Immigration
(see Arizona and California)
Normally, a writer starts off immigration with the usual platitudes: the nation is a nation of immigrants, E Pluribus Unum, a teeming nation of nations (Whitman, Preface to Leaves of Grass), My great grandparents from both sides (Ireland and French-Canadians) were immigrants—Irish side was Potato famine—and Lace Curtain; Canuck side was from Quebec and came sometime in the 1870’s. My mother did not speak English until she was twelve, and we all went to an ethnic Catholic school system. I was the first male that got beyond the eighth grade and graduated from high school. It took three generations (about 85 to 100 years) for that achievement. I stand on a lot of shoulders.
Still Gramps was an entrepreneur; he formed his own painting business that went bankrupt during the Depression when the bank shut down taking his payroll with it. Dad was a worker who labored in a host of jobs ranging from the CCC, to a Silver Star medic in the Battle of the Bulge, to a mental hospital male nurse. Mom graduated from high school and was the first to get a booking college certificate. She worked all her life at a series of part-time bookkeeping positions. I grew up in a postwar veteran’s housing development. While my first employment was at MacDonald’s, I went to driving a cab and incorporating Champion Cleaning Company whose sole contract was cleaning out a four –floor factory where my Dad was union steward. They paid for four years of my college, which my Gramps was able to get a friend to admit me to because I could not afford Boston College or Merrimack College or Suffolk University where I had been admitted.
So with that background let’s talk about immigration and economic development.
To add to this bleakness, history over the years has been enveloped in a fog, an ideological Progressive fog that ignores how disruptive and frankly how difficult immigration was in our history. That history, taught in our schools, instead choosing to wrap immigration around platitudes and moral values that inhibit, nay prevent any frank treatment in the policy literature. But immigration has proven very disruptive to our policy systems during the First Migration.
Remember political machines, anti-Catholicism, Know-Nothings, Boston Yankees and Irish, the immigrant-laced labor struggles, the blatant, extreme and legal discrimination shown to Asian immigrants (detention camps, quotas and all sorts of anti-immigration laws)—and outright violence. Immigration seems benign now, but economic and community developers at the time didn’t think it all that great. The post-1880 rise of American community development was tied at the hip to the plight of immigrants, and Alinsky worked in Irish and Polish neighborhoods. So called suburbanization was driven by pressure from immigration—before the Great Migration started. A cheap labor force was often sickly, and politically volatile.
So, in case you have been sharing a remote island with a rather old Japanese WWII Navy survivor, you might not know immigration is controversial during the Contemporary Era—BTW, it was less controversial, but still controversial in the Transition Era as well. So let’s start off by offending everyone. The politically correct perspective is that immigrants are wonderful, the more the better, who cares whether they are illegal, they are here. Those who oppose immigrants are racists, excuse me “nativists” and “know nothings”. As for the populist perspective—just turn the past statement on its head, plus build a wall to keep them out, and deep-vett those you do allow in. Immigrants are disruptive and they take away jobs from Americans. This is pretty zero-sum stuff. Why? Because it strikes at the heart of our national identity—with an intensity not matched since the Civil War.
And then is a very strange, incompatible, if not conflicting series of myths ranging from political machines, the Last Hurrah, the FDR coalition, the rise of labor unions (and socialist movements), a Tree Grows in Brooklyn, and even Tom Gjelten’s recent “A Nation of Nations”[i] which I use extensively in this section. Our foreign policy, American exceptionalism, reflects this immigrant tradition, and as the reader already knows, my Chapter One model relies heavily on population migration, i.e. including immigration. The awkward unspoken issue of whether slaves should be considered immigrants—obviously compelled against their will and considered as property, and 3/5ths of a state franchise exclusively composed of whites bespeaks an unsolvable limbo that I leave it to African-Americans to answer. Native Americans are another matter. They lost, yet preserved a separate sovereignty whose benefit to them is quite unremarkable, at least economically-speaking.
Who should we let into America affects the nature of our American identity. It used to be we were an Anglo-Saxon, Protestant nation, then that changed to European Judeo-Christian nation during the First Immigration (1880-1924). The expectation was that we will speak/write English/American English that is. The post-1965 Second Immigration challenged that identity definition and by the Contemporary Era demolished it almost entirely. That issue is one that has permeated our Transition and Contemporary Eras as the Democrats constantly remind us that somehow in 2050 the nation will be majority Hispanic and Hispanics vote Democrat. As a Democrat, I should be happy, but I’m not. The projection is divisive and stupid. Still I cannot ignore that immigration changes the local political culture, and often can topple local and even state policy systems. It already has as this book will testify.
In any case, a nation of nations means we do not construct our governance and our national identity on a single ethnic/racial culture, heritage, but on an “idea”, a commonality that unites us a nation—the skeleton of our nation is a “shared identity” we used to call patriotism. It included our capitalist economy, a willingness to compromise in a government characterized by checks and balances. Assimilation and upward class mobility, an “aspirational” spirit which allowed us to preserve our unique culture heritage, even language (I can swear in French) while “blending” into a single national identity that allows us to fight from a foxhole shared with a different fellow entirely. The Second Immigration’s timing was horrible, however. It came at a time when that fabric which wove together our shared national identity, came under serious attack.
Affluence they say changed us all, and by the Contemporary Era a globalism had developed that submerged and depreciated national self-interest in favor of world peace, anti-colonialism, and the promotion of democracy. The legitimacy of the nation-state is now up for grabs. At the same time our politics reflected a movement to “identity” politics which as defined as I write centers around concepts such as “white privilege”, inequality, and intersectionality that struggle against misogyny, racism, and the issue du jour. In short, immigration which naturally tears at the heart of the shared American identity has become one important wedge that divides us as a people, as a nation. Economic and community developers are going to be pressed to take sides in this struggle.
That ED and CD policy reaction to immigration will be purely rational, professional constructs seems rather unlikely in this atmosphere—and it hasn’t been during both Transition and Contemporary Eras. Privatist and Progressives can always argue about tax abatements and business climates, but the world does not come to an end. Immigration, especially when combined with an incremental evolving identity politics and secular free trade globalism and American economic/community developers struggle to find their way amid horribly torn state and local policy systems that broaden the definition of “disaster management”. Indeed, some readers, I suspect, even question whether there is such a thing as “American” economic/community development at all.
The Federal Government Changes the Rules
Federal immigration law radically, yet unintentionally, changed in 1965. The new law was thought at the time by many who voted for it as allowing more immigrants into the U.S., but those immigrants would be from the traditional American ethnic First Great Immigration homelands. It would not be Anglo-Saxon per se, but it would be European, and certainly white, Judeo-Christian, albeit Catholic. Immigration would be more of the same—only more so. Oops!
Gjelten’s “Part Two” is the best recent work that outlines the long story of “immigration reform”. His view stresses the role of JFK (Irish vs. Yankee legacy), the greatest generation’s different perspective on the outside world, its, and Congressional politics of the 1950’s and 1960’s. That goes a long way to explain why, and how, the older 1920’s laws were reversed. It does little to explain how the rise of immigration altered the American state and local policy system during the Transition Era, or how the arrival of hordes of immigrants injected new dynamics in regional, local and state political cultures. That was significant enuf, but what also changed was the entrance of a new generation with new attitudes about foreigners, minorities, and civil liberties—and more secure (or oblivious) to the threat of economic competition. The Second Great Immigration, like the First, played out over half a century.
The last years of the Classical Era were marked by incredibly huge and sustained internal migrations mostly from the depressed South. Left unspoken was the WWI aftermath 1920 and 1924 “immigration reform” that shut down the First Great Recession. As opposed to “open” immigration, the post-1920 federal immigration policy imposed quotas on the annual number of immigrants admitted. The quotas were 2% of each nationality foreign-born resident in the U.S. in 1890. The 1890 date favored northern and western Europe, and admitted at lower rates southern and east European Catholics and Jews. Italians were limited to 3,845, and Germans to 50,000. Given that Asians were prohibited at the time, and Caribbean and African immigration were negligible, their numbers were so low they barely registered on anybody’s scale (non-Western Hemisphere limited to 165,000 annually). Hispanics, i.e. Mexicans were cheap labor, mostly confined to Border States who depended on their participation—they were ok.
