Dallas Follow up to pp 216-18 As Two Ships: Dallas-Ft Worth Competition, City Beautiful, Depression War and Post War ED Citizens Council, Age of UR

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Policy System Cuts

Dallas

When last we left 1920’s Dallas in Chapter 6 she had established herself as the regional leader in the competition with Ft. Worth. Earlier in this chapter, aggressive chamber-city government partnership seizing upon opportunities arising during the war years had aggressively acquired an aircraft industry of national scale to booster an already diversified economic base.. Politically, Dallas had put in place a commission form of government in 1907 (as had most of Texas, it seems), but after some dissatisfaction during the twenties replaced in with a city manager form in 1930, approving in the process charter reforms that enhanced and upgraded the capacity of its municipal government. In 1930, lacking any oil fields of its own, Dallas businessmen, H. L. Hunt  purchased a major East Texas oil field.[1]. The East Texas Oil Field was huge and it spun off local oil services and equipment firms, some machinery, and oil distribution companies. Dallas, in short, had developed a meaningful energy sector.

 

As we have come to expect charter reform was business-led, and the instrument of that set of initiatives, the Citizens Charter Association, fielded a set of business candidates for the city council. All nine were elected, the city manager hired and Dallas in the Age of Urban Renewal was in place. Times were tough, of course, all over in the Depression—Dallas was no exception. Hard times generated internal conflict and Dallas was looking for an opportunity to bust some urban hierarchy to let off some steam. The 1936 Texas Centennial provided the opening and in true Dallas-style turned a page in Texas history as well. Dallas, for those not from Texas and who did not read Chapter 6, was not even incorporated when Texas became a state in 1836. The city had no real or imagined claim to compete with the likes of San Antonio (the Alamo) or Houston whose namesake won the key battle that secured independence. Suffice it to say, armed with $3.5million, the Chamber went to the state legislature—and the rest, is history. Dallas was designated as the site.

 

Needing money to fix up the fair grounds to host the events, Dallas business leadership turned to New Deal Washington D. C. and obtained the necessary funds. That was because Dallas possessed a formidable political apparatus in New Deal Washington D.C. Banker R. L. Thornton had led the Centennial campaign and the effort had left him a bit frustrated. He was determined to set up a system and process that worked more efficiently than the Centennial campaign had. So in the best J. R. Ewing tradition, he got his powerful friends together (no doubt at the “Cattleman’s Club”) and created the “Dallas Citizens Council” [2]in 1937. This was meant to be a “vault-like” political-economic development power center which would operate through the Chamber and its selected and financed city council. In terms of the large corporation elites found in Chapters 9-11, this was the Dallas equivalent. That it came together a decade earlier, with no prod from decentralization, and achieved a political/economic dominance never attained up north, bespeaks Texan cities in the Age of Urban Renewal. It was the Dallas Citizens Council that provided much of the muscle and determination that sent the Chamber off to recruit the aircraft firms, and federal war production contracts discussed earlier in this chapter. This is the group that stiffened the spine of Dallas when the North American Aviation complex emptied out at war’s end.

 

Anyway in Washington, Jesse Jones (from Houston) was FDR’s influential Reconstruction Finance Administration chair. He secured appointment for two Texan board directors on its Defense Plant Corporation (that made decisions/loans to locate privately-owned war production factories the pivotal instrument implementing the industrial decentralization initiative. One of them, Thomas W. Griffiths, hailed from Dallas. With a large and growing Democratic Texas delegation in Congress, the state was well-positioned in DC. In fact, in September 1940, Sam Rayburn[3], the Democratic majority leader became Speaker of the House of Representatives (he held that position whenever Democrats controlled Congress until he died in 1961). He was a wonderful supplement to John Nance Garner[4], FDR’s vice-president—also from Texas. During the New Deal years, Dallas picked up nearly $4 million from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration for the unemployed, secured the only Public Works Administration public housing project in Texas (built on vacant land adjoining the CBD for whites only). In 1937, the Council approved the formation of the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) to take advantage of the slum removal public housing programs authorized in the Housing Act of 1937. Dallas was ready and willing to participate in the Age of Urban Renewal.

 

Establishing the DHA and its subsequent slum clearance/public housing activities suggests the outlines of a distinctive regional approach to that policy area. Despite today’s prevailing urban renewal paradigm, northern Big City slum removal/public housing affected both working class ethnic as well as African-American neighborhoods. Not until the early sixties did the “racial” consequences of urban renewal become paramount—and even then the racial segregation confronted was both informal and real estate/ financial in nature. In the South racial segregation was all that—and embedded in law and custom as well. There was no obscuring veneer hiding race dynamics and slum removal/public housing in the South; it was evident from the start of the Age of Urban Renewal. Norfolk’s experience, befuddled as it was with machine/reformer and temporary federal war housing dynamics—but evidenced a strong ambiguity toward federal leadership. Atlanta, with its strong Progressive-like traditions, embraced federal programs but used them to fit, not challenge, existing segregation and when given the chance abandoned public housing for almost two decades in favor of CDB redevelopment. Dallas, as Privatist a stronghold as any in the nation ,bought into federal programs, but used them to reinforce already segregated neighborhoods and housing. But in Dallas’s case, it backfired.

 

The DHA commenced a major slum removal/public housing project almost immediately after its formation. By 1938, DHA had designated its first neighborhood project (Hall-Thomas area) “because this [area] has definitely been established as a negro area, and it is the desire and the intention of the city that it remain one”.[5] As its inaugural slum removal/public housing project, Dallas, its business elites, and the DHA intended 1937 Housing Act funds to maintain segregation—by improving housing and conditions in an African-American neighborhood. With better opportunities available, African-Americans would, it was felt, have less motivation to expand into white neighborhoods. There was a second motivation as well. Harkening back to the 1910 (Kessler) city plan, and reinforced by a well-received 1940 Atlantic Monthly[6] article, perceived rundown African-American slums “as a canker or eating sore” on Dallas. “The rest of our city can no more live and grow and prosper with such a condition, then our body can be well when it has an angry, bleeding, inflamed sore … so will the city … suffer the penalty for bad housing conditions among any large group of its population”.[7]

 

After two years of law suits, the project started in 1940 with 266 structures demolished and 400 families displaced. The lack of alternative places to go, amid a crushing African-American housing crisis, however, immediately generated pressure on adjacent white neighborhoods. Over the next nine months, intermittent violence, including thirteen bombings against Blacks destabilized neighborhoods and city politics. Demolishing houses to construct future housing involved an inevitable time lag into which pour all the intense frustration and fear that segregation created. That lesson was not lost on Dallas elites; slum removal/public housing was risky and volatile. Moreover, by the time emotions subsided, Dallas was in the midst of war production growth described above, and the need to find housing for those who filled these jobs. By 1942, as noted earlier, federal funding for low-income housing was zeroed out. Slum removal and public housing fell off  the policy agenda.

 

The Dallas Master Plan of 1945, promoted by both the city council and the Dallas Citizens Council, reopened this can of worms. Harland Bartholomew & Associates plan followed the themes of most plans of this era. The thrust of this comprehensive plan was to unify the metropolitan area (especially its suburbs) by connecting its various parts to the center, the CBD. Transportation upgrading and automobile access were paramount initiatives. A rebuild, attractive and modern CBD was the magnet that need to be created. Central city primacy and metropolitan economic growth became linked in this paradigm. The Plan included an aggressive annexation program[8] which when completed by the end of the forties, nearly doubled the land area of Dallas. Housing and neighborhoods, especially African-American neighborhoods were the focus on the Master Plan as well (Report 10). Report 10 urged the development of sound and vibrant neighborhoods, for all residents, reflecting much of the earlier thinking of Clarence Perry (who with Mumford were now metropolitan housers). There is no evidence that Report 10 was meant to be a challenge to segregation, rather, it was meant, as in the past, to reinforce it. Proposals, using FHA financing, followed.

 

So once again in 1949, the Dallas Chamber, the Citizens Council, the Dallas Homebuilders Association, and the City Council combined, in response to the 1949 Housing Act, to a new burst of public housing—principally for African-Americans—to be used to reinforce existing neighborhood-based segregated housing patterns. The Dallas Citizens Council publically in 1950 urged DHA to construct 1,500 units of public housing for African-Americans within the next year and half.[9] During this period racial violence in areas adjoining minority neighborhoods increased dramatically. Slum removal and public housing construction was intended by the business elites to ameliorate the explosive and violent expansion of minority neighborhoods into white areas. Between 1950 and 1954, DHA completed six projects (4,000 units for African-Americans and 1,500 units for whites). “With the completion of the West Dallas [Project, built on annexed land] in April 1954, the DHA ceased building public housing until the 1970’s.[10] During the 1950’s the tone of Dallas city politics was noticeably changing.

