Phoenix
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Chap 19 Policy Snapshot
Phoenix :
Sun City Metro Abbott p68-70 Fairbanks, Housing Act of 1954 …in Southwestern US; Abbott Metro p45ff; rice, phoenix p. 322ff;
During the fifties, Phoenix also engaged in repeated annexation initiatives, legitimized by a 1956 municipal plan calling for a “stepped up year-round program of annexation” and infrastructure investment. Between 1950 and 1980 Phoenix’s size increased from 17 to 324 square miles. In one annexation alone (1959), Phoenix increased its population by 100,000 and doubled its area[1]. The reality of a non-jurisdictional operated attraction program independent of the jurisdiction undergoing suburbanization prompts one to wonder if the chamber-led attraction program was metropolitan-wide, rather than city-focused. The companies listed above are indeed within the city jurisdictions today—but much of the semiconductor and electronics industries presently reside in suburban locations. A chamber-led attraction program led by business reformers may prove to be less sensitive to central city locations and more prone to accommodate the least-cost demands of attraction candidates? While not apparent at first glance, private leadership of the regional attraction program may develop central city-suburban tensions if suburban jurisdictions are able to assert their autonomy from the central city.
[1] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., p. 317.
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Phoenix :
Sun City Metro Abbott p68-70 Fairbanks, Housing Act of 1954 …in Southwestern US; Abbott Metro p45ff; rice, phoenix p. 322ff;
During the fifties, Phoenix also engaged in repeated annexation initiatives, legitimized by a 1956 municipal plan calling for a “stepped up year-round program of annexation” and infrastructure investment. Between 1950 and 1980 Phoenix’s size increased from 17 to 324 square miles. In one annexation alone (1959), Phoenix increased its population by 100,000 and doubled its area[1]. The reality of a non-jurisdictional operated attraction program independent of the jurisdiction undergoing suburbanization prompts one to wonder if the chamber-led attraction program was metropolitan-wide, rather than city-focused. The companies listed above are indeed within the city jurisdictions today—but much of the semiconductor and electronics industries presently reside in suburban locations. A chamber-led attraction program led by business reformers may prove to be less sensitive to central city locations and more prone to accommodate the least-cost demands of attraction candidates? While not apparent at first glance, private leadership of the regional attraction program may develop central city-suburban tensions if suburban jurisdictions are able to assert their autonomy from the central city.
[1] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., p. 317.
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Phoenix: The 1950’s were Phoenix’s breakout years. That story begins with the 1948-49 overturning of the old guard Phoenix business leadership, and its replacement with our earlier-described neo-Progressive business reformer coalition. Business reformers coalesced behind the “Phoenix Charter Government Committee” (which included department store owner, Barry Goldwater). The immediate cause of the system transformation was the “blatant corruption” exhibited by the Phoenix old guard. The municipal charter was quickly amended to strengthen the city manager’s powers and to install at-large elections and when that proved insufficient to induce change, the reformers assembled a slate of candidates, ran for office, and got themselves elected. The coalition would dominate Phoenix politics for the next generation (until the 1970’s). It was a city with ‘a good, clean, competent government run by the right people’.[1]
In a recent book, Elizabeth Shermer[2] asserts the “eastern-educated” Phoenix business reform coalition rejected New Deal Progressive policies, indeed regarded itself as freeing Phoenix from Eastern domination by adopting a “neoliberal” business climate. These 1950’s reformers rejected unions through passage of right to work legislation, and promoted Phoenix as low-wage, cheap land, business-friendly, lightly-regulated with great access to western cities and markets. By no means libertarianism, this business coalition used municipal/state governments to develop infrastructure (airport and water)[3] and higher education assets and municipal government in particular was a partner with the private-led economic development attraction strategy.
