assessed. In particular, it is in variation that we can see evidence of political culture and state and sub-state politics having an effect on economic development policy and programs. So let’s start with what should be an obvious truism: all port authorities are not structured or empowered identically—a rose, is again, not always a rose. They vary in meaningful ways.
First, not all port authorities, leaving aside multi-functionalism, operate their ports similarly. A port authority can operate as a landlord, contracting out the operation of elements of the port to private firms. As such, it will be in a position to exercise important controls over its lessees and ensure their conformity to the public good—but not get involved in the nitty-gritty of day to day operation. Landlord ports can really be described as a public-private partnership in their governance and operation. Landlord port authorities do, however, assume responsibility for the capital infrastructure of the port, especially its financing whose term typically exceeds any lease or contract.
… the landlord port is more or less the standard model in the US. In terms of operation, (it) competes aggressively with neighboring ports to secure market share, market their services like private companies, borrow capital, fund major infrastructure development and manage themselves in a manner resembling private companies …. The port is responsible for facilitating economic development via private enterprise, but (it) also … manages the port in the public interest. Port managers … seek to effect private sector activities that promote community economic development, while at the same time being cognizant of the needs of the public for environmental quality, recreation ….[15]
The NY-NJ Port Authority is a landlord port, as are most American Great Lakes, Western state and municipal ports such as Philadelphia, Miami, Long Beach and Los Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco (and other California ports) and New Orleans . Numerically, most American ports are landlord ports, but not all.
Texas ports and most interestingly, large Atlantic ports most of which are state agencies, often assume day to day operational responsibilities; they are “operating ports”. Massport, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Virginia, South Jersey, Maryland State Port Administration and Wilmington are operating ports as are many Gulf ports such as Port of South Louisiana, Tampa, Port Arthur, Beaumont, Lake Charles, Alabama State Port Authority, Houston, and Corpus Christi. Also, the larger ports of the Pacific Northwest (Portland, Seattle, Tacoma, and Vancouver (WA)) can be classified as limited operating ports.[16] Size does not explain the variation very well at all. History, i.e. time period of incorporation does suggest that older ports tend to be landlord-public private partnerships but the Northern Pacific ports are clear exceptions. Operating ports exhibit signs of geographical clustering—North Pacific, Gulf, and Atlantic seaboard. The Maryland, Virginia, North/South Carolina, and Georgia are a solid phalanx of state port authorities each created in the postwar time period.
Just why these concentrated variations occur is a matter of speculation. The distinction, however, between landlord and operating is significant. In an “operating port” the public authority “manages the day-to-day activities on its terminal by scheduling vessel calls, arranging stevedore services, employing longshore labor and other similar functions”[17]. In landlord ports, these are private sector functions. In terms of operation, there are two different forms of port authority and we suggest that states and sub-state jurisdictions adopt one form over the other on the basis of factors such as time period of incorporation and the predisposition of policy-political decision-makers, and likely different goals or expectations.
If the reader is not yet sufficiently fed up with our incessant nagging about variation, and port authorities—there is still more to come. Port authorities can be state or municipal/county agencies. The Great Lakes tend to be municipal/county port authorities. Older port authorities are municipal (San Francisco excepting). Texas is municipal/county as is Louisiana and Florida (Gulf). The Atlantic seaboard is overwhelmingly state level port authorities. The choice between state and sub-state port authority is yet another variation. That choice made even more complex in that a minority of sub-state port authorities are actually municipally-based, most are special purpose navigation districts (special districts)[18]. The distinctions again matter because the structure of the port authority strongly affects the nature of its governance and its policy and operational autonomy.
Also interesting is that the variation in the structure of port authorities has strong geographical tendencies—the North and South Atlantic by State agencies, the Gulf by special districts, the North Pacific by special districts and municipal port authorities, and the Great Lakes by special districts. Finally, there is a great number of privately owned and operated ports, which are not port authorities, which serve the same functions as port authorities but whose states permit private ports as well as public port authorities. The latter fact tests the reader’s tolerance of private firms performing functions which if performed by a public entity are deemed economic development, but being performed by a private actor are considered by many as not economic development. Whatever one’s position on that issue, some states allow private firms to perform port operations and others restrict private ports outright. That port authority variation overlaps with geographic concentration created by preference for structuring port authorities in similar ways suggest some inter-state pattern which could reflect a shared political culture, style of politics, and preference for one of our two ships. Variation can be an expression of the impact of our two ships on the structures and role of economic development and its EDOs.
[1] Lincoln Paine, The Sea and Civilization (New York, Knopf, 2013)
[2] We are indebted to Jameson W. Doig, Empire of the Hudson: Entrepreneurial Vision and Political Power at the Port of New York Authority (New York, Columbia University Press, 2001).
[3] It really was first intended to stop the constant bickering and law suits over the harbor and harbor uses between the two states. Its first major initiative was to publish a comprehensive plan which was intended to put order into that very vibrant harbor and the rail lines that fed into it.
[4] In Table 10-4, p. 230 James A Fawcett identifies as operating airports the following port authorities: Toledo-Lucas County, Puerto Rico, Bellingham WA, Seattle, Grays Harbor, Olympia (all Washington State), Portland, and Oakland; James A. Fawcett, Port Governance and Privatization in the United States: Public Ownership and Private Operation, Chapter 10 in Research in Transportation Economics, Volume 17, (2007) pp. 207-235.
[5] Witold Rybczynski, Makeshift Metropolis: Ideas about Cities (New York, Scribner, 2010) p. 119.
[6] IBID. p. 119.
[7] IBID. pp. 119-120.
[8] Maritime Commerce in Greater Philadelphia: Assessing Industry Trends and Growth Opportunities for Delaware River Ports, Report conducted by Economy League of Greater Philadelphia, PIDC, Select Greater Philadelphia, Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission and the Economic Development Research Group, July, 2009, p.13.
[9] IBID, p. 13ff.
[10] Encyclopedia Britannica, “Intercoastal Waterway”.
[11] See in particular, Lynn M. Alperin, The History of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, National Waterways Study, U.S. Army Engineer Water Resources Support Center, Institute for Water Resources, January, 1983.
[12] The port of Norfolk Virginia will be upset with this statement as they claimed an 1805 dredged canal near Norfolk VA is the true first construction. This, however, was three years before the Waterway was first proposed.
[13] The business connection to the federal government is credited principally to the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association (which folded up in 1947) and to the present day Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association. The key piece of legislation was the 1925 Rivers and Harbors Act and 1942 series of specific component construction legislation.
[14] Figures for each port authority’s 2012 annual report. We were unable to find a comparable figure for North Carolina but in other measure, the North Carolina ports are achieving levels of success commensurate with their neighbors.
[15] James A. Fawcett, Port Governance and Privatization in the United States: Public Ownership and Private Operation, Chapter 10 in Research in Transportation Economics, Volume 17, (2007) p. 217.
[16] Table 10-1, p. 216 in James A. Fawcett, Port Governance and Privatization in the United States: Public Ownership and Private Operation, Chapter 10 in Research in Transportation Economics, Volume 17, (2007) pp. 207-235.
[17] M. Hershman (ed), Urban Ports and Harbor Management: Responding to Change along U.S. Waterfronts (new York, Taylor and Francis, 1988) p. 339.
[18] Rexford B. Sherman, Director of Research and Information Services, American Association of Port Authorities. See Table III: U.S. Seaport Agency Structures, p. 11.
Ron W. Coan 