 

During the 1950’s/1960’s (and after), individual members of the Dallas-based corporate elite, some associated with the Dallas Citizens Council, more than flirted with radical right political movements[11]. Dallas acquired the epithet of “the city of hate” in stark contrast with Atlanta’s tag “too proud to hate”. The assassination of JFK[12], and Oswald, the linkage with Hinckley and his attempt on Reagan’ life stuck to Dallas for decades. Whatever that larger political/ideological motif, for the most part it does not seem to have affected the course Dallas followed during the Age of Urban Renewal. Dallas over the next generation broadly followed the path uncovered in our Atlanta case study. During the Age period, the Dallas Citizens Council, Chamber of Commerce and City Council dominated Dallas politics and economic development. Dallas corporate leadership was much more Privatist than Atlanta’s business elites, but the policy direction of both cities proceeded along the similar lines. These included attaining a competitive position in the national urban hierarchy achieved most by constructing a modern, world-class central business district. In both cases neighborhoods and housing were relatively neglected. Both gave up trying to stop decentralization and made their peace with a polycentric metropolitan area–in Dallas’s case, pursuing a more or less benign laissez-faire policy personified by  the 1972 Dallas/Ft Worth Metroplex and the 1974 Dallas-Fort Worth Airport.[13].

 

The Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex is the thirteen county economic, cultural and tourist hub of north Texas. In 2010, it includes 6.5 million Texans and cites such as Dallas, Fort Worth, Arlington, Irving, Grapevine and Plano. It produces the sixth largest GMP in the United States and tenth in the world and home to four professional sports teams. It is served by the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, the second-largest in the nation. The airport, all 17,000 acres of it, is larger than Manhattan, with an architecture everyone loves to hate. But it allegedly, led to a billion dollar increase in land values and has sprouted all sorts of towns, commercial centers and every bit of economic development an airport is supposed to create[14].

 

The point of all this seeming advertisement is that the Metroplex may be America’s most successful regional recruitment and promotion initiative—ever. It was created and promoted by an alliance of businesses that formed the “North Texas Commission” back in 1971. The fact that is a “virtual” geography, little more than the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington Combined Statistical Area, gives way to create not only an image to the outside world, but an identity to its inhabitants. The word, a creation of adman Harve Chapman, just caught on and defined a geography so well it continues and prospers a half-century later. Of course, it is a planner’s nightmare (it does have a COG behind it), but frankly it the Metroplex (natives say it should not be called that) is the best example of how central cities and their independent suburban boomburbs can prosper in a polycentric metro area. It is the living refutation that sprawl cannot work.

 

The fact that Dallas CBD-focused physical redevelopment consciously used no federal urban renewal money has resulted in much comment in later years. Neither did Houston, San Diego, Salt Lake City or Phoenix. Most Sunbelt cities were wary of federal intervention, requirements and mandates. For most of the 1960’s, while the federal government advocated New Frontier and Great Society social and civil rights priorities, federal programs made southerners and businessmen bristle. Nixon revenue-sharing federalism was easier to take and even Dallas tempered its hostility to the federal government during those years. Both Atlanta and Dallas business elites adopted a moderate accommodative posture toward integration and school desegregation. In Dallas the Citizens Council set up the tri-racial Dallas Alliance which proved reasonably successful in navigating Dallas through those turbulent years. The sixties riots missed these cities.

 

Atlanta’s Mayor Allen found his counterpart in Dallas. Mayor Erik Jonsson, elected for three terms (1964-1971), the former founder and Chair of Texas Instruments, promulgated his “Goals for Dallas”, a systems approach to city governance. “Goals” was probably the closest thing to a comprehensive plan that Dallas had seen since 1945[15], based on systems efficiency and stressing physical not social programs. There was no mistaking “Goals” for the Great Society and it might be fair to offer that the strengths of one were the weaknesses of the other. Housing, especially in minority neighborhoods was in crisis during these years and in Dallas one could find some of the most distressing housing units and neighborhoods the nation could offer.

 

A leader in the regeneration and the sustenance of the CBD was  the 1958 formation of the Central Business District Association, which today is Downtown Dallas (after several mergers). Not without its faults and limitations, congestion, open space, aesthetics and parking for instance, the CBD that resulted from a host of commercial and office projects raises the question of how such a vibrant central city CBD can thrive within a sprawled Metroplex metropolitan area. The answer has to be metropolitan-wide growth[16], population and economic, that allowed the CBD to be so successful. If so, the core goal of the Dallas Citizens Council, that growth sufficient to place Dallas among the nation’s largest metro areas, had been achieved.

 

CBD redevelopment, based entirely on private financing, started in the middle fifties (the 1955 Republic Bank and Adolphus Tower) and, as in Atlanta, continued for two generations. The well-known Dallas Market Center opened in 1957. Atlanta’s Peachtree complex was matched by Dallas’s 1972 Reunion Project. Reunion Project sat on a fifty acre site, involved a luxury hotel. A ten acre public park, a civic center, parking, road and sewer, and was anchored by the 50 story Reunion Tower, and a restored Union Terminal Building. Financed by public and private bonds/mortgages, it opened in 1978[17]. The Dallas Central Library Project, a derivative of Jonsson and “Goals” constructed a research/public library placed Dallas in the “who’s who” of great world libraries. The net result was modern downtown nested in the midst of a growing, sprawling hinterland.

 

As a final postscript to Dallas and the Age of Urban Renewal concerns the Dallas Citizens Council. This case study has argued that unique organization, and organizations that are associated with its leadership (the Chamber, Dallas Alliance and Central Business District Association) have exerted a formidable impact on Dallas economic development policy-making. As would be expected, the power and role of the Council has generated much controversy. Criticisms ranging from a dictatorship, a benevolent oligarchy, neo-liberal capitalists etc., are frequent. The deficiencies of its business, CBD, growth perspective are noted and considerable. Housing, neighborhoods, social services, anti-unionism, crime and inequality, are well-documented, supported by government statistics—and long-standing. That Dallas has a reputation for honesty and some efficiency may be meager compensation for large corporation noblesse oblige. The Dallas Citizens Council is very much alive while this section is being written. It is still a formal and formidable organization, with staff and membership—it, however, has been taken down a notch or two since the Age of Urban Renewal. In fact, a decline was noted in the election of Wes Wise to replace Jonsson in 1972. The DCA ability to control city council elections has been checked as minorities, neighborhoods, and prosperity possess some means and resources to compete. In that our model of economic development policy-making is quite sensitive to the role of business elites, it is important that we conclude comments with our sense that the Dallas Citizens Council is arguably the most sustained and effective Privatist EDO-related body observed to this point.

 

[1] When he died he was alleged to have been the world’s richest man. In the meantime, he was a powerful fund-raiser for the Republican Party—a through conservative, three wives, many children—and the image and role model for the famous, J. R. Ewing of “Dallas” TV show fame.

[2] Originally limited to 100 dues-paying members, by invitation only, the Council was non partisan, worked behind the scenes, often through the Chamber. It was what it was, but despite the image today was open to social programs, federal funds, held a conventional city efficient mentality. The Council was in no known way Progressive, but was as stereo-typical  a business elite as America has seen. Sometimes the Council served as the arbiter between growth and order-which as we shall shortly describe, attempted to provide some benefit to Dallas African-American community in the name of order—not racial justice. The Council dominated municipal elections until the 1970’s.

[3] Rayburn represented Fannin County area, twelve miles from Oklahoma, and 68 miles from Dallas. An earlier resident was the infamous outlaw, John Wesley Hardin, and Joe Morgan, baseball Hall of Fame second baseman who played for nearly every professional baseball team in America, including Cincinnati where I watched him.

[4] Garner enjoyed the vice-presidential experience so well, that when asked to describe it he likened it to “a pitcher of warm spit”. Just thought you wanted to know.

[5] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., p. 144. Fairbanks quotes DHA minutes, November 8, 1938.

[6] David L. Cohn, “Dallas” Atlantic Monthly, October, 1940, pp. 453-60.