Immigration to America dropped off sharply. Fewer than 300,000 people were allowed into the country in 1925, less than half the number of the preceding four years [and dramatically below pre-WWI levels], and 45 percent of them that year were from Canada and Mexico. The number of Italians and Poles dropped by an astounding 90 percent …. With some modifications, the attempt to maintain America’s nineteenth century ethnic character through immigration controls remained official policy for decades.[ii]
The politics behind the immigration rewrite consisted of a bunch of strange bedfellows indeed. JFK and LBJ provided the presidential leadership, Brooklyn-born Emanuel Celler (mostly German-Jewish), Mississippi’s staunch segregationist James Eastland—and his protégé Senator Ted Kennedy, the civil rights movement, and the conservative immigration sub-committee chair, Ohio’s Michael Feighan. There were others, of course. Debate at the time centered about a few key issues, one of which was the insistence of a large “cut-out” for admitting family members of existing citizens, and the admittance of immigrants that would be economically “advantageous” on the basis of skills and training (and early ancestor of H-1B). A compromise was reached to favor family members (the “brothers and sisters” provision it was nick-named).
The notion that this proposed legislation would potentially let in an entirely diverse racial and ethnic horde, while always lurking in the shadows, reflected JFK’s earlier view that “I see no reason to believe … (that future immigration) would exceed five years from now, by any great amount, perhaps not at all, the average for the past ten years”[iii].. In other words, the biased past was projected onto the immigration future. Did they ever get that wrong! The Hart-Celler (Immigration and Nationality) Act passed—with strong bipartisan support on September 22, 1965, signed on NYC’s Liberty Island. At the signing, LBJ set the tone of its passage:
The bill corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the conduct of the American nation. The bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing to immigrate to America on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here. This is a simple test, and it is a fair test. Those who can contribute most to this country—to its growth, to its strength, to its spirit—will be the first to be admitted to this land[iv].
The rest, as they say, is history—recounted in the below sections.
Immigration: Doors of Entry: Front, Back, and Side
The Second Great Immigration took a decade after the law’s passage to show up; it started in the 1970’s.
To place American immigration in some context, global migration “more than doubled“ between 1980 and 2010—by 2013 estimates were over 232 million international migrants were on the move. Analytically, one can classify migration paths into four “corridors” according to the so-called “North-South” distinction (N-N, S-S, N-S and S-N). South to North (moving from developing to industrialized nation), the corridor that constitutes the principal US inflow, is the second-largest (35%) of the four global North-South corridors. That corridor picked up steam after 1990 and accounted for 59% of all immigrants to industrialized nations (from 53% previous). The largest of these flows is from Mexico to the USA (estimated at 13 million between 1990 and 2013[v].
Together Canada and the United States have 5 percent of the world’s people and almost a quarter of the world’s migrants. The United States has 20 percent of the world’s migrants, and is the only industrialized country where one-quarter of the migrants are unauthorized[vi].
Transition Era Surge: How Many and Where
The 1970 census reported immigrants/foreign-born at their lowest level in the 20th century: 4.7% (9.6m). By 1980 that figure increased to 6.2% (14.1m) — a net increase of 4.7 million. “During the 1970’s, the origins of most immigrants changed from Europe to Latin America and Asia”. Average annual immigration leaped from 330,000 in the 1960’s to 450,000 in the Seventies—to 735,000 in the 1980’s and over 1mm in the 1990’s.[vii] In 1960 when it all began, 84% of immigrants living in the U.S. were both in Europe or Canada—only 6% from Mexico, less than 4% from South and East Asia, and 3.5% from the Caribbean and Latin/South America[viii].
The issue of when Transition Era illegal immigration began and how many there are is more challenging—and data most spongy. Alongside the 1965 immigration reform was the failure to renewal the two-decade plus farm laborer Bracero program. Since illegal immigration is logically biased toward those neighboring countries from which one can exit and travel to the USA in volume, Mexico has led the parade in illegal exports. A 1952 law made it a crime to “harbor” illegal aliens, but not a crime to employ them. Whatever illegal immigration that occurred during the 1970’s, by 1980 it was estimated that about 1.5 million illegals were in the USA, and a considerable number were likely disposed Bracero workers[ix].
A post-1980 Mexican economic crisis, combined with a relatively healthy American economy prompted a considerable rise. By 1986 an estimated 3.2 million unauthorized aliens were resident in the US. This rise is an important factor in the 1986 Simpson-Mazzoli Act was introduced/approved in Congress. That act called for (1) amnesty for those in the USA for more than five years, (2) crackdown on illegal employment of by American business of unauthorized aliens, and (3) hardening of the borders and enhanced border security to inhibit illegal entry. Three million gained citizenship, but the entry if illegals continued and by 1990, it was back to about 3.5 million,
Simpson-Mazzoli carried with it significant overlap with some elements of economic and community development, and it made border security and raids of places of employment major issues in Border States. By 1995, there were estimated about 5.7 million illegals and 8.6 by 2000. By 2006, with our economy in high gear, the number reached its estimated high point of about 12 million. Since 2009, the number has fluctuated around 11 million—until after 2014.[x]
During the 1970’s net immigration—legal and illegal—was estimated at more than 7 million (Massey). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended more than 1.2 million illegal immigrants and estimated 4 million eluded capture. Immigration during these early1970’s thru 1980’s hit Miami, Los Angeles, New York City and Honolulu (14%) the hardest. Miami’s foreign-born population was 54% in 1980, Los Angeles 27% and New York City 24%, Chicago and Boston about 15%, as was San Diego. Houston was 10, San Antonio about 8%, Tampa 7% and Dallas, Phoenix, Albuquerque between 5-7%. Atlanta was only 2% (Mohl, Miami: the Immigrant City 149-50). It is important to understand not only who and how, but when, immigration struck the nation’s cities and metro areas. Immigration after 1990 was more intense,
Where these immigrants settled differed markedly from the First Great Immigration.
As Gjelten observes in the First Great Immigration immigrants arrived in volume at port city entry points (i.e. Ellis Island in NYC). Boston, New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia handled the largest volumes—and the South did not garner any noticeable volume—ever. Immigrants settled either (1) in inner city (Big City) neighborhoods, characterized with the oldest and most distressed housing, or (2) quickly moved from the port city to sparsely-settled rural areas to establish homestead farms—especially in the upper Midwest. That did not happen in the Second Great Immigration.
Depending upon how one looks at it, there were no formal “entry ports”—any airport or border crossing would do. This geographic diffusion was further enhanced by the 1965 law that directed many immigrants to localities where their sponsoring resident families lived—and that centralized much immigrant into a few select states where Hispanics and Asians already lived. Quota or non-family-related immigrant were free to go where they chose—and they did—to the dismay of many a suburb that offered relatively cheap housing and entry-level job opportunities. Fairfax County in Virginia, for example, garnered a large number of immigrants during both Transition and Contemporary Eras. The push and pull of available jobs, the side door immigration that entered through university enrollment, and the various ED worker visa programs that technology and tourist-related firms regularly used, and incremental flow of immigrants into internal migrants diffused both Transition and Contemporary Era immigration nationally into every state of the Union.
To be sure, the First Great Immigration inner city neighborhood pattern also appeared, Los Angeles a prime example, Miami as well. This led to arguably inevitable tensions with Blacks with a major urban riot occurring in both cities during the Transition Era. During the Transition Era considerable attention was paid to bridge this tension, perhaps the most known being Jesse Jackson’s “Rainbow Coalition”. In the 1990’s, California’s plebiscite (initiative and referendum)-style democracy generated a serious “white” backlash ostensibly against “illegals”, but instead motivated a greater Hispanic shared identity that led to a radical transformation in several California local policy systems—and in the Contemporary Era radically altering the state-level policy system as well.
Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and, above all California—border states- logically attracted the most unauthorized immigrants, and more than their share of Mexicans and Central Americans. Miami (and South Florida) on the other hand became the Capital of the Caribbean due to a number of large periodic refugee flows (not usually included in immigration figures). Some municipalities during these periods conducted formal population recruitment ED strategies and developed immigrant communities. Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas, if only through the volume of immigrants, also developed “colonias” or concentrated urban settlements of immigrant population. In short, concentrations of ethnic immigrants did develop and a handful of states attracted most of the Second Great Immigration’s immigrant population. Still we acknowledge a nation-wide diffusion of immigrants to every state in the Union, a diffusion that gradually has increased during the two Eras. This is in marked contrast to the First Great Immigration.
