Seattle Washington

SEATTLE

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Seattle Chapter 19 Policy Cut

Departing from previous snapshots, the Seattle snapshot will focus on its competitive rivalry with Portland. Seattle and Portland, founded at approximately the same time (1851, 1849), initially developed in the more or less traditional pattern of establishing economic dominance over their respective hinterlands—becoming regional centers in the process. But even early on Seattle was able to carve out a larger hinterland, Alaska, than Portland was able to forge. “Boosterism, luck and previous trading connections made Seattle the entrepot of the Far North … publicist Erastus Brainerd and the Seattle Chamber of Commerce identified Seattle with Alaska in the public mind”.[1] Seattle garnered the benefits from the 1897 Klondike Gold Rush. To this day, Alaska Airlines is headquartered in Seattle.

Each city, through their port authorities competed for success in shipbuilding and Pacific trade. In this competition, Portland, thanks to its homebred Henry Kaiser established its dominance over shipbuilding, but not Pacific trade. In 1940 Seattle’s population of close to 350,000 compared to Portland’s 305,000; the 1940’s, however, saw Seattle open up its lead over Portland: 467,000 to Portland’s 373,000. The principal reason for this stepped up growth was Boeing. In 1970, the end of the period covered by this section, Seattle (despite a nearly 5% decline) had 531,000 residents, Portland 383,000—these were Seattle’s best years—because for the most part, Boeing was doing quite well.

The breakaway competitive dynamic rested on whether one or both cities could become a gateway (external trade) economy rather than rely principally on its regional hinterland. Boeing (founded as a lumber company in 1910 by Bill Boeing) added an export “gazelle” dimension to Seattle—a gazelle that, however mature, remains important in 2015. During the war and Cold War Boeing produced B-47’s and B-52’s; during the fifties, Boeing produced Boeing launched its crushingly successful 707 (1958), followed in succeeding years by the 727, 737, and 747. By 1957 about 50% of King County’s manufacturing workers labored for Boeing. There were booms and busts in the decades to follow (1969-1971 Boeing’s Seattle-resident employment fell from 105,000 to 38,000), but Boeing established Seattle as a world-wide export gateway—making it an attractive location for other firms in finance, logistics, and foreign trade. This advantage was cemented by a then-risky massive investment made during the 1960’s by the Port of Seattle. Over that decade over a hundred million dollars, two-thirds of the total investment made in the port since 1911 up to that time, modernized the port to accommodate containers[2]. Japanese shipping firms in 1970 made Seattle the chief port of entry to the USA as a result. Portland’s containerization occurred principally over the following decade with a more muted investment commitment.

In 1958 under new leadership, the University of Washington began its metamorphosis from a regional institution into a major research university. Enrollment doubled in the sixties, and in 1965 Battelle opened its Pacific Northwest Research Laboratory (Department of Energy). “By 1977 Seattle stood eighth among all metropolitan areas in federal research and development dollars to universities and sixth in total federal research and development funds.[3] To balance out the picture, Seattle even developed a “positive” reputation for its counterculture in the generation following World War II. Despite a boom or bust economy (which between 1960 and 1980 witnessed a loss of 65,000 residents due largely to Boeing), Seattle just kept on moving early into sectors and economic development strategies that characterized the rise of the Sunbelt. Microsoft, founded in Albuquerque in 1975, did not move to Bellevue Washington, Seattle’s largest suburb, until January 1979. Microsoft’s rise as an employment generator did not commence until it developed MS-Dos almost two years (November, 1980) later. Yet, when it was said and done, Seattle did not leave Portland in the dust. Seattle until 1970 kept the upper hand, but after that Portland closed the gap.

Seattle Urban Renewal

Seattle’s debut onto the world stage required an introduction, an image, a celebration and that was its 1962 World’s Fair with “Century 21” as its theme. The policy entrepreneur for Seattle’s second world’s fair (first being in 1911) was Al Robinson, a Seattle councilman. In 1955 Robinson, the Chamber, and the editor of the Seattle Times jump-started the initiative by forming the World’s Fair Commission. In 1956 a $5 million bond was approved in a referendum supported 3-1 by voters. That initiative was linked to a $7.5 million bond to upgrade the Seattle Civic Center and preparations began. In that same year Russia launched Sputnik and World’s Fair planners leaped on the theme of science, the future—the new age. That was hoped to be the image Seattle carried across the globe. The monorail and the Space Needle provided the experience and image. Over the six months of the Fair, an estimated ten million visitors dropped in—cementing tourism as a prominent element in the city’s economy. Swirling alongside the World’s Fair rather impressive infrastructure and commercial redevelopment was Seattle’s urban renewal program.

Seattle had established its Housing Authority in 1939. The Housing Authority quickly started its first slum clearance initiative, with 700 units of public housing in the Profanity Hill neighborhood.[4] The state of Washington authorized urban renewal in 1957. Seattle responded in the next year by adopting an ordinance declaring that “blighted areas existed in Seattle as defined by state law” and the Mayor appointed an Urban Renewal Coordinator (Talbot Wegg). Seattle, unlike virtually every major city in America, did not set up a municipal-level “urban renewal authority”. In its place, the City initially employed its Housing Authority for its initial housing/neighborhood urban renewal program[5]. Cherry Hill, “Conservation Project No. 1” was Seattle’s first urban renewal project; a series of projects commenced in 1959 and continued through 1976. SURE was active in these predominately housing-neighborhood redevelopment projects.[6]

In its attempt to venture into commercial/CBD renewal projects, the City dealt with a very polarized business and professional community. The bottom line was Seattle never seemed to have anything close to a private or public sector consensus on what a commercial urban renewal project looked like. From the private side, a group of approximately 400 businessmen formed the Central Association of Seattle, “dedicated to the development and maintenance of a strong, vigorous central Seattle”. In particular, they pressed for urban renewal redevelopment for “blighted downtown areas” such as the Market, central waterfront, and Pioneer Square. “The promised a revitalized city—a modern blend of new office buildings, restored historic structures, pedestrian plazas, parking garages, and colorful restaurants—that would appeal to free-spending tourists and suburbanites”.[7] The residents of the affected areas were chiefly African-Americans, and a variety of lower income ethnics.

The City (the Mayor) was onboard with Central Association-like CBD urban renewal, initial proposals and the Downtown Plan called for the demolition of both the Market and Pioneer Square. Both immediately ran afoul of professional, historic preservation-minded businesspeople. Working with the major property owners, those in opposition founded a group, “the Friends of the Market” which successfully stalled the project and contested the City’s Downtown Plan until 1969-1970 when the City Council established a forty block Pioneer Square Historic District. In 1971, a referendum, opposed by the Mayor, Central Association and the newspaper, was overwhelmingly approved to establish the seven acre Pike Place Market Historic District. In effect, urban renewal had generated a historic preservation movement in Seattle and that movement took advantage of the Great Society 1966 National Historic Preservation Act to use historic preservation to effectively counter the City’s/Central Association’s signature downtown urban renewal redevelopment.

A historic preservation district, however, was an inadequate vehicle with which to conduct an urban redevelopment program. So in 1973 the City introduced a fairly unique structure (the Public Development Authority), the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority to plan, design, preserve and carry forward both commercial and residential rehabilitation and redevelopment of the historic district. Lacking powers of eminent domain[8], the Pikes Place PDA did have the other powers held by conventional redevelopment agencies—but they were governed by a widely diverse set of board directors some of which were elected, others chosen by the board itself, and still others appointed by the mayor[9]. Following this creation, the area was upgraded with public improvements and infrastructure, and in 1976 the Kingdome/opened.

Keeping in mind this is 1973, it is evident that the traditional urban renewal redevelopment agency after twenty years in operation, was fundamentally reconfigured by the Seattle PDA which was limited in geography and powers, but entrusted with a considerably broader mission and very democratic governance. The City embraced the PDA concept and over the next twenty years eight other PDAs were created—many of which to conduct housing/neighborhood housing-dominated urban renewal style programs (for instance the Central Area Public Development Authority (1973). In 1975, to provide some coherence, the City established the Historic Seattle Preservation and Development Authority, which was city-wide (the only PDA to be so) whose mission was to restore historic structures, development of residential housing, enhancement of cultural activities, and encourage citizen involvement.

It may be the simultaneous redevelopment associated with the World’s Fair obviated the need for a “conventional” CBD-focused urban renewal program. But even so, the Seattle “urban renewal” program, from a structural or programmatic perspective, was from its start in the early 60’s, principally housing and neighborhood-focused, and its CBD initiatives blazed a historic preservation trail, which emphasized rehabilitation–not demolition—restoration—and private, decentralized governance under close supervision and accountability by the City government. In important ways, 1970’s Seattle-style urban renewal was 1950 Pittsburgh-style urban renewal turned upside down.

[1] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West (Tucson, the University of Arizona Press, 1998), p. 53; The Chamber established in 1897 a Bureau of Information in August 1897 and launched a blitz of news, public relations and god know what across the nation. Motivated by its retail community that wanted to provide clothes and equipment to prospective gold miners. The Bureau hired as its Secretary and Executive Erastus Brainerd, a Harvard educated publicist, what today we might call a free lance writer, and a former curator of the Boston Museum of Art. Brainerd imposed a tax on Seattle merchants to pay for his campaign. He purchased full page ads and copy in the major Eastern publications. Seattle, in part due to the Great Northern Railway’s direct access monopoly to Seattle, established itself as the gateway to the Yukon. In one advertisement he sent 212,000 copies to be inserted into various media—supposedly the largest printing west of Chicago. Purchasing $275 worth of gold, Brainerd constructed an exhibit which he sent across the East Coast claiming that the gold was worth $6,000. The overall campaign lasted six months and at its end, Brainerd resigned and took a job with the Chamber as lobbyist in Washington D.C. Brainerd made the campaign the success it was—a complete success commercially and image-wise. Moreover, it appears once Alaska was captured in the minds of Seattle citizens as Seattle’s hinterland, it stayed there, although the Governor and citizens of Alaska may not be of the same opinion.

[2] http://portseattle100.org/map-and-timeline/1960-1969. See also Carl Abbott, Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., p. 54.

[3] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[4] John Hoole, Public Housing in Southeast Seattle (2011) www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/southeastseattle/pdf/SE%20Essay%20-20Public%20Housing.pdf

[5]Also in 1958, the first Citizens Advisory Committee was created and began its deliberations. By August the Citizens Advisory Committee was organized and incorporated as Seattle Urban Renewal Enterprise (SURE) whose goal in 1958 was to raise funds and increase awareness of housing deterioration, rehabilitation, and conservation. SURE was a private EDO. It hired its first Executive Director (Ray Baker) in 1959. Because of an inability to raise sufficient revenues to cover expenses, SURE in 1962 replaced Baker with a staff member of the City Office of Urban Renewal as Executive Director. From that point on SURE relocated its offices and co-located in the City’s Office of Urban Renewal. SURE became a contractor for the City. Needless, to say, the two EDOs worked closely together. SURE coordinated between the City and residents, and promoted the use of urban renewal funds[5].

[6] https://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/leaguepda.pdf

[7] http://seattletimes.com/special/centennial/october/saving.html

[8] In Washington state eminent domain powers are retained by the general purpose units of government and cannot be delegated to other entities than the Housing Authority and its own powers. A PDA is unique; it has the power to issue bonds, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the City—but legally a PDA is considered legally separate from the City—and so that the City is not perceived as violating the “corporate veil” of the PDA, the City is wary of intruding into the operation and governance of the PDA. The Mayor is the supervising authority, the City can create and dissolve the PDA, financially a PDA reports to the City Comptroller, and the City Council must approve mayoral appointees and authorize PDA bond issuance.

[9] Public Development Authorities in Seattle, published by the League of Women Voters of Seattle, May, 1989.