[7] Justin F. Kimball, “Our City: A Community Civics”, (Dallas, Kessler Plan Association of Dallas, 1927), p. 199. The Plan produced Dallas’s first comprehensive zoning ordinance

[8] In 1942, Dallas encompassed 42 sq miles; by 1970 it had grown 530% to 266 sq. miles. Fort Worth, however, was less aggressive and decentralization exerted a considerable impact on that city’s CBD, its retail sales falling from 39% (1940) to 11%  (1976). Annexation, however, did not stop the development of sizeable independent suburbs such as Arlington and Richardson. Dallas/Fort Worth succumbed to a polycentric metro area as did most Sunbelt cities. Arlington in 1950 had about 7,700 residents—in 1960 nearly 45,000, 1970-90,000 and 1980. 160,000. A boomburb, today more than 365,000, it shall be discussed in a later chapter. Richardson, a more muted version Arlington, was a bit less than1,300 in 1950 and  almost 17,000 by 1960.

[9] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., p. 151.

[10] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

[11] At this point we reach a difficult juncture in the story line of our Dallas case study. The Cold War, anti-communism, McCarthyism and then onto John Birch and the Minute Man movements injected a strain of political behavior and opinion that made Dallas into the prototype of extremist politics in the minds of many. The assassination of JFK by Lee Harvey Oswald and his assassination by Jack Ruby in Dallas in 1963 cemented that image into place. The last years of the Age of Urban Renewal (1968, 1972) witnessed the rise of George Wallace and the American Independent Party and that injected an overtly racist tone into this image. Even our more narrow concern with economic development policy became tainted to some extent, as right to work legislation in this era touched on this style politics. The rise of the Sunbelt literature (discussed in a later chapter) further confused ideology, partisanship, and even morality into this discussion. Dallas business elites became associated with all this and to a considerable degree Dallas, and Texan economic development have spent the last half century living in the warm glow of being extreme right or radical right policies. Seymour Martin Lipset, the Radical Right (1955 and 1970) and Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (1964); John Birch Society founded in 1958

[12] The Citizens Council had cosponsored a lunch with Kennedy to counter the hostile treatment he received from the newspapers and TV, as well as outbursts from H. L. Hunt, and Congressman Alger. Council President Jonsson attempted to stop the hostile treatment as well. In subsequent years the Citizens Council distanced itself from the Far Right and its initiatives did not follow its themes.

[13] Two excellent period-based analyses which describe in more detail the specifics are: Martin V. Melosi, “Dallas-Fort Worth: Marketing the Metroplex”, in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice (Eds). Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since World War II (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 162-195; William E. Claggett, “Dallas: the Dynamics of Public-Private Cooperation”, in R. Scott Fosler and Renee A. Berger, Public-Private Partnership in American Cities (D. C. Heath and Company, 1982), pp. 163-200.

[14] Rice  p. 173.

[15] P. 173 Rice

[16] The Trinity River Corridor (Canal) Project  and the Trinity River Authority is yet another grandiose Texan project which has  a history dating well over a century. Originally intended to permit  the 700 mile plus Trinity River to serve as the central North Texas region’s access to the Gulf of Mexico, making inland Dallas a port city, is more than a one up of the Houston Ship Channel. In the meantime, it is a flood project by the Corps of Engineers, and for Fort Worth is a major initiative in developing the CBD and sustaining its vaunted prosperity and economic meaning into the 21st century. It  also hosts recreation sites, trails, nature centers and may be the largest “urban park” in the United States. The massiveness  and the duration of this project warrants at least a footnote. During the Age of Urban Renewal, several locks and dams were constructed and in 1955 the state established the Trinity River Authority which continues to this day.

[17] Fosler, pp. 248-258.

===

 Dallas[1]

The 1936 Texas Centennial provided the opening and in true Dallas-style turned a page in Texas history as well. Dallas, for those not from Texas and who did not read Chapter 6, was not even incorporated when Texas became a state in 1836. The city had no real or imagined claim to compete with the likes of San Antonio (the Alamo) or Houston whose namesake won the key battle that secured independence. Suffice it to say, armed with $3.5million, the Chamber went to the state legislature—and the rest, is history. Dallas was designated as the site.

 

Needing money to fix up the fair grounds to host the events, Dallas business leadership turned to New Deal Washington D. C. and obtained the necessary funds. That was because Dallas possessed a formidable political apparatus in New Deal Washington D.C. Banker R. L. Thornton had led the Centennial campaign and the effort had left him a bit frustrated. He was determined to set up a system and process that worked more efficiently than the Centennial campaign had. So in the best J. R. Ewing tradition, he got his powerful friends together (no doubt at the “Cattleman’s Club”) and created the “Dallas Citizens Council” [2]in 1937. This was meant to be a “vault-like” political-economic development power center which would operate through the Chamber and its selected and financed city council. In terms of the large corporation elites found in Chapters 9-11, this was the Dallas equivalent. That it came together a decade earlier, with no prod from decentralization, and achieved a political/economic dominance never attained up north, bespeaks Texan cities in the Age of Urban Renewal. It was the Dallas Citizens Council that provided much of the muscle and determination that sent the Chamber off to recruit the aircraft firms, and federal war production contracts discussed earlier in this chapter. This is the group that stiffened the spine of Dallas when the North American Aviation complex emptied out at war’s end.

 

Anyway in Washington, Jesse Jones (from Houston) was FDR’s influential Reconstruction Finance Administration chair. He secured appointment for two Texan board directors on its Defense Plant Corporation (that made decisions/loans to locate privately-owned war production factories the pivotal instrument implementing the industrial decentralization initiative. One of them, Thomas W. Griffiths, hailed from Dallas

 

 

Dallas

With a large and growing Democratic Texas delegation in Congress, the state was well-positioned in DC. In fact, in September 1940, Sam Rayburn[3], the Democratic majority leader became Speaker of the House of Representatives (he held that position whenever Democrats controlled Congress until he died in 1961). He was a wonderful supplement to John Nance Garner[4], FDR’s vice-president—also from Texas. During the New Deal years, Dallas picked up nearly $4 million from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration for the unemployed, secured the only Public Works Administration public housing project in Texas (built on vacant land adjoining the CBD for whites only). In 1937, the Council approved the formation of the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) to take advantage of the slum removal public housing programs authorized in the Housing Act of 1937. Dallas was ready and willing to participate in the Age of Urban Renewal.

Dallas, as Privatist a stronghold as any in the nation, bought into federal programs, but used them to reinforce already segregated neighborhoods and housing. But in Dallas’s case, it backfired.

 

The DHA commenced a major slum removal/public housing project almost immediately after its formation. By 1938, DHA had designated its first neighborhood project (Hall-Thomas area) “because this [area] has definitely been established as a negro area, and it is the desire and the intention of the city that it remain one”.[5] As its inaugural slum removal/public housing project, Dallas, its business elites, and the DHA intended 1937 Housing Act funds to maintain segregation—by improving housing and conditions in an African-American neighborhood. With better opportunities available, African-Americans would, it was felt, have less motivation to expand into white neighborhoods. There was a second motivation as well. Harkening back to the 1910 (Kessler) city plan, and reinforced by a well-received 1940 Atlantic Monthly[6] article, perceived rundown African-American slums “as a canker or eating sore” on Dallas. “The rest of our city can no more live and grow and prosper with such a condition, then our body can be well when it has an angry, bleeding, inflamed sore … so will the city … suffer the penalty for bad housing conditions among any large group of its population”.[7]

 

After two years of law suits, the project started in 1940 with 266 structures demolished and 400 families displaced. The lack of alternative places to go, amid a crushing African-American housing crisis, however, immediately generated pressure on adjacent white neighborhoods. Over the next nine months, intermittent violence, including thirteen bombings against Blacks destabilized neighborhoods and city politics. Demolishing houses to construct future housing involved an inevitable time lag into which pour all the intense frustration and fear that segregation created. That lesson was not lost on Dallas elites; slum removal/public housing was risky and volatile. Moreover, by the time emotions subsided, Dallas was in the midst of war production growth described above, and the need to find housing for those who filled these jobs. By 1942, as noted earlier, federal funding for low-income housing was zeroed out. Slum removal and public housing fell off  the policy agenda.