Diffusion is more characteristic of the Contemporary Era as the Transition Era exhibited a greater concentration in several states. In 1990, seventy-three percent of immigrants were concentrated in only six states. Those six states held sixty-eight percent of all foreign-born retained that concentration through 2010 when they held sixty-five percent of foreign-born. In order of population volume (2010), the states were: California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois. Between 2000 and 2010 the states with the largest numerical immigrant growth were (in rank order): California, Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, Georgia, Virginia, North Carolina, Maryland, Washington, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts[xi]. California’s in 2010 was residence to more than one of four (27.2%) of the nation’s immigrants and New York and Texas are nest with about 11% each. They were followed by Florida (9%) and New Jersey and Illinois (5%, 4% respectively). Together these six states are home to nearly two-thirds (65%) of the nation’s 2010 immigrant/foreign-born population[xii].
One might distinguish, however, high-volume states from states, states with high 1990-2010 growth rates, with states having high rates of foreign-born to native-born. The latter is an important indicator of the “felt”, i.e. “perceived” impact of immigration on the state and local policy system. When one does this, one can see the difference between California and Texas, Nevada and New Mexico—and can see how more diffusion, even at the state level, during the Second Great Migration. Using any one of these indicators can yield a very different picture. In that this study emphasizes policy system and culture change, I tend to rely on rates of foreign-born to native—and high volume numbers of people. However, one defines it, California, New York, Texas and Florida are in a league of their own.
In terms of percentage of state residents who were foreign-born (2010), however, California led the pack (27.2%), followed by New York (22.2%). New Jersey (21%), Florida (19.4%), Nevada (18.8%), Hawaii (18.2%), Texas (16.4%). Arizona “only” 13.4% and New Mexico (9.9%) while the Atlantic coastal states off from Massachusetts (15%), Maryland (13.9%) Connecticut (13.6%), and Rhode Island (12.8%) held high rates of foreign born in excess of the national average (12.9). West Virginia in 2010 had the lowest rate (1.2%) and nineteen states with rates lower than 5%. States along the Mississippi River and Mountain States were disproportionately included in lowest rate states. Excepting Texas and Florida, states in the former Confederacy held rates lower than the national average[xiii]. That diffusion occurred, is evident from Wyoming, who in 2010 possessed the fewest immigrant population for any state (15, 843), but grew 424% since 1990. In 2010 only 2.8% of Wyoming’s population were foreign-born. West Virginia, with America’s lowest share of foreign-born to native (1.2%) still grew nearly 150%. between 1990 and 2010—taking in twice as many immigrants as Wyoming[xiv].
Having said this, and acidly observing there is always a statistic that can convey almost any finding, the highest rates of growth in the Contemporary Era (2000-2010) (from obviously a very low base) were the same states—Alabama (92%) growth rate and many other low-volume southern, Mountain and Mississippi Valley states. From 1990 to 2010, however, the nation’s immigrant population essentially doubled, with North Carolina (525%), Georgia (445%, Arkansas (430%, Tennessee (389), with South Carolina and Kentucky 337% and 312% respectively the highest growth rates. The only non-southern post-1990 top growth state was Nevada at 385%. Middle American states also from a low base, grew moderately above the national average: Nebraska (298%), Utah (280%), and Colorado (249%, Minnesota (235%), Iowa (222%), Indiana (219%), Oklahoma (215%), and Arizona (208%) The only East Coast state above the post-1990 national immigrant growth average was Delaware (223%).
The Who and Where
The nation’s foreign-born population (9.7 million in 1970) quadrupled to exceed 40 million by 2010. In absolute numbers of foreign born in 2010 were the highest ever in our nation’s history. But in 1910 14.7% of the nation was foreign-born; while in 2010 it was 12.9%. In 2014, according to PEW, there were 42.2 million immigrants, making up about 13.2%–so the gap continues to narrow[xv].
With my emphasis on policy systems and political culture, it has been unfortunate that “the Who” of immigrants has often been reduced to “smush” agglomerations such as Hispanics and Asians, etc. This suits the media, and the simple souls who stress ideological policy-making to rectify equally smush problems such as discrimination, protectionism, and inequality. Place of origin, starting with continents helps us narrow down on cultural impacts as well as political pressures on policy systems. Asian and Hispanic immigrants developed distinctive patterns, best understood by nation of origin,[xvi].
Overview: Of immigrants who entered before 1980, Europeans constituted 24%. That changed to 8.4% between 2000 and 2010. Latin Americans (Mexicans, Caribbean, and Central America) previous to 1980 were slightly over 45% and that rose to nearly 54% during 2000-2010. Asians were nearly 24% pre-1980, and a bit less than 30% between 2000 and 2010. South Americans were 5.4% pre-1980 and 8% 2000 to 2010. Of all immigrants captured by the ACS in 2010 (nearly 40 million), Europeans were 12%, Asians 28%, Latin Americans about 53%, and South Americans nearly 7%[xvii].
From 1980 thru 2010, Mexico sent over 25 million to the United States (out of 40 million total immigrants), about 62.5%). China, Hong Kong and Taiwan was next with 4.6 million or about 11.5% of total immigrants. The Philippines were third with 4.1 million (10.25%) and fourth-place India sent 3.25 million or a little over 8%. Vietnam and El Salvador were neck and neck for fifth and sixth, and Cuba seventh just beat out Korea (eighth). Canada and the United Kingdom were 11th and 12th. After that Caribbean and South American nations (and Germany, Poland, Russia) filled out the remaining of the top twenty nations.
Hispanics: Immigration and Migration
Being defined as Hispanic/Latino is mostly based on language of nation of origin. Much demographic (and partisan) commentary reference the projected “fact” that by 2050 or so, blacks, Asians and Hispanics will be “majority”. Perhaps so, but broadly-defined smush demographics leave much to be desired in terms of actual impacts on policy systems. National origin is an important indicator of distinctive cultural heritage and opens the door to variations in matters affecting policy-making.
PEW Research, reporting from 2013 data, asset there were nearly 54 million Hispanics (17.4%) in the U.S., with Mexicans (64%, 34.5 million) the largest national group. They were followed by Puerto Ricans (9.5%, 5.1 million) and tied for third Cubans and El Salvadorians (3.7%, nearly 2 million each). Dominicans, Guatemalan and Colombians range from 3.3, to 2.4, 2%). The remaining nations of origin (seven nations including Spain) range from 1.5 to .5% and constitute the internal national diversity of Hispanics.[xviii]
It is clear Latinos as a terms reflects considerable diversity, a diversity that challenges our immigration topic, Puerto Ricans are American citizens (99%), and three in four Hispanics (76%) are either U.S. born (65%) or naturalized citizens (11%). Only Hondurans and Guatemalans have rates as low as 50%. Mexicans are younger, Cubans older, but Hispanics as a category are much younger than the general U.S. population (28 to 37 years old). South Americans can be wealthier, more educated and more dispersed throughout the nation than Mexicans or Puerto Ricans. Sixty-eight percent of Hispanics above five speak only English or speak English “very well”—obviously Puerto Ricans possess the highest rate. Over one quarter of Hispanics are below the poverty line (2010) compared to 16% of the general population. Central Americans suffer from the highest rates[xix].
In terms of immigration Hispanics are sub-divided into four geographic categories: Mexico, Caribbean, Central American and South America. Mexicans enjoy the largest share by far, followed by Caribbean, Central and then South Americans. Mexicans have been constant, albeit increasing numerically since 1970, but South Americans in particular are a Contemporary Age phenomenon. All sub-groups had the highest rates between 2000 and 2010. That has changed after the census, as reported by PEW, and Asian immigrants have exceeded for the first time the raw number of Hispanic immigrants. Central Americans seemingly had the greatest decline.