Click to access leaguepda.pdf

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Policy System Cut

Seattle

Seattle approved its Housing Authority (SHS) in 1939 and wasted little time starting its first slum clearance initiative, 700 units of public housing in the Profanity Hill neighborhood.[1] Entry into the War and passage of Lanham Act (war production housing) SHS built three major worker housing projects—which in 1953 were converted to low-income projects. Washington state authorized urban renewal in 1957and Seattle quickly adopted an ordinance declaring “blighted areas existed in Seattle as defined by state law”. The Mayor appointed an Urban Renewal Coordinator (Talbot Wegg). but did not set up a municipal-level urban renewal authority, choosing to locate UR in SHS. From its beginnings Seattle preferred neighborhood UR over CBD-focused UR, and to facilitate the former innovated its own creative approach to manage the all-too-well-known deficiencies of slum clearance and displacement.

In 1958, the Citizens Advisory Committee was incorporated as Seattle Urban Renewal Enterprise (SURE). Its goal was to raise funds and increase awareness of housing deterioration, rehabilitation, and conservation. SURE, a nonprofit subsidiary, hired its first Executive Director (Ray Baker) in 1959. Unable to raise sufficient revenues, SURE in 1962 replaced Baker with a staff member of the City Office of Urban Renewal as Executive Director. From that point on SURE co-located in the City’s Office of Urban Renewal as a contractor for the City as an intermediary between the City and residents Cherry Hill, “Conservation Project No. 1” was Seattle’s first urban renewal project. A series of neighborhood-housing projects commenced in 1959, continuing through 1976.

While focused on neighborhoods, Seattle did not lack a desire to compete in the Pacific coast urban hierarchy. Seattle’s debut onto the stage required an introduction, an image, a celebration that was its 1962 World’s Fair with “Century 21” as its theme. The entrepreneur for Seattle’s second World’s Fair (first in 1911) was Al Robinson, a councilman. In 1955 Robinson, the Chamber, and the editor of the Seattle Times jump-started the initiative by forming the World’s Fair Commission. The next year a $5 million bond was approved in a referendum supported 3-1 by voters. That initiative was linked to a $7.5 million bond to upgrade the Seattle Civic Center– and preparations began. In the same year Russia launched Sputnik and World’s Fair planners leaped on the theme of science—the new age. That was the image Seattle wanted to send across the globe. The monorail and the Space Needle provided the experience and visual. Over its six months, an estimated ten million visitors dropped in—cementing tourism as a prominent element in the city’s economy. Swirling alongside the World’s Fair rather impressive infrastructure and commercial redevelopment was Seattle’s CBD-focused UR program.

See Abbott p 140 New Urban p215—217//Gordon Clinton Mayor, King County Metro and Municipality of Metro

When SHS ventured into commercial/CBD renewal projects, it encountered a polarized business and professional community. The bottom line was Seattle never developed anything close to a private/public consensus on an acceptable commercial urban renewal project. From the private side, approximately 400 businessmen formed the Central Association of Seattle, “dedicated to the development and maintenance of a strong, vigorous central Seattle”. They pressed for urban renewal of “blighted downtown areas” such as the Market, central waterfront, and Pioneer Square. These projects “promised a revitalized city—a modern blend of new office buildings, restored historic structures, pedestrian plazas, parking garages, and colorful restaurants—that would appeal to free-spending tourists and suburbanites”.[2] Residents were African-Americans and low-income ethnics.

The City (the Mayor) was onboard with Central Association initial proposals and the Downtown Plan called for the demolition of both the Market and Pioneer Square. Both immediately ran afoul of professional, historic preservation-minded businesspeople. Working with the major property owners, those in opposition founded a group, “the Friends of the Market” which successfully stalled the project and contested the City’s Downtown Plan until 1969-1970 when the City Council established a forty block Pioneer Square Historic District. In 1971, a referendum, opposed by the Mayor, Central Association and the newspaper, was overwhelmingly approved to establish the seven acre Pike Place Market Historic District. In effect, urban renewal had generated a historic preservation movement in Seattle and that movement took advantage of the Great Society 1966 National Historic Preservation Act to use historic preservation to effectively counter the City’s/Central Association’s signature downtown urban renewal redevelopment.

A historic preservation district, however, was an inadequate vehicle with which to conduct an urban redevelopment program. So in 1973 the City introduced a fairly unique structure (the Public Development Authority), the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority to plan, design, preserve and carry forward both commercial and residential rehabilitation and redevelopment of the historic district. Lacking powers of eminent domain[3], the Pikes Place PDA did have the other powers held by conventional redevelopment agencies—but they were governed by a widely diverse set of board directors some of which were elected, others chosen by the board itself, and still others appointed by the mayor[4]. Following this creation, the area was upgraded with public improvements and infrastructure, and in 1976 the Kingdome/opened.

[1] John Hoole, Public Housing in Southeast Seattle (2011) www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/southeastseattle/pdf/SE%20Essay%20-20Public%20Housing.pdf

[2] http://seattletimes.com/special/centennial/october/saving.html

[3] Washington state eminent domain powers are retained by the general purpose units of government and cannot be delegated to other entities other than the Housing Authority. A PDA is unique; it issues bonds, backed by the City’s full faith and credit—but legally PDA is considered separate from the City—so the City is not perceived as violating the “corporate veil” of the PDA Consequently, the City is wary of intruding into PDA operations and governance. The Mayor is the supervising authority and the City can dissolve the PDA, financially PDA reports to the City Comptroller, and City Council approves mayoral appointees and authorizes PDA bond issuances.

[4] Public Development Authorities in Seattle, published by the League of Women Voters of Seattle, May, 1989.

Click to access leaguepda.pdf

End of Policy System Cut

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Seattle

The Seattle snapshot initially focuses on its competitive rivalry with Portland. Founded at approximately the same time Seattle and Portland (1851, 1849—Seattle actually incorporated in 1869) developed in the traditional pattern of establishing economic dominance over their respective hinterlands through rail access—becoming regional centers. Logging, old, and the Alaska trade connection were growth sectors.

Yesler’s Way is attributed as the place that coined the “skid row” term. 1889 fire destroyed the first CBD. In 1893 (Great Northern RR—James Hill) established its western terminus at Seattle.

The breakaway competitive dynamic, however, rested on whether one could become a gateway (external trade) economy rather than rely principally on its regional hinterland. Early on Seattle carved out a larger hinterland (Alaska) than Portland. “Boosterism, luck and previous trading connections made Seattle the entrepot of the Far North … publicist Erastus Brainerd and the Seattle Chamber of Commerce identified Seattle with Alaska in the public mind”.^[1] If San Francisco captured the benefits of the 1849 Gold Rush, Seattle seized upon the 1897 Klondike Gold Rush^[i]. In 1890 42,00 residents, 1900,80,671, and 1910, 237,194. With some irony, the Gold Rush started when the coastal steamer “Portland” arrived from Alaska bearing the first news goal had been discovered.

The Seattle Chamber in August 1897 established a Bureau of Information and launched a blitz of news, public relations and god know what across the nation. Financed by its retail community that wanted to provide clothes and equipment to prospective gold miners, the Bureau hired as its Secretary/Executive Erastus Brainerd, a Harvard-educated publicist, i.e. free-lance writer, and former curator of the Boston Museum of Art. Brainerd imposed a tax on Seattle merchants to pay for his campaign. He purchased full page ads and copy in the major Eastern publications. Seattle with direct access of the Great Northern Railway quickly established itself as the Yukon’s “north to Alaska’s” gateway. In one advertisement Brainerd inserted 212,000 copies into various media—supposedly the largest single printing west of Chicago. Purchasing $275 worth of gold, Brainerd constructed an exhibit claiming the gold was worth $6,000 and sent it across the East Coast for six months. At its end, Brainerd resigned and took a job as Chamber lobbyist in Washington D.C. Once Alaska, captured in the minds of Seattle citizens as Seattle’s hinterland, stayed there; to this day, Alaska Airlines is headquartered in Seattle metro area.

As described in Two Ships, both Oregon and Washington created the Progressive version of the Port Authority during the first decade of the 20^th Century. Their port authorities competed in lodging shipbuilding in their jurisdictional economic base—and aggressively participated in the subsequent Fortress “California” ED strategy to locate federal military facilities in their communities (Bremerton Naval Shipyard and Fort Lewis). Both sought to take advantage of Pacific trade opportunities. The Seattle1909 Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exhibition (present-day University of Washington campus)-Findlay. The Exhibition drew about 3.7m visitors. In 1910 Seattle was the nation’s 25^th largest city; has an Olmstead Park

In this competition, Portland, thanks to its homebred Henry Kaiser established its dominance over shipbuilding, but not Pacific trade where Seattle’s natural harbor and closer location to Asia won out. The breakout for both city’s shipbuilding industry was the passage in September, 1916 by Congress of legislation to create the U.S. Board and Shipping Corporation with its subsidiary Emergency Fleet Corporation. Intended to create ships which it would lease to private operators, the Corporation had to first create the shipyard. Before 1914, the Seattle Drydock and Construction Company was Seattle’s only metal-constructing shipyard. By1918, there were five, and 12 constructing wood-hull ships^[ii]. During the war shipbuilding became the City’s chief industry, with 35,000 workers in 1918. The nationally famous Seattle General Strike of 1919 (Anna Louise Strong, a Seattle resident was a principal organizer) resulted from the government pullback after the war, resulting in huge loss of contracts and massive unemployment.

By 1940 Seattle’s population of almost 350,000 exceeded Portland’s 305,000. The 1940’s war production, however let Seattle open up its lead over Portland; Seattle garnered an estimated $2.5 billion in contracts (Gibson 35). In 1950 Seattle’s population tipped 467,000 to Portland’s 373,000. The principal reason for this stepped-up growth was Boeing.

Seattle

Seattle Urban Renewal

[2] http://portseattle100.org/map-and-timeline/1960-1969. See also Carl Abbott, Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., p. 54.

[3] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[4] John Hoole, Public Housing in Southeast Seattle (2011) www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/southeastseattle/pdf/SE%20Essay%20-20Public%20Housing.pdf

[6] https://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/leaguepda.pdf

[7] http://seattletimes.com/special/centennial/october/saving.html

[9] Public Development Authorities in Seattle, published by the League of Women Voters of Seattle, May, 1989.

Click to access leaguepda.pdf

Seattle

Departing from previous snapshots, the Seattle snapshot will focus on its competitive rivalry with Portland. Seattle and Portland, founded at approximately the same time (1851, 1849), initially developed in the more or less traditional pattern of establishing economic dominance over their respective hinterlands—becoming regional centers in the process. But even early on Seattle was able to carve out a larger hinterland, Alaska, than Portland was able to forge. “Boosterism, luck and previous trading connections made Seattle the entrepot of the Far North … publicist Erastus Brainerd and the Seattle Chamber of Commerce identified Seattle with Alaska in the public mind”.^[2] Seattle garnered the benefits from the 1897 Klondike Gold Rush. To this day, Alaska Airlines is headquartered in Seattle.

The breakaway competitive dynamic rested on whether one or both cities could become a gateway (external trade) economy rather than rely principally on its regional hinterland. Boeing (founded as a lumber company in 1910 by Bill Boeing) added an export “gazelle” dimension to Seattle—a gazelle that, however mature, remains important in 2015. During the war and Cold War Boeing produced B-47’s and B-52’s; during the fifties, Boeing produced Boeing launched its crushingly successful 707 (1958), followed in succeeding years by the 727, 737, and 747. By 1957 about 50% of King County’s manufacturing workers labored for Boeing. There were booms and busts in the decades to follow (1969-1971 Boeing’s Seattle-resident employment fell from 105,000 to 38,000), but Boeing established Seattle as a world-wide export gateway—making it an attractive location for other firms in finance, logistics, and foreign trade. This advantage was cemented by a then-risky massive investment made during the 1960’s by the Port of Seattle. Over that decade over a hundred million dollars, two-thirds of the total investment made in the port since 1911 up to that time, modernized the port to accommodate containers^[3]. Japanese shipping firms in 1970 made Seattle the chief port of entry to the USA as a result. Portland’s containerization occurred principally over the following decade with a more muted investment commitment.