 

The Dallas Master Plan of 1945, promoted by both the city council and the Dallas Citizens Council, reopened this can of worms. Harland Bartholomew & Associates plan followed the themes of most plans of this era. The thrust of this comprehensive plan was to unify the metropolitan area (especially its suburbs) by connecting its various parts to the center, the CBD. Transportation upgrading and automobile access were paramount initiatives. A rebuild, attractive and modern CBD was the magnet that needed to be created. Central city primacy and metropolitan economic growth became linked in this paradigm. The Plan included an aggressive annexation program[8] which when completed by the end of the forties, nearly doubled the land area of Dallas. Housing and neighborhoods, especially African-American neighborhoods were the focus on the Master Plan as well (Report 10). Report 10 urged the development of sound and vibrant neighborhoods, for all residents, reflecting much of the earlier thinking of Clarence Perry (who with Mumford was now metropolitan housers). There is no evidence that Report 10 was meant to be a challenge to segregation, rather, it was meant, as in the past, to reinforce it. Proposals, using FHA financing, followed.

 

So once again in 1949, the Dallas Chamber, the Citizens Council, the Dallas Homebuilders Association, and the City Council combined, in response to the 1949 Housing Act, to a new burst of public housing—principally for African-Americans—to be used to reinforce existing neighborhood-based segregated housing patterns. The Dallas Citizens Council publically in 1950 urged DHA to construct 1,500 units of public housing for African-Americans within the next year and half.[9] During this period racial violence in areas adjoining minority neighborhoods increased dramatically. Slum removal and public housing construction was intended by the business elites to ameliorate the explosive and violent expansion of minority neighborhoods into white areas. Between 1950 and 1954, DHA completed six projects (4,000 units for African-Americans and 1,500 units for whites). “With the completion of the West Dallas [Project, built on annexed land] in April 1954, the DHA ceased building public housing until the 1970’s.[10] During the 1950’s the tone of Dallas city politics was noticeably changing.

 

The fact that Dallas CBD-focused physical redevelopment consciously used no federal urban renewal money has resulted in much comment in later years. Neither did Houston, San Diego, Salt Lake City or Phoenix. Most Sunbelt cities were wary of federal intervention, requirements and mandates. Both Atlanta and Dallas business elites adopted a moderate accommodative posture toward integration and school desegregation. In Dallas the Citizens Council set up the tri-racial Dallas Alliance which proved reasonably successful in navigating Dallas through those turbulent years. The sixties riots missed these cities.

 

Atlanta’s Mayor Allen found his counterpart in Dallas. Mayor Erik Jonsson, elected for three terms (1964-1971), the former founder and Chair of Texas Instruments, promulgated his “Goals for Dallas”, a systems approach to city governance. “Goals” was probably the closest thing to a comprehensive plan that Dallas had seen since 1945[11], based on systems efficiency and stressing physical not social programs. There was no mistaking “Goals” for the Great Society and it might be fair to offer that the strengths of one were the weaknesses of the other.

 

A leader in the regeneration and the sustenance of the CBD was  the 1958 formation of the Central Business District Association, which today is Downtown Dallas (after several mergers). Not without its faults and limitations, congestion, open space, aesthetics and parking for instance, the CBD that resulted from a host of commercial and office projects raises the question of how such a vibrant central city CBD can thrive within a sprawled Metroplex metropolitan area. The answer has to be metropolitan-wide growth, population and economic, that allowed the CBD to be so successful. If so, the core goal of the Dallas Citizens Council, that growth sufficient to place Dallas among the nation’s largest metro areas, had been achieved.

 

CBD redevelopment, based entirely on private financing, started in the middle fifties (the 1955 Republic Bank and Adolphus Tower) and, as in Atlanta, continued for two generations. The well-known Dallas Market Center opened in 1957. Atlanta’s Peachtree complex was matched by Dallas’s 1972 Reunion Project. Reunion Project sat on a fifty acre site, involved a luxury hotel. A ten acre public park, a civic center, parking, road and sewer, and was anchored by the 50 story Reunion Tower, and a restored Union Terminal Building. Financed by public and private bonds/mortgages, it opened in 1978[12]. The Dallas Central Library Project, a derivative of Jonsson and “Goals” constructed a research/public library placed Dallas in the “who’s who” of great world libraries. The net result was modern downtown nested in the midst of a growing, sprawling hinterland.

 

 

Establishing the DHA and its subsequent slum clearance/public housing activities suggests the outlines of a distinctive regional approach to that policy area. Despite today’s prevailing urban renewal paradigm, northern Big City slum removal/public housing affected both working class ethnic as well as African-American neighborhoods. Not until the early sixties did the “racial” consequences of urban renewal become paramount—and even then the racial segregation confronted was both informal and real estate/ financial in nature. In the South racial segregation was all that—and embedded in law and custom as well. There was no obscuring veneer hiding race dynamics and slum removal/public housing in the South; it was evident from the start of the Age of Urban Renewal. Norfolk’s experience, befuddled as it was with machine/reformer and temporary federal war housing dynamics—but evidenced a strong ambiguity toward federal leadership. Atlanta, with its strong Progressive-like traditions, embraced federal programs but used them to fit, not challenge, existing segregation and when given the chance abandoned public housing for almost two decades in favor of CDB redevelopment.

During the 1950’s/1960’s (and after), individual members of the Dallas-based corporate elite, some associated with the Dallas Citizens Council, more than flirted with radical right political movements. Dallas acquired the epithet of “the city of hate” in stark contrast with Atlanta’s tag “too proud to hate”. The assassination of JFK[13], and Oswald, the linkage with Hinckley and his attempt on Reagan’ life stuck to Dallas for decades. Whatever that larger political/ideological motif, for the most part it does not seem to have affected the course Dallas followed during the Age of Urban Renewal. Dallas over the next generation broadly followed the path uncovered in our Atlanta case study. During the Age period, the Dallas Citizens Council, Chamber of Commerce and City Council dominated Dallas politics and economic development. Dallas corporate leadership was much more Privatist than Atlanta’s business elites, but the policy direction of both cities proceeded along the similar lines. These included attaining a competitive position in the national urban hierarchy achieved most by constructing a modern, world-class central business district. In both cases neighborhoods and housing were relatively neglected. Both gave up trying to stop decentralization and made their peace with a polycentric metropolitan area–in Dallas’s case, pursuing a more or less benign laissez-faire policy personified by  the 1972 Dallas/Ft Worth Metroplex and the 1974 Dallas-Fort Worth Airport.[14].

The Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex is the thirteen counties economic, cultural and tourist hub of north Texas. In 2010, it includes 6.5 million Texans and cites such as Dallas, Fort Worth, Arlington, Irving, Grapevine and Plano. It produces the sixth largest GMP in the United States and tenth in the world and home to four professional sports teams. It is served by the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, the second-largest in the nation. The airport, all 17,000 acres of it, is larger than Manhattan, with an architecture everyone loves to hate. But it allegedly, led to a billion dollar increase in land values and has sprouted all sorts of towns, commercial centers and every bit of economic development an airport is supposed to create[15].

 

The point of all this seeming advertisement is that the Metroplex may be America’s most successful regional recruitment and promotion initiative—ever. It was created and promoted by an alliance of businesses that formed the “North Texas Commission” back in 1971. The fact that is a “virtual” geography, little more than the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington Combined Statistical Area, gives way to create not only an image to the outside world, but an identity to its inhabitants. The word, a creation of adman Harve Chapman, just caught on and defined geography so well it continues and prospers a half-century later. Of course, it is a planner’s nightmare (it does have a COG behind it), but frankly it the Metroplex (natives say it should not be called that) is the best example of how central cities and their independent suburban boomburbs can prosper in a polycentric metro area. It is the living refutation that sprawl cannot work. [16]

 

As a final postscript to Dallas and the Age of Urban Renewal concerns the Dallas Citizens Council. This case study has argued that unique organization, and organizations that are associated with its leadership (the Chamber, Dallas Alliance and Central Business District Association) have exerted a formidable impact on Dallas economic development policy-making. As would be expected, the power and role of the Council has generated much controversy. Criticisms ranging from a dictatorship, a benevolent oligarchy, neo-liberal capitalists etc., are frequent. The deficiencies of its business, CBD, growth perspective are noted and considerable. Housing, neighborhoods, social services, anti-unionism, crime and inequality, are well-documented, supported by government statistics—and long-standing. That Dallas has a reputation for honesty and some efficiency may be meager compensation for large corporation noblesse oblige. The Dallas Citizens Council is very much alive while this section is being written. It is still a formal and formidable organization, with staff and membership—it, however, has been taken down a notch or two since the Age of Urban Renewal. In fact, a decline was noted in the election of Wes Wise to replace Jonsson in 1972. The DCA ability to control city council elections has been checked as minorities, neighborhoods, and prosperity possess some means and resources to compete. In that our model of economic development policy-making is quite sensitive to the role of business elites, it is important that we conclude comments with our sense that the Dallas Citizens Council is arguably the most sustained and effective Privatist EDO-related body observed to this point.