In 1955, a Chamber-inspired business offshoot, the Municipal Industrial Development Corporation was formed. Among its achievements was to bring Sperry-Rand to Phoenix, raising a $650,000 cash inducement privately within seventy-two hours. The MIDC bought the site, paid for site improvements to the airport, as well as providing other assistance. During the fifties, Motorola (actually 1948), General Electric, Goodyear Aircraft, Kaiser Aircraft and Electronics, AiResearch also moved to Phoenix. Phoenix engaged in a competitive rivalry with El Paso as a business location which given the size of the two city’s economic base, Phoenix won. A (1950’s) El Paso businessmen complained that El Paso “does nothing”; he also observed that Phoenix ensured “industrial scouts are met at the plane, entertained, offered free land, tax deals, and an electorate willing to approve millions in business-backed bond issues”.[4]
By 1955 manufacturing had become the [metropolitan area’s] number one source of income, with farming and tourism second and third …. Between 1948 and 1960 nearly three hundred manufacturing enterprises opened their door as manufacturing employment in the metropolitan area tripled”. … By the end of 1977, the city had 74.5 percent of the total manufacturing employment in the state, and annual income from manufacturing had increased to $2.5 billion. Electronics and aerospace plants dominated the industrial landscape.[5]
The bulk of this expansion occurred in the 1950’s and, most likely was driven by the Cold War and the rise of the technologies sectors rather than 1940’s war production plants. Still, the arrival of war production manufacturing established a manufacturing base where little previously existed.
[1] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., pp. 318.
[2] Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Politics: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (Pennsylvania University Press, 2013)
[3] The Salt River Valley Water Users Association provided leadership in water and energy, and Sky Harbor Airport, a department of Phoenix municipal government, purchased in 1935, steadily was enlarged and modernized to be able to accommodate growth.
[4] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., p. 312.
[5] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., pp. 310-313.
The success of the 1950’s annexation created its own seeds of failure. In Phoenix, during the 1960’s the suburban cities such as Scottsdale, Tempe, Glendale and Chandler put the kibosh on any further attempts by Phoenix to annex them. As Luckingham describes it, “Mesa boosters energetically pursued both industrial and residential growth. The city bought up water rights, promoted its downtown, and sought new businesses. Glendale offered a $ 20,000 bonus to the first citizen that could bring a 100,000 sq. ft. factor to town. Business and civic groups such as the East Valley Partnership, the West Valley Partnership and Phoenix Together gave lip service to regional cooperation, but competed for everything from sports facilities to educational institutions …”[1] Indeed, new suburbs, such as Del Webb’s Sun City exposed the intense and pervasive popular demand for the suburban lifestyle, On January 1, 1960 Webb opened up six model units for inspection. By the end of the weekend, an estimated 100,000 traipsed through and nearly 250 homes were sold. After 1961, Phoenix was successful in only one annexation during that decade.
Increasingly, suburbanites were using independent governmental units to defend their isolation from city residents and city problems, converting spatial distance into political and social distance. … As political scientist Oliver Williams [observed] that the proliferation of governmental entities within a metropolitan area allows residents to promote and preserve differences in lifestyles and values. The independent suburban municipality and the special service district can all be used to preserve attractive and low-density physical environments, residential segregation by economic class, and ethnic segregation of schools systems.[2]
Frankly, one is not too sure this could not have been said for pre-1920 eastern suburbanites. In any case, to better demonstrate the shift from annexation to suburban resistance during the fifties and sixties, a brief snapshot of Denver and its complex city-suburban metamorphous comes next.
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Phoenix
The success of the 1950’s annexation created its own seeds of failure. In Phoenix, during the 1960’s the suburban cities such as Scottsdale, Tempe, Glendale and Chandler put the kibosh on any further attempts by Phoenix to annex them. As Luckingham describes it, “Mesa boosters energetically pursued both industrial and residential growth. The city bought up water rights, promoted its downtown, and sought new businesses. Glendale offered a $20,000 bonus to the first citizen that could bring a 100,000-sq. ft. factor to town. Business and civic groups such as the East Valley Partnership, the West Valley Partnership and Phoenix Together gave lip service to regional cooperation, but competed for everything from sports facilities to educational institutions …”[1] New suburbs, such as Del Webb’s Sun City tapped the intense and pervasive popular demand for the suburban lifestyle, On January 1, 1960 Webb opened up six model units for inspection. By the end of the weekend, an estimated 100,000 traipsed through, and nearly 250 homes were sold. After 1961, Phoenix was successful in only one annexation.