In 1958 under new leadership, the University of Washington began its metamorphosis from a regional institution into a major research university. Enrollment doubled in the sixties, and in 1965 Battelle opened its Pacific Northwest Research Laboratory (Department of Energy). “By 1977 Seattle stood eighth among all metropolitan areas in federal research and development dollars to universities and sixth in total federal research and development funds.^[4] To balance out the picture, Seattle even developed a “positive” reputation for its counterculture in the generation following World War II. Despite a boom or bust economy (which between 1960 and 1980 witnessed a loss of 65,000 residents due largely to Boeing), Seattle just kept on moving early into sectors and economic development strategies that characterized the rise of the Sunbelt. Microsoft, founded in Albuquerque in 1975, did not move to Bellevue Washington, Seattle’s largest suburb, until January 1979. Microsoft’s rise as an employment generator did not commence until it developed MS-Dos almost two years (November, 1980) later. Yet, when it was said and done, Seattle did not leave Portland in the dust. Seattle until 1970 kept the upper hand, but after that Portland closed the gap.

Seattle Urban Renewal

Seattle had established its Housing Authority in 1939. The Housing Authority quickly started its first slum clearance initiative, with 700 units of public housing in the Profanity Hill neighborhood.^[5] The state of Washington authorized urban renewal in 1957. Seattle responded in the next year by adopting an ordinance declaring that “blighted areas existed in Seattle as defined by state law” and the Mayor appointed an Urban Renewal Coordinator (Talbot Wegg). Seattle, unlike virtually every major city in America, did not set up a municipal-level “urban renewal authority”. In its place, the City initially employed its Housing Authority for its initial housing/neighborhood urban renewal program^[6]. Cherry Hill, “Conservation Project No. 1” was Seattle’s first urban renewal project; a series of projects commenced in 1959 and continued through 1976. SURE was active in these predominately housing-neighborhood redevelopment projects.^[7]

In its attempt to venture into commercial/CBD renewal projects, the City dealt with a very polarized business and professional community. The bottom line was Seattle never seemed to have anything close to a private or public sector consensus on what a commercial urban renewal project looked like. From the private side, a group of approximately 400 businessmen formed the Central Association of Seattle, “dedicated to the development and maintenance of a strong, vigorous central Seattle”. In particular, they pressed for urban renewal redevelopment for “blighted downtown areas” such as the Market, central waterfront, and Pioneer Square. “The promised a revitalized city—a modern blend of new office buildings, restored historic structures, pedestrian plazas, parking garages, and colorful restaurants—that would appeal to free-spending tourists and suburbanites”.^[8] The residents of the affected areas were chiefly African-Americans, and a variety of lower income ethnics.

The City (the Mayor) was onboard with Central Association-like CBD urban renewal, initial proposals and the Downtown Plan called for the demolition of both the Market and Pioneer Square. Both immediately ran afoul of professional, historic preservation-minded business people. Working with the major property owners, those in opposition founded a group, “the Friends of the Market” which successfully stalled the project and contested the City’s Downtown Plan until 1969-1970 when the City Council established a forty block Pioneer Square Historic District. In 1971, a referendum, opposed by the Mayor, Central Association and the newspaper, was overwhelmingly approved to establish the seven acre Pike Place Market Historic District. In effect, urban renewal had generated a historic preservation movement in Seattle and that movement took advantage of the Great Society 1966 National Historic Preservation Act to use historic preservation to effectively counter the City’s/Central Association’s signature downtown urban renewal redevelopment.

A historic preservation district, however, was an inadequate vehicle with which to conduct an urban redevelopment program. So in 1973 the City introduced a fairly unique structure (the Public Development Authority), the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority to plan, design, preserve and carry forward both commercial and residential rehabilitation and redevelopment of the historic district. Lacking powers of eminent domain^[9], the Pikes Place PDA did have the other powers held by conventional redevelopment agencies—but they were governed by a widely diverse set of board directors some of which were elected, others chosen by the board itself, and still others appointed by the mayor^[10]. Following this creation, the area was upgraded with public improvements and infrastructure, and in 1976 the Kingdome opened.

The “Capital of Boeing” and Initial Diversification Initiatives

Boeing (founded as a lumber company in 1910 by Bill Boeing) added an export “gazelle” dimension to Seattle^[iii]—a gazelle that, however mature, remains important in 2017. William Boeing first arrived in Seattle in 1903 upon graduation from Yale’s Sheffield Scientific School—his family accumulated a fortune from timber and iron ore in Minnesota. He invested family money to start a timber business. He became interested in planes in 1910, produced and flew his first Curtiss-type hydroplane over Lake Washington on July 4, 1914, and on July 15, 1916 incorporated his airplane business with 21 workers^[iv]. Originally, the company built and flew the planes commercially. Boeing’s initial burst was to provide wooden airplanes for WWI.

A subsequent corporate reorganization created the “United Air Transport and Transport Corporation” which housed the Boeing Air Transport which on July 1, 1927 (ironically) commercially flew a Chicago reporter from Chicago to San Francisco in 23 hours, reputedly, the nation’s first commercial passenger flight. In 1934, Congress enacted legislation that broke up manufacture from commercial use of planes; Boeing quit the company, and fired most of the workers in reaction. He never came back. Boeing Air Transport eventually became United Airlines, and the manufacturing our present-day Boeing. New leadership in Boeing, Claire Egtvedt took over and he took the company into WWII. During WWI and Cold War Boeing producing B-47’s and B-52’s; during the fifties Boeing “came of age”. In 1945, Boeing’s payroll was over a half million dollars a day in 1945 dollars. Then it enjoyed its first massive Boeing bust when contracts expired, Egtvedt left and William Allen took over^[v] and launched its crushingly successful 707 (1958), followed in succeeding years by the 727, 737, and 747. In 1947 Boeing workers were one of five in King County; by 1957 about 50% of King County’s manufacturing workers labored for Boeing (Findlay 219). Boeing, however, did not fit neatly into the image of the galloping gazelle. It moved its corporate HQ to Chicago in 2001.

Boeing, an example of early simultaneous suburbanization, for the most part was not located in Seattle—it was a suburban gazelle. Its largest plant in Renton (ten miles out)—and almost all of its newer plants–were suburban as well (Everett was in Snohomish County) –meant Boeing never developed a close relationship or identity with Seattle. “Many regarded the firm as aloof from the community, ‘a minimal patron of the arts and civic organizations’” (Findlay 219). To the extent Boeing wanted public assistance, it turned to the State of Washington. Boeing jumpstarted suburban population centers, jurisdictional economic bases and CBDs, attracting a goodly number of parts, logistics, and supplier firms. Very early on, suburbanization developed into a serious threat to Seattle’s central business district.

Another problem was that Boeing was Seattle’s one horse economy—it was the “capital of Boeing”. But Boeing’s sales and thus employment were volatile—and cyclical. In 1958, the company employed 72,000, by 1960 only 58,000; in 1962 it was again 70,000, but by 1964 down to 50,000 (Findlay 219). There were major booms and busts in decades to follow (1969-1971 Boeing’s-resident employment fell from 105,000 to 38,000) (Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier 54), but Boeing marked Seattle as a global export gateway—making it an attractive location for firms in finance, logistics, and foreign trade. Still, as early as mid-1950 Seattle elites recognized a compelling need to diversify Seattle’s economy as its prime ED goal.

Important initiatives were adopted in the late 1950’s: a crash Port of Seattle infrastructure investment, a University of Washington research initiative, and the formation of a private downtown EDO, the Central Association of Seattle which was unrelatedly “counter-balanced” by the 1957 Washington State legislative creation of METRO (the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle) and a 1957 approved municipal comprehensive plan which demarcated 100 individual neighborhood areas, expansion of the free network and enhanced access to it, as well as the encouragement of high density development (amending its zoning to allow high-density construction on every ridge and hilltop). .

The Port of Seattle, the city’s elite EDO, and arguably lead agency decided to launch Seattle into the global arena. The Port, a special “municipal corporation” entrusted to invest public resources in trade and commerce, promote industrial growth, stimulate economic development, and create jobs for the people of King County. Its five-member governing Commission, independently elected from city governance, holds conventional economic development powers and the power to levy taxes. Targeting tourism, higher education/scientific research, finance and foreign trade as potential growth opportunities, it commenced a decade-long $100 million modernization of its port facilities that would hopefully lure opportunities past Portland and would directly compete with Oakland. The big gamble was to refit its terminals/piers to accommodate the newly-pioneered (NY-NJ Port Authority 1958 containerization innovation). The Port sought to make Seattle the containerization nexus between Asia and the USA. Over the next decade two-thirds of the total investment made in the port since 1911 up to that time, modernized the port to accommodate containers^[11]. A consortium of six Japanese shipping firms in 1970 confirmed the wisdom of that investment by making Seattle their chief port of entry to the USA as a result of Portland’s containerization/modernization initiative.

Abbott believes the University and the “new brainpower businesses that were generated during the Sixties drew residents from outside the Pacific and Greater Northwest states (at twice the rate of Portland, by the way) “stirred up Seattle’s comfortable politics and supported massive spending on parks, pollution cleanup, and civic facilities during the 1960’s” (Abbott, How Cities Won the West 57). Forgive me my skepticism on the timing and scale of this infusion of new values, but it is clear the University faculty and students did play a significant role in the activism that permeated an early environmental/neighborhood movement and, importantly, that greatly affected CBD redevelopment politics (starting with Pikes Peak Market in the early 1960’s) for more than a generation after. The activism of the Sixties, the Great Society War on Poverty

Seattle’s Abortive Launch of CBD Urban Renewal

Seattle established its Housing Authority in 1939. The Housing Authority quickly started its first slum clearance initiative, with 700 units of public housing in the Profanity Hill neighborhood.^[13] Seattle never segregated its public housing, one of the few in the nation (Pomeroy 118). World War II 1937 Housing Act and war production housing altered the overwhelming white-dominated demographics by providing housing for over 10,000 Black migrants during the decade—permitting in 1949 the election of Seattle’s first Black officeholder (Charles Stokes). Seattle’s 29 shipyards (and Boeing factories in the suburbs), and Seattle’s military installation Fort Lawton provided opportunities for new Black residents. By 1945 nearly 10,000 blacks occupied virtually the same buildings that had housed 3,700 five years earlier (or in temporary war production housing)^[vi]. Seattle itself grew from 368,000 in 1940 to 530,000 in 1944 (Pomeroy 117) creating a severe housing shortage in the process.

The State of Washington authorized urban renewal in 1957 and Seattle in the next year adopted an ordinance declaring that “blighted areas existed in Seattle as defined by state law” and the Mayor appointed an Urban Renewal Coordinator (Talbot Wegg). Seattle did not set up a municipal-level “urban renewal authority”; the City utilized its Housing Authority for its initial housing/neighborhood urban renewal program^[14], Cherry Hill, “Conservation Project No. 1”. In 1958, the Citizens Advisory Committee was created and by August was incorporated as Seattle Urban Renewal Enterprise (SURE) whose goal was to raise funds and increase awareness of housing deterioration, rehabilitation, and conservation. SURE was a private EDO. It hired its first Executive Director in 1959. Unable to sustain sufficient revenues, SURE in 1962 contracted with the City Office of Urban Renewal. From that point on SURE co-located in the City’s Office of Urban Renewal as a contractor. SURE served as liaison between City and residents, and advocated neighborhood-based housing redevelopment. A series of projects commenced in 1959 and continued through 1976.

A hint of the change that was to come a decade later came in the form of a young activist attorney, Joseph Ellis who as chair of a citizens group desiring county charter reform to encourage and accommodate regional growth and to overcome the ill effects of jurisdictional boundaries. The group had been formed (1955) to combat Lake Washington sewage pollution by Seattle’s mayor Clinton with agreement of King County Commission. Inspired by the recent federation of Toronto, Ellis successfully lobbied the State Legislation to authorize the formation of METRO Seattle which was intended to coordinate the region’s sewer, transit, water, solid waste, parks, and planning functions. Ellis’s ambitious plans were too much for even the Seattle voters who approved only the sewer functions to allow the Lake Washington cleanup to begin. They approved a $315 million pollution control program (Gordon, Locke and McCutcheon 225).