 

[1] At this point we reach a difficult juncture in the story line of our Dallas case study. The Cold War, anti-communism, McCarthyism and then onto John Birch and the Minute Man movements injected a strain of political behavior and opinion that made Dallas into the prototype of extremist politics in the minds of many. The assassination of JFK by Lee Harvey Oswald and his assassination by Jack Ruby in Dallas in 1963 cemented that image into place. The last years of the Age of Urban Renewal (1968, 1972) witnessed the rise of George Wallace and the American Independent Party and that injected an overtly racist tone into this image. Even our more narrow concern with economic development policy became tainted to some extent, as right to work legislation in this era touched on this style politics. The rise of the Sunbelt literature (discussed in a later chapter) further confused ideology, partisanship, and even morality into this discussion. Dallas business elites became associated with all this and to a considerable degree Dallas, and Texan economic development have spent the last half century living in the warm glow of being extreme right or radical right policies. Seymour Martin Lipset, the Radical Right (1955 and 1970) and Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (1964); John Birch Society founded in 1958

[2] Originally limited to 100 dues-paying members, by invitation only, the Council was non partisan, worked behind the scenes, often through the Chamber. It was what it was, but despite the image today was open to social programs, federal funds, held a conventional city efficient mentality. The Council was in no known way Progressive, but was as stereo-typical  business elite as America has seen. Sometimes the Council served as the arbiter between growth and order-which as we shall shortly describe, attempted to provide some benefit to Dallas African-American community in the name of order—not racial justice. The Council dominated municipal elections until the 1970’s.

[3] Rayburn represented Fannin County area, twelve miles from Oklahoma, and 68 miles from Dallas. An earlier resident was the infamous outlaw, John Wesley Hardin, and Joe Morgan, baseball Hall of Fame second baseman who played for nearly every professional baseball team in America, including Cincinnati where I watched him.

[4] Garner enjoyed the vice-presidential experience so well, that when asked to describe it he likened it to “a pitcher of warm spit”. Just thought you wanted to know.

[5] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., p. 144. Fairbanks quotes DHA minutes, November 8, 1938.

[6] David L. Cohn, “Dallas” Atlantic Monthly, October, 1940, pp. 453-60.

[7] Justin F. Kimball, “Our City: A Community Civics”, (Dallas, Kessler Plan Association of Dallas, 1927), p. 199. The Plan produced Dallas’s first comprehensive zoning ordinance

[8] In 1942, Dallas encompassed 42 sq miles; by 1970 it had grown 530% to 266 sq. miles. Fort Worth, however, was less aggressive and decentralization exerted a considerable impact on that city’s CBD, its retail sales falling from 39% (1940) to 11%  (1976). Annexation, however, did not stop the development of sizeable independent suburbs such as Arlington and Richardson. Dallas/Fort Worth succumbed to a polycentric metro area as did most Sunbelt cities. Arlington in 1950 had about 7,700 residents—in 1960 nearly 45,000, 1970-90,000 and 1980. 160,000. A boomburb, today more than 365,000, it shall be discussed in a later chapter. Richardson, a more muted version Arlington, was a bit less than1,300 in 1950 and  almost 17,000 by 1960.

[9] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., p. 151.

[10] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

[11] P. 173 Rice

[12] Fosler, pp. 248-258.

[13] The Citizens Council had cosponsored a lunch with Kennedy to counter the hostile treatment he received from the newspapers and TV, as well as outbursts from H. L. Hunt, and Congressman Alger. Council President Jonsson attempted to stop the hostile treatment as well. In subsequent years the Citizens Council distanced itself from the Far Right and its initiatives did not follow its themes.

[14] Two excellent period-based analyses which describe in more detail the specifics are: Martin V. Melosi, “Dallas-Fort Worth: Marketing the Metroplex”, in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice (Eds). Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since World War II (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 162-195; William E. Claggett, “Dallas: the Dynamics of Public-Private Cooperation”, in R. Scott Fosler and Renee A. Berger, Public-Private Partnership in American Cities (D. C. Heath and Company, 1982), pp. 163-200.

[15] Rice  p. 173.

[16] The Trinity River Corridor (Canal) Project  and the Trinity River Authority is yet another grandiose Texan project which has  a history dating well over a century. Originally intended to permit  the 700 mile plus Trinity River to serve as the central North Texas region’s access to the Gulf of Mexico, making inland Dallas a port city, is more than a one up of the Houston Ship Channel. In the meantime, it is a flood project by the Corps of Engineers, and for Fort Worth is a major initiative in developing the CBD and sustaining its vaunted prosperity and economic meaning into the 21st century. It  also hosts recreation sites, trails, nature centers and may be the largest “urban park” in the United States. The massiveness  and the duration of this project warrant at least a footnote. During the Age of Urban Renewal, several locks and dams were constructed and in 1955 the state established the Trinity River Authority which continues to this day.

End of Policy system cut

===============

Dallas-Fort Worth: Competition Makes Good Neighbors

Dallas and Fort Worth (about thirty-five miles apart), like Minneapolis-St Paul, have been joined at their respective hips since birth. Despite their geographical closeness, however, the two possess separate identities.  “Fort Worth—Cowtown’ —is ‘where the West begins [and Dallas] ‘the Big D’, is where the East runs out’”. Rivals, arguably until the 1974 opening of the Dallas-Fort Worth airport, both communities shared a business-economic development culture, yet were separated by different lifestyles and economic base. “They existed because their tenacious and aggressive founding fathers brought transportation facilities to them—by hook or crook. Dallas and Fort Worth were built by men with an intense desire for economic gain” (Melosi, 1983, p. 162).

 

Dallas founded in 1841, was, by 1870, the regional center/county seat. Its economy based on cotton, cattle, sheep/wool, wheat and hides. When the first railroad opened in 1873, the population was 3,000; by 1890 Dallas surpassed 40,000. By then rail linked Dallas to St. Louis and other Eastern cities. Fort Worth, on the other hand, an army post, was established in 1849. Its economy centered on the army and cattle. In 1873, its population had declined to 600. So local businessmen organized a campaign that by 1876 “bought” access to the Texas and Pacific Railroad; that railroad’s cattle yards did the rest. By 1890 Fort Worth had attracted over 23,000 residents.  Both cities in 1890 were essentially agricultural processing centers” (Dallas-cotton/Fort Worth-cattle/wheat) (Miller & Johnson, 1968, p. 18). In their first decades of meaningful economic life both had developed into solid, viable and distinctly separate regional economic/political centers, well-connected by rail to the outside world.

 

And then the story got interesting! The rivalry that developed between the two neighboring business elites proved to be as intense and long-standing as any in America. While Fort Worth was smaller, its growth rate was higher than Dallas. At the turn of the century it was anyone’s guess who would best the other. After 1900 Fort Worth mounted a determined and successful campaign to make Fort Worth a nationally important meat-packing center. Earlier In the 1890’s, Fort Worth’s Board of Trade attracted a meat packer to town—pretty logical given that a cattle trail brought cattle into town. To follow up in 1896, the Board of Trade held a Southwestern Exposition and Fat Stock Show (we did not make this up!) to market its emerging “cluster”. In 1901 the Board of Trade helped raise $100,000 cash on the barrel to bring in two additional meat packers—critters named Armour & Co and Swift & Co. In the lingo of the day, the $100,000 cash was called a “bonus” and bonuses were usually paid to industrial promoters or “site selectors”. Fort Worth’s subsequent growth (it grew 230% between 1904 and 1909) cemented The Board’s commitment to attraction and incentives as its core economic development approach. By 1914 these two facilities employed 5,000 workers, and by 1929 Fort Worth was the state’s largest meat-packing center—an industry outranked in Texas only by petroleum refining (Miller & Johnson, 1968, p. 18).

Not to worry about the shameful use of public and private incentives to attract companies–The Fort Worth Chamber quickly found redemption by hosting a 1909 conference of Texan chamber secretaries. At the conference, it righteously condemned cash bonuses to industrial promoters, expressing a desire “to run them out of the state” (Mead, 2014, p. 163). From that point on, Texas, I am told, has never used an incentive again—yes, Virginia there is a Santa Claus.