The 1950’s were Phoenix’s breakout years. That story begins with the 1948-49 overturning of the old guard Phoenix business leadership, and its replacement with our earlier-described neo-Progressive business reformer coalition. Business reformers coalesced behind the “Phoenix Charter Government Committee” (which included department store owner, Barry Goldwater). The immediate cause of the system transformation was the “blatant corruption” exhibited by the Phoenix old guard. The municipal charter was quickly amended to strengthen the city manager’s powers and to install at-large elections and when that proved insufficient to induce change, the reformers assembled a slate of candidates, ran for office, and got themselves elected. The coalition would dominate Phoenix politics for the next generation (until the 1970’s). It was a city with ‘a good, clean, competent government run by the right people’.[2]
In a recent book, Elizabeth Shermer[3] asserts the “eastern-educated” Phoenix business reform coalition rejected New Deal Progressive policies, indeed regarded itself as freeing Phoenix from Eastern domination by adopting a “neoliberal” business climate. These 1950’s reformers rejected unions through passage of right to work legislation, and promoted Phoenix as low-wage, cheap land, business-friendly, lightly-regulated with great access to western cities and markets. By no means libertarianism, this business coalition used municipal/state governments to develop infrastructure (airport and water)[4] and higher education assets and municipal government in particular was a partner with the private-led economic development attraction strategy.
In 1955, a Chamber-inspired business offshoot, the Municipal Industrial Development Corporation was formed. Among its achievements was to bring Sperry-Rand to Phoenix, raising a $650,000 cash inducement privately within seventy-two hours. The MIDC bought the site, paid for site improvements to the airport, as well as providing other assistance. During the fifties, Motorola (actually 1948), General Electric, Goodyear Aircraft, Kaiser Aircraft and Electronics, AiResearch also moved to Phoenix. Phoenix engaged in a competitive rivalry with El Paso as a business location which given the size of Phoenix’s economic base, Phoenix won. A (1950’s) El Paso businessmen complained that El Paso “does nothing”; he also observed that Phoenix ensured “industrial scouts are met at the plane, entertained, offered free land, tax deals, and an electorate willing to approve millions in business-backed bond issues”.[5]
By 1955 manufacturing had become the [metropolitan area’s] number one source of income, with farming and tourism second and third …. Between 1948 and 1960 nearly three hundred manufacturing enterprises opened their door as manufacturing employment in the metropolitan area tripled”. … By the end of 1977, the city had 74.5 percent of the total manufacturing employment in the state, and annual income from manufacturing had increased to $2.5 billion. Electronics and aerospace plants dominated the industrial landscape.[6]
The bulk of this expansion occurred in the 1950’s and, most likely was driven by the Cold War and the rise of the technologies sectors rather than 1940’s war production plants. Still, the arrival of war production manufacturing established a manufacturing base where little previously existed.
[1] Bradford Luckingham, The Urban Southwest: a Profile History of Albuquerque, El Paso, Phoenix, and Tucson (El Paso, Texas Western Press, 1982), p. 267.
[2] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., pp. 318.
[3] Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Politics: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (Pennsylvania University Press, 2013)
[4] The Salt River Valley Water Users Association provided leadership in water and energy, and Sky Harbor Airport, a department of Phoenix municipal government, purchased in 1935, steadily was enlarged and modernized to be able to accommodate growth.
[5] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., p. 312.
[6] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., pp. 310-313.
OT
Phoenix :
Sun City Metro Abbott p68-70 Fairbanks, Housing Act of 1954 …in Southwestern US; Abbott Metro p45ff; rice, phoenix p. 322ff;
During the fifties, Phoenix also engaged in repeated annexation initiatives, legitimized by a 1956 municipal plan calling for a “stepped up year-round program of annexation” and infrastructure investment. Between 1950 and 1980 Phoenix’s size increased from 17 to 324 square miles. In one annexation alone (1959), Phoenix increased its population by 100,000 and doubled its area[3]. The reality of a non-jurisdictional operated attraction program independent of the jurisdiction undergoing suburbanization prompts one to wonder if the chamber-led attraction program was metropolitan-wide, rather than city-focused. The companies listed above are indeed within the city jurisdictions today—but much of the semiconductor and electronics industries presently reside in suburban locations. A chamber-led attraction program led by business reformers may prove to be less sensitive to central city locations and more prone to accommodate the least-cost demands of attraction candidates? While not apparent at first glance, private leadership of the regional attraction program may develop central city-suburban tensions if suburban jurisdictions are able to assert their autonomy from the central city.
[1] Bradford Luckingham, The Urban Southwest: a Profile History of Albuquerque, El Paso, Phoenix, and Tucson (El Paso, Texas Western Press, 1982), p. 267.
[2] Carl Abbott, the New Urban America, op. cit., p. 179.
[3] Bradford Luckingham, “Phoenix: the Desert Metropolis”, op. cit., p. 317.
Ron W. Coan 