METRO was the work of a group of civic-minded Young Turks—Seattleites who returned from the war to find their city in the throes of physical deterioration symbolized by the use of Lake Washington as the community cesspool. But cleaning up the lake didn’t rattle any cages, so to speak; the Big Ten [the locally-known informal business-political establishment cabal that at the time embraced the World’s Fair initiative] (Gordon, Locke and McCutcheon 226).

In its attempt to venture into commercial/CBD renewal projects, however, the City encountered a very polarized business and professional/activist community movement. In that context, approximately 400 businessmen formed the Central Association of Seattle, “dedicated to the development and maintenance of a strong, vigorous central Seattle”. The Central Association aggressively pressed for urban renewal redevelopment for “blighted downtown areas” such as the Pike’s Place Market, central waterfront, and Pioneer Square and a series of city freeway/tunnel access projects. “They promised a revitalized city—a modern blend of new office buildings, restored historic structures, pedestrian plazas, parking garages, and colorful restaurants—that would appeal to free-spending tourists and suburbanites”^[15]. The residents of the affected areas were chiefly African-Americans, and a variety of lower income ethnics. The city itself was 92% white.

The City (the Mayor) was onboard with Central Association-like CBD urban renewal, initial proposals and the Downtown Plan called for the demolition of both the Market and Pioneer Square. Both immediately ran afoul of professional, historic preservation-minded businesspeople. Led by the University of Washington’s Dean of Architecture and working with resistant property owners, a group, “the Friends of the Market” stalled the project and contested the City’s Downtown Plan thru 1969-1970. In 1971, a referendum, constructed by the “Friends of the Market” and opposed by the Mayor, Central Association and newspaper, was overwhelmingly approved. The referendum established a seven-acre Pike Place Market Historic District and saved Pike Place from the wrecking ball. Subsequent referendums stopped three freeway access initiatives dead in their tracks. In response, the City Council established a forty block Pioneer Square Historic District. Pioneer Square also captured the attention of preservationists/activists, tapping its role in the “city’s literal golden age during the Klondike Gold Rush (Abbott, How Cities Won the West 206).

A historic preservation district, however, was an inadequate vehicle with which to conduct an urban redevelopment program. So, in 1973, the City introduced a unique structure the Public Development Authority^[16], the first example of which, the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority, to plan, design, preserve and carry forward both commercial and residential rehabilitation and redevelopment of the Pike Place historic district. Lacking powers of eminent domain, the Pikes Place PDA did have other powers held by conventional redevelopment agencies—but they were governed by a widely diverse set of board directors some of which were elected, others chosen by the board itself, and still others appointed by the mayor. The conventional national urban renewal redevelopment agency model, after twenty years in operation, was fundamentally reconfigured by the Seattle PDA model which was limited in geography and powers, but entrusted with a considerably broader mission and very democratic governance. The City embraced the PDA concept and over the next twenty years eight other PDAs were created—many of which to conducted housing-neighborhood urban renewal style programs (for instance the 1973 Central Area Public Development Authority)^[17].

In 1975, to provide some coherence, the City established the Historic Seattle Preservation and Development Authority, which was city-wide (the only PDA to be so) whose mission was to restore historic structures, development of residential housing, enhancement of cultural activities, and encourage citizen involvement. The larger question, however, was why the Central Association, business dominated, City-supported attempt to implement a fairly conventional urban renewal initiative in the early 1960s was frustrated for the entire decade, and then redirected during into a a radically different initiative, the Seattle World’s Fair—and then at the end of the decade redefined into a uniquely Seattle approach to urban renewal, one less amenable to business and reflective of more Progressive values and direction? To answer this question, we first turn to the Seattle World’s Fair and then present the dynamics that characterized Seattle policy-making and its policy system during the Sixties—dynamics which led to Seattle municipal policy system change in 1969 bring into place the municipal policy system that presided over our Contemporary Economic Development.

1962 Seattle World’s Fair—Urban Renewal by another Name

The redevelopment associated with the World’s Fair substituted for a “conventional” CBD-focused urban renewal program. Seattle postwar “urban renewal” program, was from its start principally housing and neighborhood-focused, and its initial CBD initiatives stalled, and then thrust into a historic preservation path with unique structural and programmatic forms. In important ways, 1970’s Seattle-style urban renewal was 1950 Pittsburgh-style urban renewal turned upside down. The better story is Seattle’s urban renewal was typical of western-postwar urban renewal in that it served [mostly] as the City-Beautiful-like CBD redevelopment meant to announce to the nation, and in Seattle’s case, to the world that Seattle was now ready to compete and play in the urban “big league”. The idea was

A solid decade or more before the Great Reindustrialization Debate and the post 1973 Bretton Woods free trade/currency reforms, Seattle business and political leadership embarked on a set of initiatives intended to capture Asian trade and finance as a primary economic development strategy. As discussed, that strategy included the Seattle Port infrastructure modernization and its container innovation, but it also assumed the form of an urban renewal characterized by the Space Needle and the Seattle World’s Fair (1962), “a perfect example of urban boosterism designed to stimulate economic growth, and to symbolize the modernity of Seattle”. Over the six months of the Fair, an estimated ten million visitors dropped in—cementing tourism as a prominent element in the city’s economy. Swirling alongside the World’s Fair rather impressive infrastructure and commercial redevelopment was Seattle’s urban renewal program.

Seattle’s debut onto the world stage required an introduction, an image, a celebration and that was its 1962 World’s Fair with “Century 21” as its theme. The policy entrepreneur for Seattle’s second world’s fair (first being in 1911) was Al Robinson, a Seattle councilman. In 1955 Robinson, the Chamber, and the editor of the Seattle Times jump-started the initiative by forming the World’s Fair Commission (Findlay 223). In 1956 a $5 million bond was approved in a referendum supported 3-1 by voters. That initiative was linked to a $7.5 million bond to upgrade the Seattle Civic Center and preparations began. In that same year Russia launched Sputnik and World’s Fair planners leaped on the theme of science, the future—the new age. Disneyland’s designers were hired to structure the facility and produce the “Tomorrowland” image. The monorail and the Space Needle provided the experience and image; It was hoped the image would travel across the globe.

Despite the efforts of many to reduce the World’s Fair strategy to one or two goals, the strategy was always a multi-faceted one that hoped to capture a goodly number of positive benefits.

Century 21 was … intended to bolster the central business district, to enable it to hold its own against the rapid growth of suburban areas [BUT] … from the inception of exposition planning … civic leaders justified the fair primarily on the basis of the economic benefits it promised: invigoration of local business; revitalization of Seattle’s waning role as commercial gateway to Asia and Alaska; gains in state and local tax revenues; increasing property values, … increased tourism … attracting additional manufacturing, to decrease dependence on Boeing … to build a more diverse industrial economy that would reduce the region’s ‘heavy reliance … on defense spending by the Federal Government. … a Headquarters City … for the regional branch offices of national companies. (Findlay 219-20)

Three of these goals, Seattle’s entry into global/Asian markets, a counter to suburbanization, and bolster an obsolete, blighted and dysfunctional downtown, were paramount. Economic diversification was a consequence of each. As such, the World’s Fair was reasonably congruent with the typical western postwar use of urban renewal, congruent with the policy systems and strategies of the West’s postwar business-led reformers, and fully within the traditions of Mainstream ED. Seattle, for example, pursued an aggressive annexation strategy during the Fifties, but it did little to counter the suburban exodus (between1950-60 suburbs grew by 46%–Seattle less than 1%). Malls opened, freeways/bridges a la Gruen were constructed, the revitalized CBD was intended to counter suburbanization and be the visible symbol of the city’s entry into the competitive urban hierarchy. The World’s Fair was Seattle’s Trillen-domism.

As international Fairs/Exhibitions/Olympics go, it did not fare that badly. Its smaller physical scale made it affordable, the attendance (mostly regional) was adequate, and nobody went to jail or bankruptcy court. As to the chief goals intended from the Fair, it was a decidedly mixed bag. Probably its best success, an important one, was introducing Seattle as an Asian trade center and the development of a solid tourism strategy—goals that were more than supplemented by the investment of the Port of Seattle and Boeing’s organic marketing. A decade later Seattle would reap the benefits. Seattle did attract branch and office relocation. There was also some diversification from Boeing. Culturally, the impact was positive. The “locals” loved it—business leadership was capable—and the Needle and the Fair became a loved aspect of Seattle’s identity, the CBD skyline, and legacy.

The Fair’s impact on the CBD was probably less helpful. The near-downtown location did not bolster the central business district—although connected by the monorail, there were parking lots, fields and a gap between the Fair and CBD. Upon completion, the fairgrounds were converted into yet another CBD neighborhood, the Seattle Center (a cluster of cultural facilities), which while successful, was viewed by locals as apart from the CBD. Given Seattle’s CBD lacked sufficient scale and prowess to dominate their nine adjacent CBD neighborhoods, the World’s Fair only added to the sense of a polycentric CBD. The monorail never was not extended into a meaningful element of the City’s transportation system. As we have seen the Fair did little or nothing to facilitate the abortive CBD urban renewal redevelopment (Pikes Place Market, Kingdome, or Pioneer Square (the 1917 core of Seattle’s CBD) projects).). The Chamber and Central Association jumped on board and provided much of the Fair’s leadership. In many ways, the Fair was also the last hurrah of the postwar business policy system.

Change in Seattle’s Policy System and its Effects on ED

The opposition of historic preservations toward the Pike’s Peak Market obscured a larger grassroots tumult that was occurring in many of Seattle’s neighborhoods during the decade. Financed by federal funds that produced an assessment of city neighborhoods [Seattle Development Program] led to the Forward Thrust business-citizen initiative which bled into a political movement, “Choose an Effective City Council” (CHECC). It was a business-citizens–political revolt/movement that stopped construction of the freeway access routes, probably provided much of the muscle to the Pike Peak Market politics, dominated the citywide Commission on Goals for Seattle 2000 (1972-73), and Forward Thrust, changed the composition of key boards, and facilitated the victory of CHECC.

Policy system change had started several years previously. Symbolically, if not literally, it began in 1965 with a major speech by our old METRO friend, Joseph Ellis “Rapid Transit and the Shape of the City”. Ellis challenged his followers to take charge of Seattle’s accelerating growth “through a comprehensive program of capital improvements, including rapid transit and new parks, roads and community centers”. The list was quickly augmented by including a county-owned domed stadium (the Kingdome) and the package was named “Forward Thrust”.

To led the approval process, a Committee of One Hundred was formed. The 1967 Forward Thrust bond package [$334 million] included twelve separate bond issues—seven of which were approved—including the first major regional parks issue. Using the initiative and referendum, activists demanded and got the 1968 public works bonds to earmark 20% of bond proceeds to the needs of “critical neighborhoods”, and required the participation of “community councils” in its implementation. What had been social clubs transformed into neighborhood preservation EDOs. The policies, character, indeed the nature of the politics and its policy system shifted dramatically during these years—and neighborhoods were its chief beneficiary. Equally obvious was the entry of early environmentalism into the ED policy-making process.

In 1967 CHECC pushed a bipartisan coalition of Phyllis Lamphere and Tim Hill. [Lamphere later became the National League of Cities first woman president and Hill, King County Executive]. Another citizens group led by Lamphere convinced the State Legislature to allow subsequent city legislation (1968) to change form of government to a strong-mayor-council—citing its potential independence from the likes of the now-infamous Big Ten. The weak mayor-council and at large elections had ruled since 1911. Lamphere was subsequently elected to the City Council in 1968—along with a charismatic new mayor Uhlman in 1969.