Dallas’s strategy, on the other hand, was to diversify its economic base. Building upon its 1880 strength, cotton processing, Dallas expanded that sector into the nation’s largest inland cotton center. From that sector, Dallas grew an agricultural machine-building sector into the second largest producer of farm machinery in the world (Humann, 1976, p. 28). Local investors funded the Praetorian Mutual Life Company (1898), Southwestern Life (1903) and Southland Life (1908) and, lo and behold, Dallas developed a home-brewed insurance sector. On top of that, Dallas banks working with the Chamber of Commerce “promoted [and financed] an ambitious interurban rail network radiating north and south out of Dallas. As lines progressed, representatives from the chamber made weekly excursions to every town now connected to Dallas to encourage economic ties to their city …. By 1906, Dallas was the state’s most important banking center. This campaign to make Dallas a financial powerhouse culminated in 1914 when the city won an intense competition with five rivals (including Fort Worth) to become the headquarters for the Eleventh District of the Federal Reserve” (Miller & Johnson, 1968, p. 19).

 

If sheer momentum generates its own fortune, Dallas was the unexpected beneficiary of Henry Ford’s unsolicited decision to locate a sales and service center in Dallas (1909—two employees). Since Dallas bought Ford’s cars, possessed a growing workforce, and Dallas’s banks were willing to finance Ford, a Ford assembly plant was built in 1913. Within a year it was replaced by yet a larger plant—and in 1925 a still larger facility. “During the twenties, Dallas became a significant industrial center, at least by southern standards. The number of manufacturing jobs doubled during the decade. Local boosters sought to solidify this boon by formally incorporating industrial development into their strategic planning. In 1928, the city’s financial leaders organized Industrial Dallas Inc., and raised five hundred thousand dollars to fund a four-year campaign to attract even more business. They did quite well” (Miller & Johnson, 1968, p. 19).

 

Dallas Inc., and Texas lore, have since alleged that a thousand companies came to Dallas during that campaign. Whatever! By 1930 Dallas had become the state’s third largest population center. “In retrospect, it appears that Dallas’s businesspeople won this race by adopting a more sophisticated approach to economic development than their adversaries had” (Miller & Johnson, 1968, p. 18).    Dallas’s sector diversification strategy beat out Fort Worth’s also successful strategy of cluster agglomeration.

 

Dallas City Beautiful

Planning in northern City Beautiful cities initially focused on parks. Louisville was as far south as Olmstead Sr. would go (ignoring North Carolina’s Biltmore). The City Beautiful movement with its preoccupation with parks and wide boulevards was less successful in the South, including Texas. Shrubs maybe, comprehensive plans no! City Beautiful’s best southern example arguably is Dallas Texas.

 

The Dallas Civic Improvement League formed in 1902 expressed the fond desire to make Dallas a “more beautiful place to live … [in that] in the whole civilized world there is no more slovenly community than Dallas”. The League’s program included park planning and a special park tax, but in a close referendum they were both rejected (Wilson, 1989, p. 257). The baton was picked up and carried to a successful conclusion by the COO of the Dallas Morning News, George P. Dealey, a close friend of Kansas City’s City Beautiful planner, George Kessler. Dealey enamored with the Harrisburg PA model of city beautiful, believed that community/business organization supportive of planning was a key lesson appropriate to Dallas. In January 1910, launching his newspaper campaign, he allied with the Dallas Chamber of Commerce to commence a “Crusade against Ugliness”. Outside speakers and a spearhead organization, the Dallas City Plan and Improvement League, also associated with the Chamber was formed.

 

Dealey wasted little time getting his friend Kessler on board. Kessler completed his plan in 1912, but its contents clearly revealed that Dallas City Beautiful was not to be a parks and boulevard initiative, nor even a civic center complex, but a city “practical or functional” program. Its intent was to clear up the mess made of downtown Dallas by uncoordinated, speculative, incremental development. Its most disruptive proposal was to remove “at grade” rail lines that made travel impossible and congestion inevitable. Another major feature was a Trinity River levee to protect the downtown floodplain from its periodic floods. Kessler also envisioned an industrial waterfront port. A third initiative was a unified downtown central railroad station that facilitated at grade rail way removals. Some park development, connecting boulevards and associated playgrounds were also included, but “Kessler scotched all talk of beautification, for this was to be a strictly utilitarian measure” (Wilson, 1989).

 

Significant elements of the plan, Union Station (1916) and the removal of the horrendous Texas and Pacific Railway tracks from the CBD were successfully implemented. But bonds for parks and boulevards were rejected. The Trinity River levees project was built into the 1927 Ulrickson Plan which, in an extended series of projects and bonds, completed the levees, along with parks, water/sewer, flood control, library expansion and an airport by 1938. Persistence does work apparently.

 

The Dealey-led effort culminated in the establishment of a bunch of downtown planning organizations (the Dallas Property Owners Association, the Central Improvement League of the Eastern District, a Chamber subsidiary (the Metropolitan Development Association) and the Kessler Planning Association. Planners were hired, as well as engineers, and through the 1920’s these organizations guided the development of downtown Dallas. By 1920’s end, however, sustained growth and an unwillingness of Dallas late 1920’s “populist” working class politicians (for example, J. Waddy Tate—the “hot dog mayor”) to follow ‘intrusive” planning advice isolated the KPA and it failed in 1932 (Wilson, 1989, pp. 254-78) ending the last of Dallas City Beautiful program.

 Dallas

When last we left 1920’s Dallas in Chapter 6 she had established herself as the regional leader in the competition with Ft. Worth. Earlier in this chapter, aggressive chamber-city government partnership seizing upon opportunities arising during the war years had aggressively acquired an aircraft industry of national scale to booster an already diversified economic base.. Politically, Dallas had put in place a commission form of government in 1907 (as had most of Texas, it seems), but after some dissatisfaction during the twenties replaced in with a city manager form in 1930, approving in the process charter reforms that enhanced and upgraded the capacity of its municipal government. In 1930, lacking any oil fields of its own, Dallas businessmen, H. L. Hunt  purchased a major East Texas oil field.[1]. The East Texas Oil Field was huge and it spun off local oil services and equipment firms, some machinery, and oil distribution companies. Dallas, in short, had developed a meaningful energy sector.

 

As we have come to expect charter reform was business-led, and the instrument of that set of initiatives, the Citizens Charter Association, fielded a set of business candidates for the city council. All nine were elected, the city manager hired and Dallas in the Age of Urban Renewal was in place. Times were tough, of course, all over in the Depression—Dallas was no exception. Hard times generated internal conflict and Dallas was looking for an opportunity to bust some urban hierarchy to let off some steam. The 1936 Texas Centennial provided the opening and in true Dallas-style turned a page in Texas history as well. Dallas, for those not from Texas and who did not read Chapter 6, was not even incorporated when Texas became a state in 1836. The city had no real or imagined claim to compete with the likes of San Antonio (the Alamo) or Houston whose namesake won the key battle that secured independence. Suffice it to say, armed with $3.5million, the Chamber went to the state legislature—and the rest, is history. Dallas was designated as the site.

 

Needing money to fix up the fair grounds to host the events, Dallas business leadership turned to New Deal Washington D. C. and obtained the necessary funds. That was because Dallas possessed a formidable political apparatus in New Deal Washington D.C. Banker R. L. Thornton had led the Centennial campaign and the effort had left him a bit frustrated. He was determined to set up a system and process that worked more efficiently than the Centennial campaign had. So in the best J. R. Ewing tradition, he got his powerful friends together (no doubt at the “Cattleman’s Club”) and created the “Dallas Citizens Council” [2]in 1937. This was meant to be a “vault-like” political-economic development power center which would operate through the Chamber and its selected and financed city council. In terms of the large corporation elites found in Chapters 9-11, this was the Dallas equivalent. That it came together a decade earlier, with no prod from decentralization, and achieved a political/economic dominance never attained up north, bespeaks Texan cities in the Age of Urban Renewal. It was the Dallas Citizens Council that provided much of the muscle and determination that sent the Chamber off to recruit the aircraft firms, and federal war production contracts discussed earlier in this chapter. This is the group that stiffened the spine of Dallas when the North American Aviation complex emptied out at war’s end.