Geographically, the high volume states are not clones of each other in terms of Latino composition. California, sui generis, has 39% Mexican of its foreign-born populations, but only 1.7% Caribbean, yet 26.7% Central American and 8.5% South American. Texan immigrant population, on the other hand, is 22% Mexican, 2% Caribbean, 12% Central American and nearly 5% South American. New York immigrants are only 2% Mexican, but 26.7% Caribbean, only 8% Central American and nearly 21% South American. Florida, like NY only has 2.4% Mexican, but 41% Caribbean, 11% Central American, and more than 26% South American. New Jersey, however has half as many Mexicans (1%) than NY, 5.6% Caribbean, about the same Central Americans (4.3%) and 20% South Americans—reasonably similar to NY. Illinois, with less than 1% Caribbean, 1.7% Central American, and 1.9% South American, is the third ranking state in terms of Mexicans (6%), after California and Texas—more than Arizona’s 4.4%.—which BTW has .3% , .9%, and .6% Caribbean Central American and South American respectively. Two-thirds of Mexicans live in California, Texas and Illinois—three out of five in California and Texas[xx].
Internal Migration: Puerto Rican Migration
Puerto Ricans are born citizens of the United States. They are Americans since 1917. The movement of Puerto Ricans is an internal migration and is placed under the “immigration” topic only because Puerto Ricans are an element of America’s Hispanic/Latino population. Inclusion as an Hispanic/Latino is salient to this ED/CD analysis. In 2013, PEW estimated there were 5.1 million Mainland-resident Puerto Ricans (3.5 million on the Island); in 2017, some estimates ranged to 5.3 million, reflecting a post-2013 surge in Island migration. These numbers make Puerto Ricans the second largest Hispanic grouping (Mexicans) and 1.7% of all Americans; they account for about 9.5% of American Hispanics. Over 70% of Mainland Puerto Ricans were born I on the Mainland, and about 1.5 million were born on the Island (29%)[xxi].
For various reasons Puerto Rican mainland residents have been early and significant participants in the development of post-WWII community development, are important players in many jurisdictional policy systems, and are a principal potential beneficiary of mainstream ED targeting. Treatment of Puerto Rican Territorial ED/CD should be considered similar to that of a state. The application of relevant federal ED-related legislation to the Territory has resulted in enormous impact to the Island, and has been charged with being a major factor in migration to the Mainland. In recent years, the drift to Territorial bankruptcy (or whatever it may be called) has prompted higher rates to emigration from the Island—as well as including a rather significant ED dimension as well.
Significant migration to the Mainland started in the 1920’s (to New York City especially). Mainland PR population grew by nearly 350% during the 1920’s. Between 1940 and 1960, Mainland population increased by over 1100%, adding about 825,000 to 1940’s 70,000 base. Almost all of this period’s migration went to NYC, New Jersey and to New England urban centers. Mainland migration was a central city/urban phenomenon, but was dispersed to second and third tier cities also. The effect on the neighborhood composition and character of the urban jurisdictions was often profound. Major Puerto Rican CDOs, and cultural entities, are too numerous to list, but in communities where they are resident, Puerto Ricans have been significant participants in American sub-state ED/CD.
Neighborhood succession, usually characterized by high levels of concentration/segregation, and the relative poverty/low education level of the migrants arguably created more disruption than opportunity. The Ford Foundation Gray Cities experiment, the investment that produced many concepts and key principles underlying several post-WWII CD approaches, were in response to NYC/Hartford Puerto Rican juvenile delinquency and gangs. Both as competitors and allies, Puerto Ricans shared many of the same neighborhoods (East Harlem, South Bronx, Brooklyn’s Bushwick, and Fairhill Philadelphia) with African-Americans; both lived in segregated, poverty, discrimination, low-opportunity neighborhoods that were heavily involved in the post-Great Society rise of community development. While a majority of Puerto Ricans self-identify as white, well over forty per cent are Black or mixed racial background.
That Puerto Ricans and Blacks lived in the same neighborhoods, suffered different, but severe discrimination from the larger American society, and displayed remarkably similar demographic and behavioral characteristics, but were inconsistent allies and chronic “rivals” with each defending its own “turf” is testimony to their different cultures, and evidence supporting “invasion” so critical to concepts of neighborhood succession. A distinctive Puerto Rican culture, a subject of a considerable literature, legacy and heritage, is a well-accepted literary, social, historical and entertainment “category”, and that culture has impacted ED and CD strategies and programs, and has always, and likely will always, affect the making of neighborhood and jurisdictional ED/CD policy.
Residential concentration has facilitated the elections of Puerto Ricans to key political bodies, and powerful institutions since 1937. When Corey Booker ran for New Jersey senator (2013), he was succeeded as mayor of Newark by Island-born Puerto Rican Luis Quintana—the fourth mayor of a large American city (Miami, Hartford, and Camden).
Puerto Rican settlement has been mainly an East Coast urban phenomenon. New York (City) was the principal initial migration, and even today is arguably the “home base” of Mainland Puerto Ricans. New York City politics has accommodated Puerto Ricans as an active player in its policy process, and neighborhood EDOs, as well as public unions reflect the City’s Puerto Rican base. From the City migration entered into New Jersey and from there to Philadelphia. New England cities also experienced post WWII Puerto Rican migration as did New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Post-1980 Puerto Rican migration has opened up new residential bases in several southern states, especially Florida. Central Florida (Orlando and Tampa) today house nearly 19% of all Mainland Puerto Ricans, and the South including Florida about 31%. The state of New York still holds the honor for housing most Mainland Puerto Ricans—about 21%. Chicago and Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island also house a substantial number of Puerto Ricans in their major cities. In terms of states where Puerto Ricans are the largest Hispanic component, Connecticut (57%) is the highest, followed by Pennsylvania (53%). Massachusetts and Connecticut hover around 40%, which are noticeably higher than NY and NJ, around 33%. Florida’s Puerto Ricans are only 27% of the state’s Hispanics. Looked at from another angle, the states with the largest Puerto Rican populations relative to total population are (in order of rank, 2010): Connecticut (7.1%), New York (5.5%), New Jersey (4.9%), Florida 4.5%), Massachusetts (4.1%), Rhode Island (3.3%), Hawaii (military service) (3.2%), Pennsylvania (2.9) and Delaware (2.5%).
The cities with the most Puerto Rican residents are (in order of rank, 2010): New York City (723,621)—almost 9% of the city population), Philadelphia (121, 643), Chicago (102,703), Springfield MA (50,798), Hartford (41,995), Newark (35,993), Bridgeport CT (31,881), and then Orlando (31, 201), the fastest growing. Tampa, it is noted, is seventeenth with 24,057. It is obvious that the older now-traditional urban centers still retain a considerable number of Puerto Ricans, often the poorest and minimally educated. Puerto Ricans in the southern states are older, more affluent, often retired middle class, and are dispersed throughout the metro areas, as opposed to the central cities. It is also true the Puerto Rican middle class has also moved to the suburbs even in the traditional older Puerto Rican settlements. Holyoke Massachusetts has the highest percentage of Puerto Ricans as a percent of its total population (44%), a close tie with Buenaventura Florida, with 44% as well. Next are several Florida suburbs with 35% or higher—residential retirement enclaves. Generational cohort migration is a significant factor in post-2000 Contemporary Era Puerto Rican migration.
Asian Immigration: Asian includes a lot of the world’s geographies—ranging from the Middle East, to India, to Southeast Asia, China, Japan and East Asia. To compound the issue the dissolution of the USSR after 1990 created a number of new Asian nations (Central Asia) that were formerly classified as European. Refugee “immigration”—refugees are not included usually in immigrant statistics—further affect the impact of new populations on our jurisdictional policy systems. America’s colonial and pre-1965 historical legacy has also compounded our analysis. Hawaii and California do not share the sane Asian-American history as the remaining forty-eight states. Both possess an historical legacy that created an Asian population previous to the 1965 legislation.
Chinese and Japanese entered into San Francisco and California during the 19th century—San Francisco’s “Chinatown” is well known as are Japanese internment camps during WWII. As early as 1918, 180,000 Asian-Americans lived in the USA (including 100,000 Japanese, 60,000 Chinese and 5,000 Filipinos)[xxii]. American colonialism/imperialism led to our “adoption” of Hawaii (which adopted in 1906 a worker recruitment program that brought an estimated 100,000 Philippines to replace its former East Asian recruitment program) and imposed a colonial government on the Philippines (see an “Internal Migration” below for Puerto Rico). One can also argue our nation’s involvement with Vietnam (which some date back to the 1950’s) has overtones of imperialism/anti-communism. World War II and post-war occupation of Japan produced many naturalized citizens who fought with us or who married GIs.