Uhlman with a supportive City Council (1973) approved the Seattle 2000 Plan that “reversed the policies of the sixties by stressing the need for neighborhood influence on local decisions, and the necessity to subordinate the demands of the automobile to the needs of the neighborhoods”. (Abbott, the New Urban America 215-6). It was the City Council that aggressively pushed the Pikes Peak and Pioneer Square historic preservation projects, the PUD/PDA urban renewal, a 1% fee on construction projects for arts projects, and a serious water-quality act. The recognition and integration of neighborhoods, and neighborhood EDOs into the policy system was not uncommon in the late 1960’s, early 1970’s. Just the reverse. The fascinating trend to municipal decentralization expressed in mini city halls was a fairly short-term structural reform (Boston’s Kevin White arguably started it off in 1969 after running on it during his 1968 campaign. White abandoned it in 1975)

CHECC changed the composition of the Council by electing members who typified the new quality-of-life liberal-bright and well-educated professions who enjoyed the amenities of older neighborhoods and the pleasures of a vibrant downtown. The election and reelection of Mayor Wes Uhlman in 1970 and 1974 [and continuity for [twelve] years after 1979 from Mayor Charles Royer] reflected the new orientation of Seattle voters. Under Uhlman’s direction, the city established nine ‘little city halls’ to bring service delivery into the neighborhoods, created an Office of Neighborhood Planning, and brought housing and transportation planners together in an Office of Policy Planning. The Uhlman Administration expanded the area covered by the Model Cities Program in 1971, started work on twenty-two neighborhood improvement plans, and implemented neighborhood planning in six other areas. The city ordinance that implemented the [newly passed] State Environmental Quality Act added social and economic sections to the environmental impact statement … and makes them available to community groups. (Abbott, the New Urban America 216)

The next phase of … [HUD] funded the neighborhood improvement program in the Dept. of Community Development [inspiring] … intense neighborhood planning in a third of the neighborhoods [which were] … passed by the City Council in 1975^[vii].

To complete the metro picture, a COUNTY charter review commission formed in 1969 and its recommendations –a county executive, full-time nine-member district-based County Council—were shortly after approved by the voters. The reformed County, however, proved to be a mixed bag for Seattle reformers. Seattle-district commissioners’ favored regional government [which they hoped Seattle would benefit] while the suburban district commissioners strongly preferred transforming the county into an “urban county” and directly focus on the considerable unincorporated areas outside the City.

A series of intergovernmental wars, beginning with King County’s 1972 withdrawal from the four-county Puget Sound Governmental Conference that eventually resulted in a federally-leveraged compromise to form the two-tiered Puget Sound COG. Then after 1975 a multi-decade struggle against METRO that eventually led to the dissolution/merger of METRO in the 1990’s. Simultaneous County-City Policy System change seriously disrupted Seattle metropolitan intergovernmental relations; after the departure of King County Executive Dan Evans, relationships with the Second or Metro Hierarchy were conflict-prone and tense.

The Boeing Bust and the Rise of the International City

In 1969, Boeing did it again. Between 1969 and 1971 Boeing shed over 60,000 jobs in King County and rubbing salt in that wound, the 1970 Census revealed Seattle had actually lost population. The newly installed Uhlman-led Seattle policy system produced its policy shifts and transformations in a period of considerable personal trauma, high unemployment, and insecurity. The City experienced serious disruptions from Vietnam War and Kent State demonstrators that turned violent and raged on for four days. During the early 1970’s the City’s violent crimes surged dramatically That it turned away from conventional Mainstream ED toward its neighborhood-oriented, historic preservation-based urban redevelopment, and community development—and never looked back—is a statement in itself. Seattle was in the process of becoming a blue state, with nary a Republican left in sight, in the City nor in the suburbs.

This is Bishop’s partisan Big Sort” and, probably the rise of a new “boomer” generational cohort. Seattle does not fit Big Sort voting time frame perfectly, but the author, an older boomer, cast his first ballot in the 1972 election—after the voting age had been lowered. Only 20, he was not able to vote in 1968.The dramatically increasing university enrollment, and boomer-associated hyper-pluralism made its appearance in Seattle’s early 1960s. “in contrast to the out-migration of families, Seattle has been a net-importer of young adults ages 20 to 29, particularly between 1970 and 1980. … the city may be characterized as having a bi-modal age distribution … home for young adults and senior citizens.” (Gordon, Locke and McCutcheon 222) What seems more impressive is the business-professional activism engendered by Ellis, and the tolerance of the postwar “Big Ten” business/government coalition to it, bespeaks a business elite considerably more liberal/Progressive on the ideological/culture spectrum than, say, Houston’s or Phoenix’s business elites. Republican Governor Dan Evans, in power during these years, would probably agree.

In any case, after 1960 Seattle’s population sagged noticeably. Its 1960 peak (557,087) declined in 1970 and reached its nadir in 1980 (493,846). Seattle did not breach its 1960 peak until 2000 (563,374). The share of Seattle’s population to its suburbs (including both King and Snohomish counties) fell from its peak in 1940 (62%) to 55% in 1950 and 30% in 1980. In 2010 it was 23%. Not unexpectedly, the economic downturn and suburban shopping malls badly hurt CBD retail business. Adjusting for inflation downtown retail sales dropped 28% between 1967 and 1972, while the metro area retail sales gained 12%. The drop-off in CBD retail sales would prove to be chronic and structural. Between 1998 and 1993, Seattle’s share of taxable retail sales in the metro area dropped from 37% to 28%. The decline devastated department store retail with department store retail falling by nearly one-half (Gibson 74). In this context, the Central Association, now renamed the Downtown Seattle Association (DSA), and the Seattle Chamber organized downtown retail and property owners, the banks, and a pro-growth political-policy folk to pick up after the World Fair and strive to become the international city and stop CBD decay and decline.

Pushed to the margins by a new neighborhood-oriented policy system, rebuffed dramatically on its Pikes Place Market and the various transportation/freeway projects they endorsed, and clearly out-of-step with the Uhlman neighborhood-oriented policy system, the Chamber and Central Association with supportive city and county elected officials formed in 1971 the Economic Development Council of Seattle-King County. The EDC took over many of traditional Mainstream ED strategies such as attraction, retention, small business, and business lending/assistance–intended to produce a more diversified metropolitan economy. In 1971, the region, resulting from the decade earlier infrastructure investment and marketing by the Port of Seattle, got a break when a consortium of six Japanese traders and shippers selected Seattle as their American home base “cementing Seattle’s place as the crucial node in the Pacific Rim marine trade”.

Asian immigration after 1965 increased rapidly in Pacific Coast cites—a direct result of national immigration reform (1965) opening the doors to a new wave of immigration that would eventually transform American demographics and rival, indeed exceed numerically, the “Great Immigration” of 1880 to 1924. Asian immigration whose national quotas in 1964 allowed about 6% of immigrants would eventually produce nearly half of America’s immigrants by the 1990’s. Honolulu, San Francisco and Los Angeles captured the lion’s share, of course, but Seattle garnered its fair share. In 1970 4% of Seattleites were Asian; by 1990 it tripled to over 12%. Asian immigration was considerably more dramatic in Seattle’s manufacturing and export-producing suburbs, however. Today Redmond is 25% Asian, Renton 18% and Bellevue, 17%–Seattle is 14%.

In reaction to these opportunities, the public/private progrowth leadership, led by the Chamber, set up the Trade Development Alliance of Greater Seattle^[viii] to market the strengths of Seattle area to Asian nations, and the global trade and finance community. Repeated, influential and sizeable Trade missions became a regular occurrence and highly visible attraction campaigns were annual endeavors, as were special treatment for visiting businesses, international investors, and potential leads (Gibson 86). Promoting Seattle as “the livable city”, “with unparalleled quality of life, easily accessible beautiful natural surroundings, vibrant street life, cultural, sports and arts events and destinations to business leads, international and domestic tourists, and conventions has made tourism and convention attraction very effective economic development strategy. Much of Seattle’s tourist/convention-related destinations are “walkable”/monorail—a key attraction in convention promotion. In 1980’s Asian cruise liners pulled into the Seattle Port and Asian tourists poured into the City.

It didn’t happen overnight, but through the 1970’s Seattle’s international city strategy, a critical mass of offices and HQ from international and domestic companies, tourism, and the Chamber/DSA’s efforts to promote CBD reinvestment to reverse chronic and structural decline came together. Up until the late 1970’s Seattle was a “build-to-suit” market (i.e. non-speculative, custom-build only with signed leases) that produced few CBD developments. The trigger to change in 1983 was one developer, Martin Selig, believing a market existed for a speculative project of considerable scale, financed and constructed the 1.4 million sq. ft. 76 story Columbia Center—a scale that equaled the total CBD office construction during the entire 1960’s. It leased up and suddenly other developers awoke to the opportunity. This scared the hell out of Mayor Royer and his CD neighborhood-focused administration.

“The anti-skyscraper fury of ‘Joe Six Pack’ and ‘Jane Tree-Hugger’ (Gibson 68) prompted the Mayor to approve a 1985 CBD Plan that capped the height and footprint of future development—for any development that began after its approval. The latter proved to be a loophole as all sorts of projects came out of the woodwork in the period before its passage. Financed by Japanese and pension capital (which poured billions into real estate nationally at this time—in 1989 Washington State was fifth in the nation for Japanese capital) “another 9.4 million square feet of office space in a market still reeling from the arrival of the Columbia Center [was added]. In fact, just two years from 1987 to 1989 four massive projects opened for business in downtown Seattle. … By 1990 the race to beat the new restrictions of the 1985 Plan [added] … the equivalent of six Columbia Centers to the downtown office market” (Gibson 69-70)—creating what would evolve into Seattle’s skyscraper financial and international office district.

The effect of these developments on employment was huge. Trigger by the investment generated from its “international city” strategy, a number of Fortune 500 HQ in Seattle and King County generating thousands of white-collar, professional and producer services (FIRE, business services, legal, engineering and management, and membership organizations) jobs^[ix].

(W)holesale/retail jobs more than doubled from just over 100,000 jobs in 1972, to over 230,000 jobs in 1996. Manufacturing experience greater volatility … but gained 75,000 jobs in the same period. “But of all these sectors, producer services posted the most impressive gains … a three-fold increase in twenty-four years … from 60,000 jobs in 1972 to nearly 200,000 in 1996”. (Gibson 63)

The astute reader may wonder of the massively increased office supply absorbed this job growth in time to pay off the monthly mortgage payments on the new office buildings? It didn’t. Columbia Center itself went down for the count. A national recession didn’t help, but there was never any real hope this much space could find sufficient tenants quick enough. The CBD high rents, in fact, drove existing CBD tenants out of the city into suburban locations during the recession. One developed claimed “nearly 50 to 60% of the buildings around here (CBD) went into bankruptcy” (Gibson 71-2). Maybe so; in any case the early 1990’s were the “bad old days” of Seattle’s downtown.

The Rice Administration, Nordstrom and the Rhodes Project

None of this set very well with either the hoi polloi or the city fathers. True domestic and international tourism, international trade, and a bustling Seattle Center was evident and the late Eighties office construction certainly was promising—a new skyscraper financial district was built–if only the property owners weren’t bankrupt and huge pockets of vacancies were evident. Downtown retail was in structural decline and it took city taxes and downtown vitality with it. Now its crown jewels were in trouble. In The sentimental favorite of Seattle shoppers, Frederick & Nelson had closed its downtown building and its remained vacant—a physical memory of what downtown retail had been and now was. The wonder was whether Seattle’s native king of retail, Nordstrom, just across the street from the empty F&N building, would leave the downtown also.

For the past generation Seattle City Hall under Uhlman and Royer had prioritized neighborhoods, education, the environment; but the downtown needed more than historic preservation could offer. Royer;’s twelve years in office and his Presidency of National League of Cities (1983) were associated with combatting poverty/inequality, teenage pregnancy, children, drugs, a recycling program reputed to be the best in the nation, housing, civil liberties, and citizen participation in government. But in November 1990, Mayor Royer was off to Harvard Institute of Politics at the JFK School of Government.

At Harvard, he would serve as Director for the Urban Health Initiative for health and safety of children in depressed neighborhoods. To the extent downtown figured in these priorities, it was thought of as a “neighborhood for the residents of all city neighborhoods” not as the conventional symbol of the City in the metropolitan hierarchy. It was not thought of as the engine of its prosperity. The downtown retail market was on the verge of collapse and government action seemed necessary to counter the declining market dynamics. That would have to be a task for the new mayor.