 

Anyway in Washington, Jesse Jones (from Houston) was FDR’s influential Reconstruction Finance Administration chair. He secured appointment for two Texan board directors on its Defense Plant Corporation (that made decisions/loans to locate privately-owned war production factories the pivotal instrument implementing the industrial decentralization initiative. One of them, Thomas W. Griffiths, hailed from Dallas. With a large and growing Democratic Texas delegation in Congress, the state was well-positioned in DC. In fact, in September 1940, Sam Rayburn[3], the Democratic majority leader became Speaker of the House of Representatives (he held that position whenever Democrats controlled Congress until he died in 1961). He was a wonderful supplement to John Nance Garner[4], FDR’s vice-president—also from Texas. During the New Deal years, Dallas picked up nearly $4 million from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration for the unemployed, secured the only Public Works Administration public housing project in Texas (built on vacant land adjoining the CBD for whites only). In 1937, the Council approved the formation of the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) to take advantage of the slum removal public housing programs authorized in the Housing Act of 1937. Dallas was ready and willing to participate in the Age of Urban Renewal.

 

Establishing the DHA and its subsequent slum clearance/public housing activities suggests the outlines of a distinctive regional approach to that policy area. Despite today’s prevailing urban renewal paradigm, northern Big City slum removal/public housing affected both working class ethnic as well as African-American neighborhoods. Not until the early sixties did the “racial” consequences of urban renewal become paramount—and even then the racial segregation confronted was both informal and real estate/ financial in nature. In the South racial segregation was all that—and embedded in law and custom as well. There was no obscuring veneer hiding race dynamics and slum removal/public housing in the South; it was evident from the start of the Age of Urban Renewal. Norfolk’s experience, befuddled as it was with machine/reformer and temporary federal war housing dynamics—but evidenced a strong ambiguity toward federal leadership. Atlanta, with its strong Progressive-like traditions, embraced federal programs but used them to fit, not challenge, existing segregation and when given the chance abandoned public housing for almost two decades in favor of CDB redevelopment. Dallas, as Privatist a stronghold as any in the nation ,bought into federal programs, but used them to reinforce already segregated neighborhoods and housing. But in Dallas’s case, it backfired.

 

The DHA commenced a major slum removal/public housing project almost immediately after its formation. By 1938, DHA had designated its first neighborhood project (Hall-Thomas area) “because this [area] has definitely been established as a negro area, and it is the desire and the intention of the city that it remain one”.[5] As its inaugural slum removal/public housing project, Dallas, its business elites, and the DHA intended 1937 Housing Act funds to maintain segregation—by improving housing and conditions in an African-American neighborhood. With better opportunities available, African-Americans would, it was felt, have less motivation to expand into white neighborhoods. There was a second motivation as well. Harkening back to the 1910 (Kessler) city plan, and reinforced by a well-received 1940 Atlantic Monthly[6] article, perceived rundown African-American slums “as a canker or eating sore” on Dallas. “The rest of our city can no more live and grow and prosper with such a condition, then our body can be well when it has an angry, bleeding, inflamed sore … so will the city … suffer the penalty for bad housing conditions among any large group of its population”.[7]

 

After two years of law suits, the project started in 1940 with 266 structures demolished and 400 families displaced. The lack of alternative places to go, amid a crushing African-American housing crisis, however, immediately generated pressure on adjacent white neighborhoods. Over the next nine months, intermittent violence, including thirteen bombings against Blacks destabilized neighborhoods and city politics. Demolishing houses to construct future housing involved an inevitable time lag into which pour all the intense frustration and fear that segregation created. That lesson was not lost on Dallas elites; slum removal/public housing was risky and volatile. Moreover, by the time emotions subsided, Dallas was in the midst of war production growth described above, and the need to find housing for those who filled these jobs. By 1942, as noted earlier, federal funding for low-income housing was zeroed out. Slum removal and public housing fell off  the policy agenda.

 

The Dallas Master Plan of 1945, promoted by both the city council and the Dallas Citizens Council, reopened this can of worms. Harland Bartholomew & Associates plan followed the themes of most plans of this era. The thrust of this comprehensive plan was to unify the metropolitan area (especially its suburbs) by connecting its various parts to the center, the CBD. Transportation upgrading and automobile access were paramount initiatives. A rebuild, attractive and modern CBD was the magnet that need to be created. Central city primacy and metropolitan economic growth became linked in this paradigm. The Plan included an aggressive annexation program[8] which when completed by the end of the forties, nearly doubled the land area of Dallas. Housing and neighborhoods, especially African-American neighborhoods were the focus on the Master Plan as well (Report 10). Report 10 urged the development of sound and vibrant neighborhoods, for all residents, reflecting much of the earlier thinking of Clarence Perry (who with Mumford were now metropolitan housers). There is no evidence that Report 10 was meant to be a challenge to segregation, rather, it was meant, as in the past, to reinforce it. Proposals, using FHA financing, followed.

 

So once again in 1949, the Dallas Chamber, the Citizens Council, the Dallas Homebuilders Association, and the City Council combined, in response to the 1949 Housing Act, to a new burst of public housing—principally for African-Americans—to be used to reinforce existing neighborhood-based segregated housing patterns. The Dallas Citizens Council publically in 1950 urged DHA to construct 1,500 units of public housing for African-Americans within the next year and half.[9] During this period racial violence in areas adjoining minority neighborhoods increased dramatically. Slum removal and public housing construction was intended by the business elites to ameliorate the explosive and violent expansion of minority neighborhoods into white areas. Between 1950 and 1954, DHA completed six projects (4,000 units for African-Americans and 1,500 units for whites). “With the completion of the West Dallas [Project, built on annexed land] in April 1954, the DHA ceased building public housing until the 1970’s.[10] During the 1950’s the tone of Dallas city politics was noticeably changing.

 

During the 1950’s/1960’s (and after), individual members of the Dallas-based corporate elite, some associated with the Dallas Citizens Council, more than flirted with radical right political movements[11]. Dallas acquired the epithet of “the city of hate” in stark contrast with Atlanta’s tag “too proud to hate”. The assassination of JFK[12], and Oswald, the linkage with Hinckley and his attempt on Reagan’ life stuck to Dallas for decades. Whatever that larger political/ideological motif, for the most part it does not seem to have affected the course Dallas followed during the Age of Urban Renewal. Dallas over the next generation broadly followed the path uncovered in our Atlanta case study. During the Age period, the Dallas Citizens Council, Chamber of Commerce and City Council dominated Dallas politics and economic development. Dallas corporate leadership was much more Privatist than Atlanta’s business elites, but the policy direction of both cities proceeded along the similar lines. These included attaining a competitive position in the national urban hierarchy achieved most by constructing a modern, world-class central business district. In both cases neighborhoods and housing were relatively neglected. Both gave up trying to stop decentralization and made their peace with a polycentric metropolitan area–in Dallas’s case, pursuing a more or less benign laissez-faire policy personified by  the 1972 Dallas/Ft Worth Metroplex and the 1974 Dallas-Fort Worth Airport.[13].

 

The Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex is the thirteen county economic, cultural and tourist hub of north Texas. In 2010, it includes 6.5 million Texans and cites such as Dallas, Fort Worth, Arlington, Irving, Grapevine and Plano. It produces the sixth largest GMP in the United States and tenth in the world and home to four professional sports teams. It is served by the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, the second-largest in the nation. The airport, all 17,000 acres of it, is larger than Manhattan, with an architecture everyone loves to hate. But it allegedly, led to a billion dollar increase in land values and has sprouted all sorts of towns, commercial centers and every bit of economic development an airport is supposed to create[14].

 

The point of all this seeming advertisement is that the Metroplex may be America’s most successful regional recruitment and promotion initiative—ever. It was created and promoted by an alliance of businesses that formed the “North Texas Commission” back in 1971. The fact that is a “virtual” geography, little more than the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington Combined Statistical Area, gives way to create not only an image to the outside world, but an identity to its inhabitants. The word, a creation of adman Harve Chapman, just caught on and defined a geography so well it continues and prospers a half-century later. Of course, it is a planner’s nightmare (it does have a COG behind it), but frankly it the Metroplex (natives say it should not be called that) is the best example of how central cities and their independent suburban boomburbs can prosper in a polycentric metro area. It is the living refutation that sprawl cannot work.

 

The fact that Dallas CBD-focused physical redevelopment consciously used no federal urban renewal money has resulted in much comment in later years. Neither did Houston, San Diego, Salt Lake City or Phoenix. Most Sunbelt cities were wary of federal intervention, requirements and mandates. For most of the 1960’s, while the federal government advocated New Frontier and Great Society social and civil rights priorities, federal programs made southerners and businessmen bristle. Nixon revenue-sharing federalism was easier to take and even Dallas tempered its hostility to the federal government during those years. Both Atlanta and Dallas business elites adopted a moderate accommodative posture toward integration and school desegregation. In Dallas the Citizens Council set up the tri-racial Dallas Alliance which proved reasonably successful in navigating Dallas through those turbulent years. The sixties riots missed these cities.