Still, the passage of the 1965 legislation transformed Asian-American immigration. Asian immigrants increased from less than 500,000 in 1960 to about 12.8 million in 2014. While growth rates have slowed since 1980 Asia in that year was the second-largest region of birth for post-1980 immigrants. In the last several years, with the slowing of Mexican/Hispanic immigration, Asian immigrants are now the largest annual number of recent immigrants. The largest countries of origin as of 2014 (see above) India, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Korea-accounting for 68% of total Asian immigration. Eastern Asia (Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan) comprise 31% of Asian immigrants, South Central Asians (India, Pakistan/Bangladesh, Iran and Nepal) are 27.7%, South East Asian countries 32.6% (the highest), and Middle East (excluding Iran and Pakistan) about 8.3%.[xxiii] These are vastly disparate cultures, religions, and historical legacies.
Reflecting the bimodal (concentration/diffusion) post-1965 immigration settlement pattern, nearly half of Asian immigrants have settled in just three states (California (32%), New York (10%) and Texas (7%). In that Asians immigrants are often highly educated (half of Asian adults had a college degree or higher in 2014—76% of Indian—employment location and student status have impacted locational choice. Since the Great Recession the number of Asian students have doubled (led by China, nearly 500% increase, Kuwait (540%) and Saudi Arabia 1730%)[xxiv]. Accordingly New Jersey and Illinois (Chicago) also rank high. Most states have less than 1% of Asian immigrants (major exceptions being states with Ivy League or prestigious universities). Montana, Vermont, West Virginia Wyoming, North Dakota have “trace” amounts of Asian immigrants—suggesting an urban bias.
In terms of absolute numbers, the single most popular location for 2009-2013 Asian immigrants has been Los Angeles Metro area (nearly 1.6 million) and New York (also 1.6 million). San Francisco Metro is third (over 700,000) and Washington DC and Chicago fourth/fifth at about 440,000. Houston and Dallas led Texas. Our preference to use proportion of total population as an indicator of potential impact on local policy systems and ED policy-making suggest that the San Jose is the top Metro area for 2009-2013 Asian immigrants (419,000, with 22.5% of the Metro population) and San Francisco Metro is second (over 16%). Los Angeles is third with over 12% of the Metro total population. New York, by comparison is less than 8% as is Washington DC and San Diego; Houston and Dallas about 5% and 4%. Asians, particularly Indian, are employed in high-skilled jobs and have entered the US on temporary H-1B visas for specialty occupations. Of the 2014 approved H-1B petitions, 70% were born in India, followed by Mainland China (8%)[xxv]. New York, Dallas and San Jose are the top three H-1B beneficiaries, at least in 2013[xxvi].
Refugee/Asylum Migration
While most eyes are focused on immigration, legal or otherwise, the entry of refugees/asylum has cumulatively injected a reasonably large number of foreign born into a few metropolitan areas. The U.S. is the world’s admitter of refugees—at least until the 2015-16 Syrian-African/European migration. Since 1983, somewhat less than 3.5 million refugees/asylum entered into the USA. Following after a large-scale refugee increase that resulted from Castro’s Cuban takeover and the Vietnamese exodus after its 1975 fall, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980.
The reader is referred to our discussion of Miami for a more detailed sense of the impact of refugees (Cuban in Miami’s case) on selected municipalities in the early Transition Era. Cuban post-1960 refugees dramatically transformed the character and the future of Miami-Dade and indeed southern Florida. Today Miami refers to itself as the “Queen City of the Caribbean”, is considered by many as a “world class” or global city as a direct consequence of its repopulation by Cuban refugees. While Miami-Dade is not the typical “refugee” municipal experience, it does strongly suggest the impact of large number of refugees in a single jurisdiction may impart consequences and characteristics to the local policy system and politics that depart somewhat from those inserted by more traditional immigration. It is possible that refugees tend to be more “insular-inward looking”, concentrated/ segregated in residency, more disposed to “identity politics”, and hold over considerable time periods an attachment to the “motherland” that affects the refugee’s level of participation/commitment to the U.S. local policy system.
That act formalized the US refugee program, and adopted the UN’s 1951 Convention and subsequent 1967 Protocols (which we signed in 1968) as the definition of a refugee. The importance of definition is demonstrated by the decision to consider the Miami-bound Haitian Boat refugees as “economic” and not political” refugees which placed them outside of the UN definition—and hence could be intercepted and returned to their homeland.
In any case, from 1980 on, the President, in “consultation” with Congress, set the annual number of refugees allowed into the United States. The 1980 was amended by the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. The annual refugee cap has varied. Its peak was 1992-3. Higher annual rates were allowed previous to 9/11 (2001) than after, so it is wise to distinguish between the Transition Era and our Contemporary Era. Also, it is the refugee program which was the target of the controversial President Trump “travel ban executive orders/ court decisions” of 2017 (Executive Order 13780).
Through 2004, thirty metro areas, most with large foreign-born populations, handled most refugee resettlements. As described earlier, New York and Los Angeles settled the largest number, but the ethnic background of each was markedly different. Chicago was third, mostly European, but also a noticeable number of Asians and Middle Easterners. Washington DC resettled a large number of African refugees, and Minneapolis with a large number of Southeast Asian refugees. Boston, San Diego and Houston also accepted many refugees. Seattle (the fifth largest metro in this Era), San Jose, Minneapolis-St Paul, Sacramento and Portland in the later Transition Era increasingly became serious refugee gateways, and St. Louis also accepted a meaningful number, chiefly Bosnian refugees[xxvii].
The Transition Era exhibited three distinct, yet overlapping, “refugee” periods. During the Transition Era resettled refugees were about 10% of the immigrants entering into the U.S. The Cold War period which ended with the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union was characterized by large numbers of Soviet refugees. Peaking at 60,000 in 1992, nearly 500,000 Soviet residents entered the USA between 1983 and 2004 (the largest grouping during the Transition Era)—by 1994, however that number was reduced to less than 30,000 annually. New York (City) metropolitan area was their prime destination. A second refugee grouping entered through Los Angeles during these years, however. Several waves of Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian refugees were admitted. Totaling approximately 367,000 through 2004, Vietnamese were the second largest Transition Era group. Laotians and Cambodians were fourth and fifth largest. Their annual rates ranged from 35,000 to 52,000. Settling in communities when earlier Southeast Asian refugees had settled (California, Los Angeles and Orange County). While continuing to accept large numbers of refugees, New York and Los Angeles dropped noticeably in the Contemporary Era[xxviii].
The second period began after 1992 when Yugoslavia disintegrated and the Balkans entered into an extended period of “civil war”—and religious/ethnic genocide. About 155,000 Balkan residents were admitted previous to 2000. Refugees from the various areas of former Yugoslavia were the third largest grouping during the Transition Era, around 168,000. In the Late 1990’s a third period emerged, characterized by a more diverse flow of refugees, principally from widespread civil war and ethnic conflict in Africa. Somali, Sudanese, Liberian and Ethiopian refugees constituted the largest groupings, but there was significant flows from Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. About 127,000 refugees flowed from the latter three nations, and fifteen African nations, Somalia the largest, sent a slightly higher number[xxix]. Several second and third tier cities accepted high rates of refugees and led the “per capita”-based refugee resettlement: Fargo ND, Erie PA, Sioux Falls SD, and Binghamton NY. Half of the Iranian refugees settled in the Los Angeles metro area, and no surprise, half of the Cubans settled in Miami, one in five Somali went to Detroit. Laotian refuges went disproportionately to Fresno, Minneapolis-St Paul, and Cambodians to Los Angeles. Chicago and St Louis accepted the highest rates of Yugoslavian-based refugees[xxx].
The Contemporary Era–Jointly administered by several federal agencies, the refugee resettlement program, works with, is dependent upon the voluntary participation of states, cities, and church/-based and community development agencies. The federal government distributes refugees according to family ties, job availability, and acceptance by a state and local CDO group. The federal government assumes financial responsibility for the first 90 days, and then the locals take over. The refugee is eligible for “long-term residency” or a “green card” after one year. The refugee must find employment after six months—which is usually handled by the CDO. Most refugees are woman and children, however. With a green card, refugees are free to move to wherever they want. There was a marked slowdown in the vetting and entry of refugees following 9/11 and for several years thereafter.