The candidate that emerged victorious, Norman Rice was Seattle’s first African-American mayor. His primary platform was city educational reform for a school system believed to be in trouble—but downtown and its troubled retail intruded into his priorities after he took office. More pro-growth city council members were concerned. They saw “lots of empty spaces and graffiti … there were no people. There were no pedestrians …[and] the buildings were all vacant” (Gibson 92). The DSA and downtown businesses were demanding action. So Rice quickly assembled a downtown task force, headed by his Deputy Mayor and filled with department heads. Among its concerns were a new Symphony Hall and the Auditorium, it attacked the retail issue by concentrating on the empty and battered F&N building—more specifically to find some way “to help the private sector fill … the black hole in the retail core”. The hope was to find a world-class retail use to refurbish the F&N building and give juice to the downtown retail market.

The obvious candidate was Nordstrom. Controlled by the Nordstrom family, not noted for its attachment to the Seattle community, the fear was it was only a question of time before it would leave for the suburbs—or worse. It was clear early on that the family was not very interested in moving across the street to a 1918 building closed down and deteriorating for years in an obviously freefalling downtown retail market. Rebuffed the city tried to drum up alternatives; the best they could find was a proposal, without clear financing, to turn it into Seattle’s downtown public library. At this critical juncture, along came serendipity in the form of Jeff Rhodes, a real estate hotshot from one of the most successful and prominent redevelopment firms in the nation. Rhodes a player in Chicago’s Water Tower Place, a 74-story vertical mall, a half-billion plus Boston Copley Square hotel, office and retail complex. and a 1986 Beverly Hills Hotel, had taken an early retirement in Seattle and no sooner in town had been retained by the Nordstrom family to figure out their options.

The “Rhodes Plan” was a masterpiece deal structure that involved him forming a corporation, obtaining financing from the City in the form of a HUD 108 loan for “blighted” area redevelopment, taking over the F&N building, swapping it with Nordstrom’s across the street facility—plus $40 million. Nordstrom would invest $100 million in its new home and Rhodes development corporation would use the 108 proceeds to restore the old Nordstrom facility and convert it into shops and offices. The City in turn would construct a seven level 1,200 space parking garage and various tax abatements. All-in-all the City was in for about $100 million and it would generate $350 million in private investment—in the most critical location in the declining CBD’s retail core.

For many Big Cities this was a no-brainer, but in Seattle’s politics and political culture there was way too many moving parts, hostile State gifts and loans restrictions that had seriously inhibited developing a previous track record for public/private deal-structure, a strong constituency not supportive of public financial participation in a private project, a Nordstrom family uncertain and unfamiliar with a public/private real estate structure, and Rhodes whose professional experience prepared him not at all for the slow, hesitant, public sector and popular culture, the resultant process was torturous for all parties.

Local activists and Progressive planners contested the HUD 108 determination of blight and alleging it fabricated a crime wave in its application cost Rice a job as HUD new Secretary (Andrew Cuomo got it). Rhode’s own precarious financial position required additional public subsidy—by increasing the City’s commitment to the parking garage—which was a hidden subsidy for Rhode’s development cost, for which the City desiring to transfer the long-term risk of financing and operating the garage to Rhodes, was able to transfer such risks to Rhodes through a complicated set of “puts and calls” on bond financing and ultimate ownership of the garage. In short, the nervousness of a complicated deal-structure engendered a closing process that made the public/private deal even more complicated and convoluted.

It came together. The deal closed and the projects went forward. Two years later, however, reporters from Seattle’s major newspaper did an expose which revealed the City had paid more for the garage than the garage cost. The resulting media and activist deluge that followed obscured the benefits the City negotiated in return for the added cost—and almost ignored completely the “value” of retaining a strong CBD Nordstrom retail presence and rehabilitation of the F&N building—preferring to stress the inappropriateness (semi-immorality) of its private-public financing and public involvement in private projects. The scandal dissipated over time

Post 1990’s Resurgence

In the midst of this CBD roller-coaster ride, Microsoft co-founder, Seattle-born Paul Allen (in 2016 the 40^th richest man in the world) and his Vulcan (Foundation/VC) Corporation arrived on the Seattle CBD scene. Owner of the Seattle Seahawks and the (soccer) Seattle Sounders, Allen funded several CBD scientific investments including Allen Institute for Brain Science, Institute for Artificial Intelligence. Institute for Cell Science and the outer space venture, Vulcan Aerospace. He initially funded the redevelopment of a CBD adjacent neighborhood, South Lake Union, which he subsequently sold to Amazon for over $1 billion to relocate its HQ. A major funder of CenturyLink stadium, the downtown Seattle Cinerama complex, Science Fiction Museum and Hall of Fame, and a major advocate of the new South Union Streetcar to Westlake Center. Over the last several decades developed 6.3 million sq. ft. of office, residential, retail and biotechnical research in the CBD—and lots of low-income housing.

Allen was around because Microsoft, (founded in Albuquerque in 1975) had moved to Bellevue (and then Redmond), Seattle’s largest suburb, in January 1979. Microsoft’s rise as an employment generator and catalyst for a tremendous software cluster did not commence until after it developed MS-Dos two years later. Also, in the 1970’s and 1980’s a biotech agglomeration centered about the University’s School of Medicine developed (Seattle Biomedical Research Institute and Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center. During the next decade (the 1990’s), Amazon, Real Networks, Nintendo, McCaw Cellular, T-Mobile, Costco, Starbucks, (no one talks about Washington Mutual Bank any more), a host of biotech and medical industry firms, not to mention Ted Turner’s 1990 Goodwill Games and 1993 Sleepless in Seattle moved into or started up in suburbs and the City. Seattle Best Coffee and Tully’s complete the picture and cement coffee into Seattle’s brand image. Who can take credit for all this, this history will leave to others. The reader, however, is advised to be skeptical. This seemingly spontaneous development of startups and move-ins within such a short period of time is not likely to be without its reasons—but it is not likely to it includes collateral material or site selectors. Our suspicion is that the Big Sort, the one that carried Richard Florida’s Rise of the Creative Class, is more likely to be cited.

Consistent and effect use of initiative and referendum throughout its recent history—especially in controlling agencies right to tax.

Mayor Schell, a former Dean of University School of Architecture, was committed to promoting Seattle as a world-class city and he lobbied hard to bringing the 1999 WTO meeting to Seattle.. He was successful, the delegates came and were greeted by 50,000 plus protesters who proceeded to thoroughly rampage through the downtown. WTO was lambasted as a “tool of global corporate finance that tramples local labor and environmental protection in the name of free trade” (Abbott, How Cities Won the West 238).

Seattle had committed itself to competing in the free trade hierarchy, took aggressive use of NAFTA, and marketed itself aggressively as a world center for biotech and environmental engineering. Its manufacturing was export-oriented as was much of its technology sectors. Both Mayors Rice and Schell promoted the two nation area as “Cascadia” as a global powerhouse.

City owns the electric utility.

In 2012 no plastic bags, 2014 $15 minimum wage, and in 2014 replaced Columbus Day with Indigenous People’s Day

In 2015 at large elections, used since 1911 were replaced by a hybrid 7 district, 2 at-large nonpartisan short ballot and continued strong mayor-council. The 2016 election produced Ed Murray, the city’s first openly gay mayor, a Democratic vote in excess of 80%, with a majority of city council female.

In 2012, Referendum 74 overwhelmingly passed to legalize gay marriage in Washington State.

According to a 2006 study nearly 13% of Seattle residents claimed to be gay, lesbian or bisexual—the second highest in the nation after San Francisco^[x].

Pop in 2015= 684451, 18^th largest; metro area 3.7mm, 15^th largest port—3^rd largest Port in North America, Port established in 1911

Seattle is HQ for Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Socialist Alternative—a New Direction in Community Organizing?

[1] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West (Tucson, the University of Arizona Press, 1998), p. 53.

[2] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West (Tucson, the University of Arizona Press, 1998), p. 53; The Chamber established in 1897 a Bureau of Information in August 1897 and launched a blitz of news, public relations and god know what across the nation. Motivated by its retail community that wanted to provide clothes and equipment to prospective gold miners. The Bureau hired as its Secretary and Executive Erastus Brainerd, a Harvard educated publicist, what today we might call a free lance writer, and a former curator of the Boston Museum of Art. Brainerd imposed a tax on Seattle merchants to pay for his campaign. He purchased full page ads and copy in the major Eastern publications. Seattle, in part due to the Great Northern Railway’s direct access monopoly to Seattle, established itself as the gateway to the Yukon. In one advertisement he sent 212,000 copies to be inserted into various media—supposedly the largest printing west of Chicago. Purchasing $275 worth of gold, Brainerd constructed an exhibit which he sent across the East Coast claiming that the gold was worth $6,000. The overall campaign lasted six months and at its end, Brainerd resigned and took a job with the Chamber as lobbyist in Washington D.C. Brainerd made the campaign the success it was—a complete success commercially and image-wise. Moreover, it appears once Alaska was captured in the minds of Seattle citizens as Seattle’s hinterland, it stayed there, although the Governor and citizens of Alaska may not be of the same opinion.

[3] http://portseattle100.org/map-and-timeline/1960-1969. See also Carl Abbott, Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., p. 54.

[4] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[5] John Hoole, Public Housing in Southeast Seattle (2011) www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/southeastseattle/pdf/SE%20Essay%20-20Public%20Housing.pdf

[6]Also in 1958, the first Citizens Advisory Committee was created and began its deliberations. By August the Citizens Advisory Committee was organized and incorporated as Seattle Urban Renewal Enterprise (SURE) whose goal in 1958 was to raise funds and increase awareness of housing deterioration, rehabilitation, and conservation. SURE was a private EDO. It hired its first Executive Director (Ray Baker) in 1959. Because of an inability to raise sufficient revenues to cover expenses, SURE in 1962 replaced Baker with a staff member of the City Office of Urban Renewal as Executive Director. From that point on SURE relocated its offices and co-located in the City’s Office of Urban Renewal. SURE became a contractor for the City. Needless, to say, the two EDOs worked closely together. SURE coordinated between the City and residents, and promoted the use of urban renewal funds[6].

[7] https://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/leaguepda.pdf

[8] http://seattletimes.com/special/centennial/october/saving.html

[9] In Washington state eminent domain powers are retained by the general purpose units of government and cannot be delegated to other entities than the Housing Authority and its own powers. A PDA is unique; it has the power to issue bonds, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the City—but legally a PDA is considered legally separate from the City—and so that the City is not perceived as violating the “corporate veil” of the PDA, the City is wary of intruding into the operation and governance of the PDA. The Mayor is the supervising authority, the City can create and dissolve the PDA, financially a PDA reports to the City Comptroller, and the City Council must approve mayoral appointees and authorize PDA bond issuance.

[10] Public Development Authorities in Seattle, published by the League of Women Voters of Seattle, May, 1989.

Click to access leaguepda.pdf

[11] http://portseattle100.org/map-and-timeline/1960-1969; Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., p. 54.

[12] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[13] John Hoole, Public Housing in Southeast Seattle (2011) www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/southeastseattle/pdf/SE%20Essay%20-20Public%20Housing.pdf

[15] http://seattletimes.com/special/centennial/october/saving.html

[16] In Washington State, eminent domain powers are retained by general purpose units of government and cannot be delegated to other entities other than the Housing Authority with its own special demarcated powers/purposes. A PDA is unique; it has the power to issue bonds, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the City—but legally a PDA is considered legally separate from the City—so that the City is not perceived as violating the “corporate veil” of the PDA, the City is wary of intruding into the operation and governance of the PDA. The Mayor is the supervising authority, the City can create and dissolve the PDA, but financially, a PDA reports to the City Comptroller (not the Mayor), and the City Council must approve mayoral appointees, and authorize PDA bond issuance.

[17] Public Development Authorities in Seattle, published by the League of Women Voters of Seattle, May, 1989.

https://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/leaguepda.pdf.

[i] Carl Abbott, “Regional City and Network City: Portland and Seattle in the Twentieth Century”, Western Historical Quarterly, August 1992.