 

Atlanta’s Mayor Allen found his counterpart in Dallas. Mayor Erik Jonsson, elected for three terms (1964-1971), the former founder and Chair of Texas Instruments, promulgated his “Goals for Dallas”, a systems approach to city governance. “Goals” was probably the closest thing to a comprehensive plan that Dallas had seen since 1945[15], based on systems efficiency and stressing physical not social programs. There was no mistaking “Goals” for the Great Society and it might be fair to offer that the strengths of one were the weaknesses of the other. Housing, especially in minority neighborhoods was in crisis during these years and in Dallas one could find some of the most distressing housing units and neighborhoods the nation could offer.

 

A leader in the regeneration and the sustenance of the CBD was  the 1958 formation of the Central Business District Association, which today is Downtown Dallas (after several mergers). Not without its faults and limitations, congestion, open space, aesthetics and parking for instance, the CBD that resulted from a host of commercial and office projects raises the question of how such a vibrant central city CBD can thrive within a sprawled Metroplex metropolitan area. The answer has to be metropolitan-wide growth[16], population and economic, that allowed the CBD to be so successful. If so, the core goal of the Dallas Citizens Council, that growth sufficient to place Dallas among the nation’s largest metro areas, had been achieved.

 

CBD redevelopment, based entirely on private financing, started in the middle fifties (the 1955 Republic Bank and Adolphus Tower) and, as in Atlanta, continued for two generations. The well-known Dallas Market Center opened in 1957. Atlanta’s Peachtree complex was matched by Dallas’s 1972 Reunion Project. Reunion Project sat on a fifty acre site, involved a luxury hotel. A ten acre public park, a civic center, parking, road and sewer, and was anchored by the 50 story Reunion Tower, and a restored Union Terminal Building. Financed by public and private bonds/mortgages, it opened in 1978[17]. The Dallas Central Library Project, a derivative of Jonsson and “Goals” constructed a research/public library placed Dallas in the “who’s who” of great world libraries. The net result was modern downtown nested in the midst of a growing, sprawling hinterland.

 

As a final postscript to Dallas and the Age of Urban Renewal concerns the Dallas Citizens Council. This case study has argued that unique organization, and organizations that are associated with its leadership (the Chamber, Dallas Alliance and Central Business District Association) have exerted a formidable impact on Dallas economic development policy-making. As would be expected, the power and role of the Council has generated much controversy. Criticisms ranging from a dictatorship, a benevolent oligarchy, neo-liberal capitalists etc., are frequent. The deficiencies of its business, CBD, growth perspective are noted and considerable. Housing, neighborhoods, social services, anti-unionism, crime and inequality, are well-documented, supported by government statistics—and long-standing. That Dallas has a reputation for honesty and some efficiency may be meager compensation for large corporation noblesse oblige. The Dallas Citizens Council is very much alive while this section is being written. It is still a formal and formidable organization, with staff and membership—it, however, has been taken down a notch or two since the Age of Urban Renewal. In fact, a decline was noted in the election of Wes Wise to replace Jonsson in 1972. The DCA ability to control city council elections has been checked as minorities, neighborhoods, and prosperity possess some means and resources to compete. In that our model of economic development policy-making is quite sensitive to the role of business elites, it is important that we conclude comments with our sense that the Dallas Citizens Council is arguably the most sustained and effective Privatist EDO-related body observed to this point.

[1] When he died he was alleged to have been the world’s richest man. In the meantime, he was a powerful fund-raiser for the Republican Party—a through conservative, three wives, many children—and the image and role model for the famous, J. R. Ewing of “Dallas” TV show fame.

[2] Originally limited to 100 dues-paying members, by invitation only, the Council was non partisan, worked behind the scenes, often through the Chamber. It was what it was, but despite the image today was open to social programs, federal funds, held a conventional city efficient mentality. The Council was in no known way Progressive, but was as stereo-typical  a business elite as America has seen. Sometimes the Council served as the arbiter between growth and order-which as we shall shortly describe, attempted to provide some benefit to Dallas African-American community in the name of order—not racial justice. The Council dominated municipal elections until the 1970’s.

[3] Rayburn represented Fannin County area, twelve miles from Oklahoma, and 68 miles from Dallas. An earlier resident was the infamous outlaw, John Wesley Hardin, and Joe Morgan, baseball Hall of Fame second baseman who played for nearly every professional baseball team in America, including Cincinnati where I watched him.

[4] Garner enjoyed the vice-presidential experience so well, that when asked to describe it he likened it to “a pitcher of warm spit”. Just thought you wanted to know.

[5] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., p. 144. Fairbanks quotes DHA minutes, November 8, 1938.

[6] David L. Cohn, “Dallas” Atlantic Monthly, October, 1940, pp. 453-60.

[7] Justin F. Kimball, “Our City: A Community Civics”, (Dallas, Kessler Plan Association of Dallas, 1927), p. 199. The Plan produced Dallas’s first comprehensive zoning ordinance

[8] In 1942, Dallas encompassed 42 sq miles; by 1970 it had grown 530% to 266 sq. miles. Fort Worth, however, was less aggressive and decentralization exerted a considerable impact on that city’s CBD, its retail sales falling from 39% (1940) to 11%  (1976). Annexation, however, did not stop the development of sizeable independent suburbs such as Arlington and Richardson. Dallas/Fort Worth succumbed to a polycentric metro area as did most Sunbelt cities. Arlington in 1950 had about 7,700 residents—in 1960 nearly 45,000, 1970-90,000 and 1980. 160,000. A boomburb, today more than 365,000, it shall be discussed in a later chapter. Richardson, a more muted version Arlington, was a bit less than1,300 in 1950 and  almost 17,000 by 1960.

[9] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., p. 151.

[10] Robert B. Fairbanks, Dallas in the 1940’s, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

[11] At this point we reach a difficult juncture in the story line of our Dallas case study. The Cold War, anti-communism, McCarthyism and then onto John Birch and the Minute Man movements injected a strain of political behavior and opinion that made Dallas into the prototype of extremist politics in the minds of many. The assassination of JFK by Lee Harvey Oswald and his assassination by Jack Ruby in Dallas in 1963 cemented that image into place. The last years of the Age of Urban Renewal (1968, 1972) witnessed the rise of George Wallace and the American Independent Party and that injected an overtly racist tone into this image. Even our more narrow concern with economic development policy became tainted to some extent, as right to work legislation in this era touched on this style politics. The rise of the Sunbelt literature (discussed in a later chapter) further confused ideology, partisanship, and even morality into this discussion. Dallas business elites became associated with all this and to a considerable degree Dallas, and Texan economic development have spent the last half century living in the warm glow of being extreme right or radical right policies. Seymour Martin Lipset, the Radical Right (1955 and 1970) and Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (1964); John Birch Society founded in 1958

[12] The Citizens Council had cosponsored a lunch with Kennedy to counter the hostile treatment he received from the newspapers and TV, as well as outbursts from H. L. Hunt, and Congressman Alger. Council President Jonsson attempted to stop the hostile treatment as well. In subsequent years the Citizens Council distanced itself from the Far Right and its initiatives did not follow its themes.

[13] Two excellent period-based analyses which describe in more detail the specifics are: Martin V. Melosi, “Dallas-Fort Worth: Marketing the Metroplex”, in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice (Eds). Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since World War II (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 162-195; William E. Claggett, “Dallas: the Dynamics of Public-Private Cooperation”, in R. Scott Fosler and Renee A. Berger, Public-Private Partnership in American Cities (D. C. Heath and Company, 1982), pp. 163-200.

[14] Rice  p. 173.

[15] P. 173 Rice

[16] The Trinity River Corridor (Canal) Project  and the Trinity River Authority is yet another grandiose Texan project which has  a history dating well over a century. Originally intended to permit  the 700 mile plus Trinity River to serve as the central North Texas region’s access to the Gulf of Mexico, making inland Dallas a port city, is more than a one up of the Houston Ship Channel. In the meantime, it is a flood project by the Corps of Engineers, and for Fort Worth is a major initiative in developing the CBD and sustaining its vaunted prosperity and economic meaning into the 21st century. It  also hosts recreation sites, trails, nature centers and may be the largest “urban park” in the United States. The massiveness  and the duration of this project warrants at least a footnote. During the Age of Urban Renewal, several locks and dams were constructed and in 1955 the state established the Trinity River Authority which continues to this day.

[17] Fosler, pp. 248-258.

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