After its peak in 1993 (142,000), the annual cap declined to its nadir in 2002 and 2003 (around 30,000 actually resettled). Rising to around 70,000 it was raised to 80,000 in 2008 and stayed around that through 2011, when it was reduced to 76,000, and 70,000 in 2012 and 2013 respectively. It remained at 70,000 through 2015. In 2016 the Obama administration raised the cap 50 85,000 and 110,000 in 2017. Targets were set to resettle 40,000 Near East and South Asian (Burma, Bhutan) refugees. Latin, Caribbean, and Central Americans were the lowest grouping. The largest refugee grouping resettled thus far in the Contemporary Era, over the decade after 2006, Burmese were the largest single refugee group (163,000 or 23% of those resettled), followed by Bhutan (13% or nearly 93,000). In the Obama years, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq, Syria, Burma, and Somalia were the major groups[xxxi]. On a per capita-resident basis, Nebraska led the pack, followed by North Dakota, Idaho, Vermont and Arizona[xxxii].
In 2015 almost 70,000 refugees were admitted, and the 2016 increase to 85,000 (+23%), while noticeable was not a return to the levels of past years. Given the ISIS crisis, past utilization by Burmese/Bhutan was reduced from about 36% to 16%. The increase flow of Syrians, from 2% to 15% was dramatic, as was the increase of Democratic Republic of Congo from 12% to 17%. By 2017, fifty-five percent of resettled refugees/asylum seekers were settled in ten states—California (10% and Texas (9%) lead the pack, with NY, WA, OH, MI, and AZ each accepted 5-6%[xxxiii].
In hindsight, the increase in accepting asylum seekers (the distinction is “refugees” are vetted in the country to which they initially fled and after a review which often requires 18-24 months is approved by U.S. bureaucratic decision-makers, while asylum seekers literally arrive at the port of entry without such vetting) proved unsettling to the incoming Trump administration. In 2015, the Obama administration approved a record-breaking 26,124 individuals, mostly from ISIS-affected regions. In 2014 about 23,374 were admitted. The initial asylum seekers family members (over 7,000) were admitted afterwards. Interestingly, the flow-pattern differed considerably from the refugee flow pattern. Twenty-four percent of these 2015 asylum seekers were from the People’s Republic of China and over 25% from El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Guatemala. Just over 6% came from Iraq and Syria[xxxiv]. The Trump administration reduced by executive order the Obama administration’s 110,000 refugee cap to 50,000—which by the time of its issuance was almost reached. Since the cap reduction was never contested, the Trump strictures would have potentially affected about 7,000 refugees from all nations.
The Federal Government: Borders, Dream Act/DACA, and H-IB (et al) Visas
Immigration obviously triggers the involvement of the federal government, as it enjoys constitutional responsibility for that policy area (putting aside for the moment, sanctuary cities). In particular, this section will introduce Protecting/Administration of Border Areas and Entry Points—as well as the administrative process (including vetting in national of origin) that applies to immigrants has been an increasing (especially post-1980) factor in state and sub-state matters—in major entry points and, border states where the border patrol, drug enforcement, and customs are deeply involved. Federal border policy, the effectiveness of its application as well as the policy itself, has become a major issue in California, Arizona, Texas and New Mexico—also Miami and Florida. The reactions to this will be detailed in discussion of key states such as Texas, California and Arizona.
The Dream Act/DACA: Secondly, the federal government has attempted to respond with its own legislation to deal with complications and impact of the considerable post 1965 immigration. The Dream Act (Sens Durban and Hatch), for example, has been a major issue, affecting ED/CD since it was first introduced in the 2001 Senate. Since 2001 many Dream Act bills have been introduced, the House passed on2 (216-198) in 2010, but other bills have failed, for example in a 2005 Senate cloture vote (52-44). The Act was included in several comprehensive immigration reform acts (2006 and 2007), and was also inserted into other legislation (Defense, for example) in various years.
Each bill and annual version of the Dream Act included its own language and provisions. While the Dream Act was considered by many to be a de facto “amnesty” for illegal immigrants, it was never its formal intention to do so. Essentially, most bills included a provision to grant “conditional legal status” for a six year period provided the immigrant satisfy other provisions such as attend community college, enlist in the military, or complete a four year college degree, for which they would not be eligible for Pell grants, but could apply for work study and student loans. If, the registered lived up to these conditions, permanent residency could follow after the six year conditional status. Applicants had to also satisfy age, and that they had already resided for more than five years in the USA. They had to graduate from high school/GED and no hold a criminal record.
The actual terms and conditions were tweaked over the torturous legislative history, and the Dream Act/DACA became linked with other aspects of immigration policy, such as workforce legality, verification by employer and college, and precisely what constituted a criminal record. The military loved the bill as it addressed a chronic need for enlistees, but states were conflicted as the Act overlapped with local school administration, Medicaid, driver’s license and a host of other programs.
Given the inevitable distortions induced by the polarized media and the hyper-partisanship associated with immigration, it was unlikely those outside the immediate policy/program had any clear idea as to what the Dream Act actually “was”, and, for that matter, what DACA (or DAPA) was. The overlap with ED appeared minimal, but in fact it did become an ED-related issue in several states. Many Community Developers and CDOs were noticeably involved with the Act and DACA administration.
After 2009, with the election of President Obama and a Democrat control of all three policy-making branches, a bi-partisan effort was made to approve a strong version of the Act—it failed and the attempt was remade in the 2010 Congress as well. That too suffered the same fate. The House did pass the bill, and it did not reach the necessary 60 vote minimum in the Senate. So in 2011, Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader, introduced yet again a strong version of the Dream Act. It ran afoul of key conservative Republicans (McCain and Graham) who had in the past been advocates for immigration legislation. In the midst of Senate negotiations, California passed its own Dream Act (July). The 2011 legislation did not pass.
With his reelection imminent, on June 15, 2012, President Obama ordered agencies involved in key elements of the Dream Act would (deportation, Immigration Services) implement the provisions of a new, unapproved by Congress, federal program Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, (DACA)—an administration program to implement a number of key Dream Act elements—including a controversial provision to allow the federal government to issue 2 year work permits to undocumented/illegal immigrants under 36 years of ag. The unilateral implementation of an unapproved program generated a counter action by Arizona’s governor Jan Brewer denying driver’s license and welfare benefits to illegal immigrants who benefited from the DACA program. Law suits from a number of parties (including U.S. Immigration and Custom agents) followed.
A turbulent history resulted but it did not stop the flow of illegal immigrants that applied for DACA. As of January 2017, approximately 740,000 immigrants were registered and received benefits from DACA. Its constitutionality, however, appears fragile (usurpation of Congressional authority/ issuance of work permits)—even Obama originally felt he lacked the authority at its inception stated it was temporary. In 2015 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals placed a “stay” (an injunction) on DAPA, which the Supreme Court left in place after their review in 2016.
H-1B: Temporary Worker Visas—the Side Door
Illegal immigration captures the headlines and was arguably the primary driver of policy during both the Transition and Contemporary Era. But legal and illegal immigration numbers significantly understate the entry of foreign workers and visitors to the United States. There is, as the Population Reference Bureau argues, a sizable “side door”[xxxv]. Not included in these statistics are “green cards” or temporary visas that allow foreigners to travel, study, or to live in the USA and work (up to five years) and creates a path to naturalized citizenship. They estimated between 2006 and 2010 (the Contemporary Era) over 40 million temporary visitors and workers entered into the US. Oversight of the temporary visa problem is erratic and is frequently criticized for not keeping track of expiration dates on temporary visas—creating a gray area—but one that frequently falls off the economic developer’s radar.
The H-1B visa program commenced in 1990 as part of the 1990 Immigration Act. Its purpose was to access on behalf of employers high skilled foreign workers for “specialty” occupations unable to satisfy their requirements/needs from American sources for a temporary period of time. The “specialty” as defined by the legislation meant such occupations required at least a bachelor’s degree (exception being fashion models—Gisele can apply Mr. Brady). An H-1B visa is for three years, renewable for another three year term. There are other smaller visa programs (for example O, L-1 and L-1B) that fill niches in employer-specific occupational situations. The program distinguishes between academic/nonprofit research positions and those with a private employer. Until 2004, the former were “uncapped” (see below).