[ii] Gerald Nelson, Seattle: the Life and Times of an American City, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977, p. 32.

[iii] Robert Serling, Legend & Legacy: the Story of Boeing and its People (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1991)

[iv] Gerald Nelson, Seattle: the Life and Times of an American City, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977 pp. 27-32

[v] Gerald Nelson, Seattle: the Life and Times of an American City, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977, pp. 30-49

[vi] Quintard Taylor, “Swing the Door Wide: World War II Wrought a Profound Transformation in Seattle’s Black Community”, Columbia Magazine, Summer 1995, Vol. 9, No. 2 http://www.washingtonhistory.org/files/library/swing-door-wide.

[vii] JoAnne McGraw, Neighborhood Planning and Vision of the City Update, League of Women Voters, November 2001 http://www.seattlelwv.org/files/neighborhoodplanning.pdf

[viii] Former Chamber Chair, George Duff is credited with the idea—trying to reverse a disorganized and unfocused regional promotion effort. His selling point was “Only a few American cities will be awarded an international franchise Seattle has the opportunity to be one of them”. Gibson, Spectacular City, p. 87.

[ix] See Timothy Gibson, Securing the Spectacular City, Footnote 19, p.79

[x] Gary Gates, “Same-Sex Couples and the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Population”, UCLA School of Law (October, 2006).

=====================

SEATTLE Repeat but look at last section on UR

Seattle

Yesler’s Way is attributed as the place that coined the “skid row” term. 1889 fire destroyed the first CBD. In 1893 (Great Northern RR—James Hill) established its western terminus at Seattle.

The breakaway competitive dynamic, however, rested on whether one could become a gateway (external trade) economy rather than rely principally on its regional hinterland. Early on Seattle carved out a larger hinterland (Alaska) than Portland. “Boosterism, luck and previous trading connections made Seattle the entrepot of the Far North … publicist Erastus Brainerd and the Seattle Chamber of Commerce identified Seattle with Alaska in the public mind”.^[1] If San Francisco captured the benefits of the 1849 Gold Rush, Seattle seized upon the 1897 Klondike Gold Rush[i]. In 1890 42,00 residents, 1900,80,671, and 1910, 237,194. With some irony, the Gold Rush started when the coastal steamer “Portland” arrived from Alaska bearing the first news goal had been discovered.

In this competition, Portland, thanks to its homebred Henry Kaiser established its dominance over shipbuilding, but not Pacific trade where Seattle’s natural harbor and closer location to Asia won out. The breakout for both city’s shipbuilding industry was the passage in September, 1916 by Congress of legislation to create the U.S. Board and Shipping Corporation with its subsidiary Emergency Fleet Corporation. Intended to create ships which it would lease to private operators, the Corporation had to first create the shipyard. Before 1914, the Seattle Drydock and Construction Company was Seattle’s only metal-constructing shipyard. By1918, there were five, and 12 constructing wood-hull ships[ii]. During the war shipbuilding became the City’s chief industry, with 35,000 workers in 1918. The nationally famous Seattle General Strike of 1919 (Anna Louise Strong, a Seattle resident was a principal organizer) resulted from the government pullback after the war, resulting in huge loss of contracts and massive unemployment.

The “Capital of Boeing” and Initial Diversification Initiatives

Boeing (founded as a lumber company in 1910 by Bill Boeing) added an export “gazelle” dimension to Seattle[iii]—a gazelle that, however mature, remains important in 2017. William Boeing first arrived in Seattle in 1903 upon graduation from Yale’s Sheffield Scientific School—his family accumulated a fortune from timber and iron ore in Minnesota. He invested family money to start a timber business. He became interested in planes in 1910, produced and flew his first Curtiss-type hydroplane over Lake Washington on July 4, 1914, and on July 15, 1916 incorporated his airplane business with 21 workers[iv]. Originally, the company built and flew the planes commercially. Boeing’s initial burst was to provide wooden airplanes for WWI.

A subsequent corporate reorganization created the “United Air Transport and Transport Corporation” which housed the Boeing Air Transport which on July 1, 1927 (ironically) commercially flew a Chicago reporter from Chicago to San Francisco in 23 hours, reputedly, the nation’s first commercial passenger flight. In 1934, Congress enacted legislation that broke up manufacture from commercial use of planes; Boeing quit the company, and fired most of the workers in reaction. He never came back. Boeing Air Transport eventually became United Airlines, and the manufacturing our present-day Boeing. New leadership in Boeing, Claire Egtvedt took over and he took the company into WWII. During WWI and Cold War Boeing producing B-47’s and B-52’s; during the fifties Boeing “came of age”. In 1945, Boeing’s payroll was over a half million dollars a day in 1945 dollars. Then it enjoyed its first massive Boeing bust when contracts expired, Egtvedt left and William Allen took over[v] and launched its crushingly successful 707 (1958), followed in succeeding years by the 727, 737, and 747. In 1947 Boeing workers were one of five in King County; by 1957 about 50% of King County’s manufacturing workers labored for Boeing (Findlay 219). Boeing, however, did not fit neatly into the image of the galloping gazelle. It moved its corporate HQ to Chicago in 2001.

The Port of Seattle, the city’s elite EDO, and arguably lead agency decided to launch Seattle into the global arena. The Port, a special “municipal corporation” entrusted to invest public resources in trade and commerce, promote industrial growth, stimulate economic development, and create jobs for the people of King County. Its five-member governing Commission, independently elected from city governance, holds conventional economic development powers and the power to levy taxes. Targeting tourism, higher education/scientific research, finance and foreign trade as potential growth opportunities, it commenced a decade-long $100 million modernization of its port facilities that would hopefully lure opportunities past Portland and would directly compete with Oakland. The big gamble was to refit its terminals/piers to accommodate the newly-pioneered (NY-NJ Port Authority 1958 containerization innovation). The Port sought to make Seattle the containerization nexus between Asia and the USA. Over the next decade two-thirds of the total investment made in the port since 1911 up to that time, modernized the port to accommodate containers^[2]. A consortium of six Japanese shipping firms in 1970 confirmed the wisdom of that investment by making Seattle their chief port of entry to the USA as a result of Portland’s containerization/modernization initiative.

Seattle’s Abortive Launch of CBD Urban Renewal

Seattle established its Housing Authority in 1939. The Housing Authority quickly started its first slum clearance initiative, with 700 units of public housing in the Profanity Hill neighborhood.^[4] Seattle never segregated its public housing, one of the few in the nation (Pomeroy 118). World War II 1937 Housing Act and war production housing altered the overwhelming white-dominated demographics by providing housing for over 10,000 Black migrants during the decade—permitting in 1949 the election of Seattle’s first Black officeholder (Charles Stokes). Seattle’s 29 shipyards (and Boeing factories in the suburbs), and Seattle’s military installation Fort Lawton provided opportunities for new Black residents. By 1945 nearly 10,000 blacks occupied virtually the same buildings that had housed 3,700 five years earlier (or in temporary war production housing)[vi]. Seattle itself grew from 368,000 in 1940 to 530,000 in 1944 (Pomeroy 117) creating a severe housing shortage in the process.

The State of Washington authorized urban renewal in 1957and Seattle in the next year adopted an ordinance declaring that “blighted areas existed in Seattle as defined by state law” and the Mayor appointed an Urban Renewal Coordinator (Talbot Wegg). Seattle did not set up a municipal-level “urban renewal authority”; the City utilized its Housing Authority for its initial housing/neighborhood urban renewal program^[5], Cherry Hill, “Conservation Project No. 1”. In 1958, the Citizens Advisory Committee was created and by August was incorporated as Seattle Urban Renewal Enterprise (SURE) whose goal was to raise funds and increase awareness of housing deterioration, rehabilitation, and conservation. SURE was a private EDO. It hired its first Executive Director in 1959. Unable to sustain sufficient revenues, SURE in 1962 contracted with the City Office of Urban Renewal. From that point on SURE co-located in the City’s Office of Urban Renewal as a contractor. SURE served as liaison between City and residents, and advocated neighborhood-based housing redevelopment. A series of projects commenced in 1959 and continued through 1976.

In its attempt to venture into commercial/CBD renewal projects, however, the City encountered a very polarized business and professional/activist community movement. In that context, approximately 400 businessmen formed the Central Association of Seattle, “dedicated to the development and maintenance of a strong, vigorous central Seattle”. The Central Association aggressively pressed for urban renewal redevelopment for “blighted downtown areas” such as the Pike’s Place Market, central waterfront, and Pioneer Square and a series of city freeway/tunnel access projects. “They promised a revitalized city—a modern blend of new office buildings, restored historic structures, pedestrian plazas, parking garages, and colorful restaurants—that would appeal to free-spending tourists and suburbanites”^[6]. The residents of the affected areas were chiefly African-Americans, and a variety of lower income ethnics. The city itself was 92% white.

The City (the Mayor) was onboard with Central Association-like CBD urban renewal, initial proposals and the Downtown Plan called for the demolition of both the Market and Pioneer Square. Both immediately ran afoul of professional, historic preservation-minded businesspeople. Led by the University of Washington’s Dean of Architecture and working with resistant property owners, a group, “the Friends of the Market” stalled the project and contested the City’s Downtown Plan thru 1969-1970. In 1971, a referendum, constructed by the “Friends of the Market” and opposed by the Mayor, Central Association and newspaper, was overwhelmingly approved. The referendum established a seven-acre Pike Place Market Historic District and saved Pike Place from the wrecking ball. Subsequent referendums stopped three freeway access initiatives dead in their tracks. In response, the City Council established a forty block Pioneer Square Historic District. Pioneer Square also captured the attention of preservationists/activists, tapping its role in the “city’s literal golden age during the Klondike Gold Rush (Abbott, How Cities Won the West 206).

A historic preservation district, however, was an inadequate vehicle with which to conduct an urban redevelopment program. So, in 1973, the City introduced a unique structure the Public Development Authority^[7], the first example of which, the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority, to plan, design, preserve and carry forward both commercial and residential rehabilitation and redevelopment of the Pike Place historic district. Lacking powers of eminent domain, the Pikes Place PDA did have other powers held by conventional redevelopment agencies—but they were governed by a widely diverse set of board directors some of which were elected, others chosen by the board itself, and still others appointed by the mayor. The conventional national urban renewal redevelopment agency model, after twenty years in operation, was fundamentally reconfigured by the Seattle PDA model which was limited in geography and powers, but entrusted with a considerably broader mission and very democratic governance. The City embraced the PDA concept and over the next twenty years eight other PDAs were created—many of which to conducted housing-neighborhood urban renewal style programs (for instance the 1973 Central Area Public Development Authority)^[8].

1962 Seattle World’s Fair—Urban Renewal by another Name (*****See detailed ABBOTT-based internal study of UR process below after this yellow presentation)

Seattle’s debut onto the world stage required an introduction, an image, a celebration and that was its 1962 World’s Fair with “Century 21” as its theme. The policy entrepreneur for Seattle’s second world’s fair (first being in 1911) was Al Robinson, a Seattle councilman. In 1955 Robinson, the Chamber, and the editor of the Seattle Times jump-started the initiative by forming the World’s Fair Commission (Findlay 223). In 1956 a $5 million bond was approved in a referendum supported 3-1 by voters. That initiative was linked to a $7.5 million bond to upgrade the Seattle Civic Center and preparations began. In that same year Russia launched Sputnik and World’s Fair planners leaped on the theme of science, the future—the new age. Disneyland’s designers were hired to structure the facility and produce the “Tomorrowland” image. The monorail and the Space Needle provided the experience and image; It was hoped the image would travel across the globe.

Despite the efforts of many to reduce the World’s Fair strategy to one or two goals, the strategy was always a multi-faceted one that hoped to capture a goodly number of positive benefits.

Change in Seattle’s Policy System and its Effects on ED

To complete the metro picture, a COUNTY charter review commission formed in 1969 and its recommendations –a county executive, full-time nine-member district-based County Council—were shortly after approved by the voters. The reformed County, however, proved to be a mixed bag for Seattle reformers. Seattle-district commissioners favored regional government [which they hoped Seattle would benefit] while the suburban district commissioners strongly preferred transforming the county into an “urban county” and directly focus on the considerable unincorporated areas outside the City.