There is a rather complex and “bureaucratic” process to qualify a specialty occupation and submit an individual application. A network of agencies, chief of which are DOL, Homeland Security, and State (which issues the visa) is involved—there is a fee of course. Half of the fee is transferred to DOL’s Employment and Training Administration to fund programs intended to address skill shortages. Bookings singles out the Workforce Alliance of South Central Kansas (Engineering Excellence Project-KEEP) as a successful recipient of an ETA grant and who developed a program model of benefit to the region)[xxxvi]. Over the years, the program has been tweaked by several pieces of legislation, none of which exacted any serious impact on the program itself.
The program has a “dual purpose” and accordingly permits, with employer sponsorship, application for permanent residency (green card). Since there has historically been a considerable backlog in such applications and final determination (plus quota restrictions based on national origin) some allegations have been made the program encourages recipients to stay illegally until their application is resolved. Approval of applications is sometimes achieved through a “lottery” administered by USCIS (which was unsuccessfully challenged in a legal action), and in other years it seems approval is on first-come basis—with USCIS publishing when the cap has been reached. Unopened applications are then returned.
There is an annual cap imposed on H-1B visas, initially set at 65,000 but was raised several times, reaching a 2001-2003 peak at 195,000 (Twenty-First Century Act of 2000). Since 2004 through 2011, the 65,000 cap was restored with a second cap of 20,000 for workers with an advanced degree from U.S. colleges. Since 2003, the cap has been reached and demand (applications) has exceeded the cap. In 2008, there were almost 405,000 applications for 85,000 visas About 70,000 employers annually file applications for H-1B worker slots. Half requested only one worker, and 94% less than ten. Fifteen employers filed at least 1000 applications, and another sixteen between 500-1000[xxxvii]. On April 3, the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Service (which administers much of the H-1B program—and issues the visas would “temporarily” suspend processing for H-1B visa applications. On April 18, President Trump signed a “Buy American, Hire American” executive order which among other features called for federal agencies to submit reforms to the H-1B program.
Technology, Accounting Corporate Personnel Contractors, and Investment Banks (also CVS) are some of the heaviest traditional users. Foreign-owned firms are also heavy users. In 2010-11 Microsoft led the pack with 4109 applications—and Tata Consultancy (Indian-owned) was second with 3179. In that year, sixty-four percent of the applications were for STEM-related occupations. There is noticeable difference in nonprofit research and private employer applications. Private firms stress computer/ software related skills, engineering and financial analysis. Nonprofit top occupation was life sciences[xxxviii]. Firms file the applications on behalf of employees and pay the fees.
Virtually every metropolitan area has firms/nonprofits that submits an H-1B application, but logically heavy users dominated the process. The heaviest application submittal, again logically, originates from the most populated metro areas, New York being the heaviest (53,000 in 2010-11), followed by Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose and Washington D.C (ranging from 18,000 to 14,000 in the same year). The top nine (next in line being Chicago, Boston, Dallas, Houston—and Seattle 10—ranging from 14,000 to 9,600) file half the H-1B applications.[xxxix].
If one measures the intensity of application submittal to per capita population (more helpful in understanding the issues and underlying patterns), New York drops from the pack and San Jose goes to number one, followed by Columbus Indiana (Cummins), Durham NC (Duke/University of NC) and Trenton NJ (Princeton) and Ann Arbor (Univ. of Michigan). This suggests smaller metros participate in the H-1B process. Brookings also suggest it hints private firms use H-1B to overcome constraints in specialty occupation labor supply for the smaller metros. Rochester Minnesota (Mayo Clinic) ranks No. 1 in geographic areas submitting applications for “uncapped” H-1B which concentrate on health and life sciences/research occupations. Within the “private firm” pattern, Brookings uncovered two sub-patterns: (a) product-based firms (Google, Amazon, and Cummins—with a wide range of occupations requested) are geographically concentrated, usually from corporate HQ, while (b) service/client-based companies (Tata Consultancy, Fujitsu, Qualcomm and Accenture) are dispersed and sent from their client’s metro area—also applications are concentrated with a narrow range of occupations requests)[xl].
From this we glean the H-1B application process includes at least three distinct sub-patterns. Twenty-seven metros in 2010-11 were topped by private/corporate submittals—nine to the top twenty metros that submit the highest number of applications are corporate. Another twenty-seven metros compete in the “uncapped” research/nonprofit submittals—and they are home to top research universities and research entities (Durham NC, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, New Haven and Buffalo top the rankings). The third sub-pattern includes metros with a combination of the previous two sub-patterns. Washington, Chicago, Boston, Houston and Philadelphia lead in this sub-group. In all three patterns, STEM occupations constitute 92% of the occupations desired.
While no aggregate study of approved applications exists[xli], sporadic one-year studies do provide glimpses into the H-1B impact. Recode[xlii] asserts in 2015 about 80% of the approved applicants in 2015, and 82% in 2016 came from India (126,692) and China (21,657). Tata Consultancy and Wipro dominate the client-serving (and foreign-owned) users, Google and Facebook the corporate. They confirm other data which supports our previous discussion that applications issued equal 85,000 per year and about 100,000 renewed annually. Research on 2012 approvals found that Indians were 64% of the approved applicants and China was in second place[xliii].
In 2017 Senator Ron Johnson (R-WIS) and Rep. Ken Buck (R-Colo) submitted legislation, “the State-Sponsored Visa Pilot Program Act, that would allow states to start visa programs for foreign guest workers—in effect transferring the H-1B (and other visas, see below) to the states. The legislation would allow 500,000 visas to be issued, 5,000 per state, and the remainder apportioned on the basis of state population. Indexed to growth, each state could decide, if it chose to participate at all, which occupations, skills and industries it would admit. This could include farm labor, as well as H-1B’s specialty occupations.
As one might expect, there have been several concerns (including Congressional hearings and legislation) which have persisted through the long life of the program. The obvious bottom line is whether American workers are being “discriminated” against either because they are too expensive, or foreign workers are more desired by the corporate user. Interestingly, these criticism are not applied to those workers utilized by nonprofit universities and research institutes. Other concerns include whether the program is a backdoor, or even informal way to create a path to citizenship, than through the immigration process. Given that it is asserted by many that about one million legal immigrants enter into the US each year, the H-1B (and the refugee/asylum) programs could allow about 15% additional residents.
There is a lesser known H-2 A&B visa program which admits temporary non-agricultural workers. H-2B has been capped in recent years to 66,000 annually—divided into two six month periods. Hospitality, ski resorts, and tourist industries, as well as construction and landscaping sectors have benefited from this program. It has escaped the attention of the Policy World and research institutes, for reasons that are not known, but one suspects not “honorable”—that is until it was discovered Trump hotels took advantage of the program. This program also were expanded by 15,000 when President Trump took office. Specific nations are admitted as eligible to send applications.[xliv] The program started in 1987, but it was not until 2000 that approved applicants reached 60,000 annually. Its peak was 2008 (above 94,000), but that is more evidence of the previous bubble/boom that led to the 2008 Great Recession. By 2015 it recovered sufficiently to admit nearly 70,000.[xlv] This program suffers from the same criticisms and concerns mention in H-1B, with the addition of “slave” labor for low-paid, hard-working positions, for example on cruise/resort ships and Martha Vineyard restaurants.
All this “temporary”, “non-immigrant” visa “stuff opens the door to the incredible number of visa programs that exist (including H-1 and H-2) and admit individuals to the United States each year. In 2016, for example, the last year for which data exists, 10,381,000[xlvi] were admitted to the US. I hand counted eighty-five different visas. B1/2 and BBC (temporary business visas, called by some the “nanny visa”—which is unfair) admitted over one million in 2016, H-2A over 134,000, J-1 (au pair, exchange students) 340,000. Student visas (F or M) admitted nearly 500,000 in 2016.
Summary
Immigration on this scale is a shock to jurisdictional policy systems in any number of policy areas. Until the Great Recession times were “good” and the economy’s capacity to “absorb” immigrants, mostly into low wage employment, seemed remarkable considering post-Great Recession job growth has been anemic at best—taking the better part of the following decade to recapture lost ground. It is testimony to the immigrants themselves they were able to make it and raise families during these years. Economic developers, if one dwells on the literature, focused on the highly talented, well-educated segment, prized for their creativity, advanced degrees and hard work, as well as risk-taking entrepreneurism. This fit in well with high-tech/bio-health/information cluster-targeting common to the 1990’s and after.
The impact, perceived or actual, on America’s Forgotten People, however, was unacknowledged during these Eras—in fact dismissed is too mild a term, negative reaction to these impacts was attributed to parochialism, obsolescence of skills and lifestyles, and racism. Community developers, on the other hand, took up the difficult task of empowering and integrating these hosts of ethnics into the community/neighborhood in which they settled. Mainstream economic developers centered their interest of the several federal visa programs which were used by technology firms, tourist businesses, agricultural companies, and research universities.
Immigration changed neighborhoods, created homogenous ethnic suburbs, and augmented high end and low-wage labor forces. Regarding political cultures, Hispanic “el Norte” has already changed the cultural face of America. Hispanics are the largest “minority”, they elect representatives to all levels of government, have diffused, and settled in concentrated areas. They are one of Woodard’s Eleven Nations.
Victor Davis Hanson, “Imagine there’s No Border, City Journal, Summer 2016, pp.44-53 Vol 26, No3,
1986 Simpson-Mazzoli Act (transferred enforcement of immigration laws to private employers)
George Borjas, We Wanted Workers, Norton, 2016
[i] Tom Gjelten, A Nation of Nations: a Great American Immigration Story (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2015)
[ii] Tom Gjelten, A Nation of Nations: a Great American Immigration Story (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 91.
[iii] Tom Gjelten, A Nation of Nations: a Great American Immigration Story (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 123.
[iv] Tom Gjelten, A Nation of Nations: a Great American Immigration Story (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 132.
[v] Phillip Martin, “Trends in Migration to the U.S.”, the Global Challenge in Managing Migration, Vol. 68, No. 2, November, 2013, Population Reference Bureau, p.2
[vi] Phillip Martin, “Trends in Migration to the U.S.”, the Global Challenge in Managing Migration, Vol. 68, No. 2, November, 2013, Population Reference Bureau, p.4.
[vii] Phillip Martin, “Trends in Migration to the U.S.”, the Global Challenge in Managing Migration, Vol. 68, No. 2, November, 2013, Population Reference Bureau,
[viii] Anna Brown, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2014, Pew Research Center, April 19, 2016.
[ix] Robert Siegel and Selma Simmons-Duffin, March 7, 2017, “How Did We Get To 11.5 Million Unauthorized Immigrants”,
http://www.npr.org/2017/03/07/518201210/how-did-we-get-to-11-million-unauthorized-immigrants
[x] Robert Siegel and Selma Simmons-Duffin, March 7, 2017, “How Did We Get To 11.5 Million Unauthorized Immigrants”,
http://www.npr.org/2017/03/07/518201210/how-did-we-get-to-11-million-unauthorized-immigrants
[xi] Steven A. Camarota, A Record-Setting Decade of Immigration: 2000-2010, Center for Immigration Studies, October 2011, see Tables 1 thru 3
[xii] Steven A. Camarota, A Record-Setting Decade of Immigration: 2000-2010, Center for Immigration Studies, October 2011, see Table 1
[xiii] Steven A. Camarota, A Record-Setting Decade of Immigration: 2000-2010, Center for Immigration Studies, October 2011, see Tables 1 thru 3.
[xiv] Steven A. Camarota, A Record-Setting Decade of Immigration: 2000-2010, Center for Immigration Studies, October 2011, see Table 2.
[xv] Anna Brown, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2014, Pew Research Center, April 19, 2016.
[xvi] The Pew Research Center has developed databases for the major Hispanic and Asian nationalities and has prepared excellent reports which help considerably to explain local and state variations.
[xvii] Steven A. Camarota, A Record-Setting Decade of Immigration: 2000-2010, Center for Immigration Studies, October 2011, see Table 6.
[xviii] Gustavo Lopez and Eileen Patten, “The Impact of Slowing Immigration: Foreign-born Share Falls Among 14 Largest U.S. Hispanic Origin Groups”, PEW Research Center, Hispanic Trends, September 15, 2015, Figure 2.
[xix] Anna Brown, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2014, Pew Research Center, April 19, 2016.
[xx] Table 47 as 2015.
[xxi] Gustavo Lopez and Eileen Patten, “Hispanics of Puerto Rican Origin in the United States, 2013, PEW Research Center: Hispanic Trends, September 15, 2015.
[xxii] See Asian-American History Timeline American-Asian Immigration Center.
[xxiii] Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Asian Immigrants in the United States, Migration Policy Institute, January 6, 2016.
[xxiv] Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Asian Immigrants in the United States, Migration Policy Institute, January 6, 2016.
[xxv] Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Asian Immigrants in the United States, Migration Policy Institute, January 6, 2016.
[xxvi] Neil Ruiz and Jill Wilson, “The H-1B Visa Race Continues, Brookings, the Avenue; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2015/04/02/the-h-1b-visa-race-continues-which-regions-received-the-most/. See also their article“ the Search for Skills,, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/…/18-H1B-visas-labor-immigration.pdf
[xxvii] Audrey Singer and Jill Wilson, Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America” Migration Policy Institute, March 1 2007.
[xxviii] Audrey Singer and Jill Wilson, Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America” Migration Policy Institute, March 1 2007.
[xxix] Audrey Singer and Jill Wilson, Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America” Migration Policy Institute, March 1 2007.
[xxx] Audrey Singer and Jill Wilson, Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America” Migration Policy Institute, March 1 2007.
[xxxi] Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Asian Immigrants in the United States, Migration Policy Institute, January 6, 2016.
[xxxii] Jynnah Radford, Just Ten States Resettled More than Half of Recent Refugees to U.S., PEW Research Center, December 6, 2016.
[xxxiii] Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Asian Immigrants in the United States, Migration Policy Institute, January 6, 2016; see also Jynnah Radford, Just Ten States Resettled More than Half of Recent Refugees to U.S., PEW Research Center, December 6, 2016.
[xxxiv] Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Asian Immigrants in the United States, Migration Policy Institute, January 6, 2016.
[xxxv] Phillip Martin, “Trends in Migration to the U.S.”, the Global Challenge in Managing Migration, Vol. 68, No. 2, November, 2013, Population Reference Bureau, p. 6.
[xxxvi] Neil Ruiz, Jill Wilson, and Shyamali Choudhury, the Search for Skills: Demand for H-1B Immigrant Workers in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution, July 2012, p. 20.
[xxxvii] Neil Ruiz, Jill Wilson, and Shyamali Choudhury, the Search for Skills: Demand for H-1B Immigrant Workers in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution, July 2012, pp. 7-8 Figure 2.
[xxxviii] Neil Ruiz, Jill Wilson, and Shyamali Choudhury, The Search for Skills: Demand for H-1B Immigrant Workers in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution, July 2012, pp.10-11.
[xxxix] Neil Ruiz, Jill Wilson, and Shyamali Choudhury, The Search for Skills: Demand for H-1B Immigrant Workers in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution, July 2012, pp.15.
[xl] Neil Ruiz, Jill Wilson, and Shyamali Choudhury, The Search for Skills: Demand for H-1B Immigrant Workers in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution, July 2012, pp.11-13, See Figure 5.
[xli] Wikipedia does provide an excellent discussion; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H-1B_visa
[xlii] https://www.recode.net/2017/4/13/15281170/china-india-tech-h1b-visas, April 13, 2017
[xliii] http://globalworkers.org/iii-h-1b-workers-us-%E2%80%93-data,
[xliv] https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-2b-non-agricultural-workers/cap-count-h-2b-nonimmigrants; https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-2b-temporary-non-agricultural-workers.
[xlv] https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/non-immigrant-visas.html
[xlvi] The appropriate spreadsheet is “Nonimmigrant Visa Issuances by Visa Class and by Nationality”,
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/non-immigrant-visas.html
Ron W. Coan 