The Boeing Bust and the Rise of the International City

In reaction to these opportunities, the public/private progrowth leadership, led by the Chamber, set up the Trade Development Alliance of Greater Seattle[viii] to market the strengths of Seattle area to Asian nations, and the global trade and finance community. Repeated, influential and sizeable Trade missions became a regular occurrence and highly visible attraction campaigns were annual endeavors, as were special treatment for visiting businesses, international investors, and potential leads (Gibson 86). Promoting Seattle as “the livable city”, “with unparalleled quality of life, easily accessible beautiful natural surroundings, vibrant street life, cultural, sports and arts events and destinations to business leads, international and domestic tourists, and conventions has made tourism and convention attraction very effective economic development strategy. Much of Seattle’s tourist/convention-related destinations are “walkable”/monorail—a key attraction in convention promotion. In 1980’s Asian cruise liners pulled into the Seattle Port and Asian tourists poured into the City.

The Rice Administration, Nordstrom and the Rhodes Project

Post 1990’s Resurgence

Consistent and effect use of initiative and referendum throughout its recent history—especially in controlling agencies right to tax.

City owns the electric utility.

In 2012 no plastic bags, 2014 $15 minimum wage, and in 2014 replaced Columbus Day with Indigenous People’s Day

In 2012, Referendum 74 overwhelmingly passed to legalize gay marriage in Washington State.

According to a 2006 study nearly 13% of Seattle residents claimed to be gay, lesbian or bisexual—the second highest in the nation after San Francisco[x].

Pop in 2015= 684451, 18^th largest; metro area 3.7mm, 15^th largest port—3^rd largest Port in North America, Port established in 1911

Seattle is HQ for Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Socialist Alternative—a New Direction in Community Organizing?

Departing from previous snapshots, the Seattle snapshot will focus on its competitive rivalry with Portland. Seattle and Portland, founded at approximately the same time (1851, 1849), initially developed in the more or less traditional pattern of establishing economic dominance over their respective hinterlands—becoming regional centers in the process. But even early on Seattle was able to carve out a larger hinterland, Alaska, than Portland was able to forge. “Boosterism, luck and previous trading connections made Seattle the entrepot of the Far North … publicist Erastus Brainerd and the Seattle Chamber of Commerce identified Seattle with Alaska in the public mind”.^[9] Seattle garnered the benefits from the 1897 Klondike Gold Rush. To this day, Alaska Airlines is headquartered in Seattle.

The breakaway competitive dynamic rested on whether one or both cities could become a gateway (external trade) economy rather than rely principally on its regional hinterland. Boeing (founded as a lumber company in 1910 by Bill Boeing) added an export “gazelle” dimension to Seattle—a gazelle that, however mature, remains important in 2015. During the war and Cold War Boeing produced B-47’s and B-52’s; during the fifties, Boeing produced Boeing launched its crushingly successful 707 (1958), followed in succeeding years by the 727, 737, and 747. By 1957 about 50% of King County’s manufacturing workers labored for Boeing. There were booms and busts in the decades to follow (1969-1971 Boeing’s Seattle-resident employment fell from 105,000 to 38,000), but Boeing established Seattle as a world-wide export gateway—making it an attractive location for other firms in finance, logistics, and foreign trade. This advantage was cemented by a then-risky massive investment made during the 1960’s by the Port of Seattle. Over that decade over a hundred million dollars, two-thirds of the total investment made in the port since 1911 up to that time, modernized the port to accommodate containers^[10]. Japanese shipping firms in 1970 made Seattle the chief port of entry to the USA as a result. Portland’s containerization occurred principally over the following decade with a more muted investment commitment.

In 1958 under new leadership, the University of Washington began its metamorphosis from a regional institution into a major research university. Enrollment doubled in the sixties, and in 1965 Battelle opened its Pacific Northwest Research Laboratory (Department of Energy). “By 1977 Seattle stood eighth among all metropolitan areas in federal research and development dollars to universities and sixth in total federal research and development funds.^[11] To balance out the picture, Seattle even developed a “positive” reputation for its counterculture in the generation following World War II. Despite a boom or bust economy (which between 1960 and 1980 witnessed a loss of 65,000 residents due largely to Boeing), Seattle just kept on moving early into sectors and economic development strategies that characterized the rise of the Sunbelt. Microsoft, founded in Albuquerque in 1975, did not move to Bellevue Washington, Seattle’s largest suburb, until January 1979. Microsoft’s rise as an employment generator did not commence until it developed MS-Dos almost two years (November, 1980) later. Yet, when it was said and done, Seattle did not leave Portland in the dust. Seattle until 1970 kept the upper hand, but after that Portland closed the gap.

Seattle Urban Renewal

Seattle had established its Housing Authority in 1939. The Housing Authority quickly started its first slum clearance initiative, with 700 units of public housing in the Profanity Hill neighborhood.^[12] The state of Washington authorized urban renewal in 1957. Seattle responded in the next year by adopting an ordinance declaring that “blighted areas existed in Seattle as defined by state law” and the Mayor appointed an Urban Renewal Coordinator (Talbot Wegg). Seattle, unlike virtually every major city in America, did not set up a municipal-level “urban renewal authority”. In its place, the City initially employed its Housing Authority for its initial housing/neighborhood urban renewal program^[13]. Cherry Hill, “Conservation Project No. 1” was Seattle’s first urban renewal project; a series of projects commenced in 1959 and continued through 1976. SURE was active in these predominately housing-neighborhood redevelopment projects.^[14]

In its attempt to venture into commercial/CBD renewal projects, the City dealt with a very polarized business and professional community. The bottom line was Seattle never seemed to have anything close to a private or public sector consensus on what a commercial urban renewal project looked like. From the private side, a group of approximately 400 businessmen formed the Central Association of Seattle, “dedicated to the development and maintenance of a strong, vigorous central Seattle”. In particular, they pressed for urban renewal redevelopment for “blighted downtown areas” such as the Market, central waterfront, and Pioneer Square. “The promised a revitalized city—a modern blend of new office buildings, restored historic structures, pedestrian plazas, parking garages, and colorful restaurants—that would appeal to free-spending tourists and suburbanites”.^[15] The residents of the affected areas were chiefly African-Americans, and a variety of lower income ethnics.

A historic preservation district, however, was an inadequate vehicle with which to conduct an urban redevelopment program. So in 1973 the City introduced a fairly unique structure (the Public Development Authority), the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority to plan, design, preserve and carry forward both commercial and residential rehabilitation and redevelopment of the historic district. Lacking powers of eminent domain^[16], the Pikes Place PDA did have the other powers held by conventional redevelopment agencies—but they were governed by a widely diverse set of board directors some of which were elected, others chosen by the board itself, and still others appointed by the mayor^[17]. Following this creation, the area was upgraded with public improvements and infrastructure, and in 1976 the Kingdome/opened.

[1] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West (Tucson, the University of Arizona Press, 1998), p. 53.

[2] http://portseattle100.org/map-and-timeline/1960-1969; Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., p. 54.

[3] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[4] John Hoole, Public Housing in Southeast Seattle (2011) www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/southeastseattle/pdf/SE%20Essay%20-20Public%20Housing.pdf

[6] http://seattletimes.com/special/centennial/october/saving.html

[7] In Washington State, eminent domain powers are retained by general purpose units of government and cannot be delegated to other entities other than the Housing Authority with its own special demarcated powers/purposes. A PDA is unique; it has the power to issue bonds, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the City—but legally a PDA is considered legally separate from the City—so that the City is not perceived as violating the “corporate veil” of the PDA, the City is wary of intruding into the operation and governance of the PDA. The Mayor is the supervising authority, the City can create and dissolve the PDA, but financially, a PDA reports to the City Comptroller (not the Mayor), and the City Council must approve mayoral appointees, and authorize PDA bond issuance.

[8] Public Development Authorities in Seattle, published by the League of Women Voters of Seattle, May, 1989.

https://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/leaguepda.pdf.

[9] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West (Tucson, the University of Arizona Press, 1998), p. 53; The Chamber established in 1897 a Bureau of Information in August 1897 and launched a blitz of news, public relations and god know what across the nation. Motivated by its retail community that wanted to provide clothes and equipment to prospective gold miners. The Bureau hired as its Secretary and Executive Erastus Brainerd, a Harvard educated publicist, what today we might call a free lance writer, and a former curator of the Boston Museum of Art. Brainerd imposed a tax on Seattle merchants to pay for his campaign. He purchased full page ads and copy in the major Eastern publications. Seattle, in part due to the Great Northern Railway’s direct access monopoly to Seattle, established itself as the gateway to the Yukon. In one advertisement he sent 212,000 copies to be inserted into various media—supposedly the largest printing west of Chicago. Purchasing $275 worth of gold, Brainerd constructed an exhibit which he sent across the East Coast claiming that the gold was worth $6,000. The overall campaign lasted six months and at its end, Brainerd resigned and took a job with the Chamber as lobbyist in Washington D.C. Brainerd made the campaign the success it was—a complete success commercially and image-wise. Moreover, it appears once Alaska was captured in the minds of Seattle citizens as Seattle’s hinterland, it stayed there, although the Governor and citizens of Alaska may not be of the same opinion.

[10] http://portseattle100.org/map-and-timeline/1960-1969. See also Carl Abbott, Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., p. 54.

[11] Carl Abbott, the Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[12] John Hoole, Public Housing in Southeast Seattle (2011) www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/southeastseattle/pdf/SE%20Essay%20-20Public%20Housing.pdf

[13]Also in 1958, the first Citizens Advisory Committee was created and began its deliberations. By August the Citizens Advisory Committee was organized and incorporated as Seattle Urban Renewal Enterprise (SURE) whose goal in 1958 was to raise funds and increase awareness of housing deterioration, rehabilitation, and conservation. SURE was a private EDO. It hired its first Executive Director (Ray Baker) in 1959. Because of an inability to raise sufficient revenues to cover expenses, SURE in 1962 replaced Baker with a staff member of the City Office of Urban Renewal as Executive Director. From that point on SURE relocated its offices and co-located in the City’s Office of Urban Renewal. SURE became a contractor for the City. Needless, to say, the two EDOs worked closely together. SURE coordinated between the City and residents, and promoted the use of urban renewal funds[13].

[14] https://www.mrsc.org/artdocmisc/leaguepda.pdf

[15] http://seattletimes.com/special/centennial/october/saving.html

[16] In Washington state eminent domain powers are retained by the general purpose units of government and cannot be delegated to other entities than the Housing Authority and its own powers. A PDA is unique; it has the power to issue bonds, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the City—but legally a PDA is considered legally separate from the City—and so that the City is not perceived as violating the “corporate veil” of the PDA, the City is wary of intruding into the operation and governance of the PDA. The Mayor is the supervising authority, the City can create and dissolve the PDA, financially a PDA reports to the City Comptroller, and the City Council must approve mayoral appointees and authorize PDA bond issuance.

[17] Public Development Authorities in Seattle, published by the League of Women Voters of Seattle, May, 1989.

Click to access leaguepda.pdf

[i] Carl Abbott, “Regional City and Network City: Portland and Seattle in the Twentieth Century”, Western Historical Quarterly, August 1992.

[ii] Gerald Nelson, Seattle: the Life and Times of an American City, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977, p. 32.

[iii] Robert Serling, Legend & Legacy: the Story of Boeing and its People (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1991)

[iv] Gerald Nelson, Seattle: the Life and Times of an American City, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977 pp. 27-32

[v] Gerald Nelson, Seattle: the Life and Times of an American City, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977, pp. 30-49

[vii] JoAnne McGraw, Neighborhood Planning and Vision of the City Update, League of Women Voters, November 2001 http://www.seattlelwv.org/files/neighborhoodplanning.pdf

[ix] See Timothy Gibson, Securing the Spectacular City, Footnote 19, p.79

[x] Gary Gates, “Same-Sex Couples and the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Population”, UCLA School of Law (October, 2006).

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